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Abstract: Marriage, Contract, and the State
This thesis is a work o f applied moral and political philosophy which analyses 
the moral value o f marriage and argues for a restructuring o f the legal institution of 
marriage in accordance with principles o f justice.
The first section contains exegesis and criticism o f Kant’s and Hegel’s 
accounts of marriage. Kant’s focus is on the contractual exchange o f rights, Hegel’s 
on the nature of the relationship between the spouses. In the second section, I 
consider Kantian, Hegelian, and eudaimonistic accounts o f the moral value of 
marriage and conclude that moral value is found in the relationship between the 
spouses, not in the rights established through the marriage contract. In order to 
defend the position that loving relationships have moral value, I elucidate what moral 
value love for a particular other has within a universalist ethics. While I argue that 
marriage has no moral value which is not to be found in such relationships, I defend a 
Hegelian account which locates social value in the institution o f marriage precisely 
because it promotes such relationships.
In the final section, I argue that the principle o f liberal neutrality requires that 
the principle o f freedom of contract should apply to marriage. While I defend the 
institution o f marriage against certain feminist criticisms, I also argue that justice 
requires that the state recognize same-sex and polygamous unions as marriages. 
Freedom of contract may be limited under certain conditions in the interest of gender 
equality: I argue for an interpretation o f Rawls’ principle o f  equal opportunity which 
entails that liberalism is committed to addressing gender inequality even at the 
expense o f freedom of contract.
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INTRODUCTION: MARRIAGE, CONTRACT, AND THE STATE
1. Defining characteristics of marriage
2. Moral and political questions
Marriage occupies an uneasy place in historical, and to some extent 
contemporary, moral and political philosophy. On the one hand, marriage has been 
regarded, popularly and by philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, as a morally 
valuable institution. On the other hand, marriage and the family have been 
mechanisms, if not the mainstay, of the oppression of women. These roles are 
interdependent: historically, philosophical defences or accounts o f the moral value of  
marriage have presupposed, or attempted to justify, patriarchal values.^ 
Wollstonecrafi:, Mill, Thompson, and other early and late feminists have criticised the 
injustices which accompanied marriage for women. In The Subjection o f  Women, 
Mill drew a sustained comparison between marriage and slavery: “no slave is a slave 
to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is.”^
In this thesis, I will defend an account of the moral value o f marriage and the 
rationale of marriage legislation which is compatible with feminism. I will also 
present a detailed account of how justice requires marriage legislation to be 
structured. Before developing these objectives, I will discuss the definition of 
marriage.
1. Defining characteristics of marriage
 ^ See Okin 1979, Parts I-III, on Aristotle and Rousseau on women and marriage. Pateman 1988 
discusses women and marriage in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Pufendorf, Kant, and Hegel, among 
others.
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Introduction: Marriage, Contract, and the State
First, marriage is a socially specific institution. My account of marriage is not 
of an ahistorical, unchanging entity, but rather the modem institution of marriage in 
contemporary liberal societies. This institution has legal, social, ‘ and religious 
dimensions. The major religions defend definite marital structures and provide 
interpretations of the meaning and value o f the institution. Socially, there is a 
profusion o f understandings of the practice of marriage. These include the 
understanding o f monogamous heterosexual marriage in biological terms as the 
natural evolutionary unit, and the understanding of marriage in social and political 
terms as the smallest form of human association, which marks off the private from the 
public realm. Historically, marriage was motivated by the need to shore up property- 
owning dynasties, ensuring that power and property remained in the family. Marxist 
and feminist theorists continue to see the operation of power relations in the 
institution of marriage.  ^ Finally, the dominant contemporary understanding, 
developed in the nineteenth century, is of marriage as a partnership, or the ideal o f  
companionate marriage."* These different rationales of marriage have produced 
controversy over the right understanding of marriage, its social role, and legislation 
concerning it, including questions about same-sex marriage, pre-nuptial agreements, 
and the social effects of divorce and unmarried cohabitation.
In this thesis, I will define marriage in terms of the essential features shared by 
all the various conceptions of marriage. Insofar as it is possible to speak of the social 
institution of marriage (as distinct from the legal or any particular religious 
institution), a broad but coherent definition can be based on the shared elements of 
social understandings of marriage. To this end, I will identify the underlying 
characteristics of marriage. Marriage is constituted by an intimate relationship 
between adults. Generally, marriage is understood to be a relationship between two
2 Mill [1869], p. 33.
 ^ See Engels [1891], Chapter II.
"* For a discussion of the development of modern marriage, see Shorter 1976, pp. 227-254.
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adults. However, polygamy is practised and recognised by many groups as a form of 
marriage. Similarly, marriage has been traditionally understood as consisting of one 
man and one woman and this is its legal form. However, many groups agitate for the 
extension of legal recognition as marriages to relationships between persons o f the 
same sex. The concept of marriage as an intimate relationship between unrelated 
adults persists through these structural changes. Although there is resistance to the 
call for legalisation of same-sex marriage, it is evident in what sense such 
relationships can be understood as marriages.
Defining marriage by the features of the relationship it involves, rather than a 
fixed structure (such as monogamy or heterosexuality), is justified for two reasons. 
First, some groups claim the status of marriage for polygamy and same-sex 
marriages. There are widely held understandings of marriage which allow these 
structural changes. To define marriage as monogamous and heterosexual avoids 
addressing the question of whether other relationships should legally count as 
marriages. Second, even within the structure of monogamous heterosexual marriage, 
ideas about structure differ. For instance, there are disagreements between various 
religions on divorce and the roles of wife and husband. Defining marriage in terms of 
the emotional features of marriage relationships includes these various conceptions of 
marriage. Although there are competing conceptions of marriage, an inclusive, 
unified definition is possible.
The features characteristic of marriage are a loving or affectionate 
relationship, and, further, a relationship which is life-defining. ‘Life-defining’ here 
involves various criteria. The relationship is placed at the centre of the spouses’ 
emotional life and forms part of their identity or self-definition. Their other goals and 
plans are affected by it. There is a commitment to continuing the relationship, shared 
daily life and domicile (through most of the period of marriage), and a presumption of 
exclusivity or at least priority for this relationship over other relationships. Finally, in
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contrast to familial relationships, the other spouse is actively chosen. These 
characteristics reflect the dominant modem ideal of marriage as companionate.^
Marriage also involves the external aspect of formal legal or religious 
recognition. Loving, life-defining relationships are essential to the concept of 
marriage, but marriages, as distinct from the entire class of such relationships, are 
constituted by some formal recognition. Where specific religious recognition is at 
issue, requirements for marriage may be much narrower than the essential 
characteristics I have described (heterosexual monogamy, for example). But I will 
argue that legal recognition of marriage should be extended to all relationships which 
fit the broad definition o f marriage which I have given. While my definition of 
marriage may be rejected by those who hold that only heterosexual monogamous 
relationships can qualify as marriages, this does not affect the argument o f my thesis. 
First, I shall argue in Chapter V that the legal understanding o f marriage should be 
drawn from features on which there is wide agreement. Legal recognition should not 
be extended only to a contested conception o f marriage. Second, my account o f the 
moral value of marriage focuses on the qualities of affection and life-definingness, 
which belong to heterosexual monogamous relationships as well as same-sex or 
polygamous marriages. In Chapter III and IV, I will explain why these qualities are 
the source of the moral value of marriage.
Several objections to my definition must be discussed. First, it might be 
objected that my definition of marriage applies to some friendships as well. One may 
have many friendly relationships which are affectionate and life-defining but are not 
marriages. However, the condition of life-definingness is strong enough to rule most 
friendships out. In the cases of intense, life-defining friendships which fall within my 
definition of marriage, the extension of legal recognition seems acceptable if desired 
by the parties. It might be thought that sexual intimacy is a necessary constituent of 
marriage. However, as a legal condition, this seems unjustified as well as difficult for
See footnote 4.
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the law to determine. Further, marriages where spouses are not sexually intimate are 
recognisably marriages.
Sex and reproduction are associated with marriage, but neither is necessary or 
essential to it. Relationships not including either constituent are currently recognised, 
both formally and informally, as marriages.  ^ In this thesis, I will discuss marriage 
wholly in terms o f the relationship between spouses, making little reference to 
reproduction. This is for several reasons: first, not all marriages result in children. I 
am interested in the moral and legal status o f marriages as distinct from families. 
Second, the rights and interests o f children, as well as the nature of parent-child 
relationships, complicate the issue beyond what I can discuss in this space. There is 
more to be said, both regarding moral value and state legislation, about marriages 
with children. However, that is not the topic o f this thesis. I am interested in what 
marriages with and without children have in common. Even in marriages with 
children, marriages ojfien pre-exist and outlast the term of child-rearing. Finally, 
child-birth and child-raising takes place, and increasingly so, outside marriage. Thus, 
the topics are not co-extensive.
2. Moral and political questions
The first topic I will discuss is the moral value of marriage. There are two 
distinct ways in which marriage could be morally valuable. One account focuses on 
its institutional structure, that is, the contract and the formal exchange of rights and 
responsibilities which distinguish marriages from other similar relationships. The 
second focuses on the relationship between the individuals, a type of relationship 
which does not share extension with marriage. Marriages can lack this relationship, 
and it can exist outside marriages.
S3
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The first account is exemplified by Kant’s, in which the moral value of 
marriage depends on the legal structure. The contractual exchange of rights is the 
source o f the moral value of marriage, and this value cannot be found in loving sexual 
relationships outside marriage — in fact, these are morally impermissible. The second 
account is represented by Hegel’s, in which the value of marriage is found in the 
ethical love between the spouses. Hegel argues, implausibly, that ethical love could 
not occur outside marriage. In Chapters I and II, I will discuss Hegel’s and Kant’s 
accounts in detail. In Chapters III and IV, I will argue that the value of marriage is 
found in the type of relationship characteristic of it, but that this value can also be 
found in similar relationships not formalised as marriages.
This account of the moral value of marriage will provide a rationale for state 
recognition o f marriages. One might ask why a liberal state is justified in extending 
recognition to marriages. I will argue that the legal institution o f marriage serves a 
valuable purpose, that of promoting such relationships, which is justified as a 
legitimate purpose for the state in terms of social stability. Since the institution of  
marriage can be maintained only through state recognition, state legislation is 
justified. This raises the question of how marriage should be legislated.
Historically, philosophers have argued that the principles o f justice applicable 
in the public sphere are not applicable to family life, that family life should be 
regulated instead by love. Susan Moller Okin shows that the family has been 
portrayed as “beyond justice.” Within it, according to Hume, Hegel, and Rousseau 
among others, principles of justice are unnecessary and so do not apply.  ^ In the past, 
this argument has licensed a (theoretically) benign paternalism on the part of the 
husband. Feminists have argued that principles of justice must apply within the family 
as well and that individuals do not lose their rights within the family. However, 
contemporaiy communitarians challenge the application of principles of justice within
 ^By ‘informally’, I mean that the formalisation of such relationships as marriages is socially 
accepted.
2 See Okin 1982, and 1989 Chapter 2.
Introduction: Marriage, Contract, and the State vii
the family. In Chapter IV, I will argue that love between spouses is compatible with 
their possession o f rights against each other and that love is only o f moral value in the 
context of rights and justice. The standards of justice between individuals are not 
superseded by marital roles.
In addition, I will argue that marriage, as a legal institution, should be 
structured in compliance with liberal principles of justice in a liberal state. Liberal 
neutrality between conceptions o f the good should apply to marriage legislation. The 
legal institution of marriage is a basic structure o f society, to which the principles o f  
justice apply. Of course the state should not force religions to practice liberal 
neutrality in their celebrations of marriage. But marriage law, as the law regulating a 
major social institution, must be governed by justice.^ There is no justification for the 
state to act unjustly in legislating one of the basic structures o f society. This means, 
as I will argue, that no conception o f the good marriage should be privileged 
(Chapter V), and that insofar as the liberal state is committed to addressing gender 
inequality (as I will argue that it is), marriage legislation must address this (Chapter 
VI).
While marriage law has steadily improved — from the feminist point-of-view - 
- in liberal societies since the 19th century, new feminist criticisms o f marriage, the 
family, and heterosexual relationships have developed. A crucial conceptual tool in 
feminism since the 1970’s has been the theory o f patriarchy, or how various and 
apparently non-political social structures, including marriage, operate to oppress 
women. ^  In light o f this, feminist considerations o f what justice between the sexes 
will require have altered. While one school of feminism continues to seek the 
application of principles of justice to relations between the sexes, another questions 
how far liberal ideals o f justice, equality, and liberty can be effective as feminist tools.
 ^Rawls 1971, p. 7, gives the monogamous family as an example of a basic structure to which justice 
applies. Rawls however is notoriously unclear and ambiguous on the application of justice to the 
family: see Munoz-Dardé 1998.
 ^See for example Figes 1970.
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and whether they might in fact even subvert the feminist agenda. In Chapter VI, I 
will respond to some o f these claims by arguing that liberalism is committed to 
pursuing feminist goals.
Issues concerning the moral and legal nature of contract are unfortunately too complex to be 
treated in this thesis.
CHAPTER I: KANT’S CONTRACTUAL ACCOUNT OF MARRIAGE
1. Kant’s moral argument for marriage
2. Why Kant’s solution fails
3. Kant’s prudential argument for marriage
4. A better solution
5. Contract and marriage: Hegel’s charges against Kant
6. Developing Kant’s account
This chapter has three main objectives. First, I will develop a question which 
will recur later in the thesis: if marriage is a moral institution, what exactly is its moral 
significance, and in what does its moral value originate? Here I will give an 
exposition of Kant’s answer to that question, and raise some problems with it. 
Second, I will draw attention to a morally problematic aspect of sex. Again, this 
theme will be taken up in a later discussion of the moral value of marriage. Finally, I 
will begin to study the notion of a contractual account of marriage by looking at 
Hegel’s criticisms of the contractual account given by Kant,
Kant dealt with marriage primarily in the Lectures on Ethics (ca. 1780) and 
Part 1 of The Metaphysics o f Morals, the Doctrine of Right (1797). His discussion 
of marriage — in which he describes the source and the content of its moral value — is 
influenced by two other concerns. First, the Doctrine o f Right is an investigation o f  
property rights over external objects, and the role of the state in creating them. The 
discussion of marriage occurs in a context of explaining how individuals are morally 
connected to property so as to exclude others from its use. Such a connection is 
necessary for persons to act on the world, since possession of external objects is 
“[t]he subjective condition of any possible use.”  ^ If rightful power to use objects did
 ^Kant [1797], p. 245 (following the page numbering of the standard German edition of Kant’s 
works); italics tiiroughout belong to the original unless otlierwise noted. The arrangement of tlie
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not exist, then '^usable objects [would be placed] beyond any possibility o f being 
used''^ The existence of property rights depends on the existence of a state, since a 
body empowered by common agreement must enforce them and settle disputes/ The 
coercive power of the state is therefore justified as enabling, rather than encroaching 
on, freedom. The creation of property rights permits the exercise of freedom through 
the rightful use of objects, an exercise which would be impossible without the state. 
Only through the state can right — in which “the freedom o f choice o f each can 
coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” — be realised."^  
In this context, the discussion of marriage is shaped by the agenda of explaining how 
rights like rights of possession are held by spouses over each other, and why state 
legislation of marriage is morally necessary. Why marriage right, like property right, 
should be a moral requirement is explained by the second theme which motivates 
Kant’s account of marriage: the morally problematic nature o f sex.
Kant’s thinking on marriage is profoundly influenced by his perception of sex, 
and sexual desire, as fundamentally immoral. The immorality intrinsic to sexual 
desire and sexual relations stems from the tendency to objectification, use o f another 
as a thing, and exploitation. Kant’s analysis of these faults is distinct from, although 
suggestive of, contemporary feminist claims that sex involves the exploitation or use 
of women, or the claim that sex is immoral where power relations are unequal. 
Kant’s discussion is based on general claims about human nature rather than gender 
relations. Yet there is some ambiguity in his analysis, and I shall suggest later that 
gender inequality acted upon his moral imagination in this context. The claim he 
explicitly makes, however, is that objectification and use of another as a thing are 
intrinsic to sex and sexual desire, and that sex without benefit of a marriage contract 
is exploitative.
text differs in Ladd 1965. See “Translator’s note” in Kant 1996. I will follow Gregor’s 
arrangement.
 ^Kant [1797], p. 250.
 ^ See Kant [1797], pp. 311-2. Acquisition may be in accordance with right in tlie state of nature, 
but the right is still only provisional.
 ^Kant [1797], p. 230.
Chapter I; Kant’s Contractual Account of Marriage
1. Kant’s moral argument for marriage
In Kant's account, marriage is a contract both necessitated and sealed by the 
sexual act. Both contract and sex are central to marriage. Kant writes that a 
marriage exists only if a contract has been made and sexual relations have occurred:
Acquisition o f a wife or of a husband ... takes place neither ... by 
intercourse without a contract nor ... by a mere marriage contract 
without intercourse.^
This requirement follows from Kant’s rationale for marriage, for its purpose is the 
legitimisation of sex. A marriage must be consummated in order to be valid because 
marriage right exists
as the rightful consequence o f the obligation not to engage in sexual 
union except through possession o f each other's person, which is 
realised only through the use of their sexual attributes by each other. ^
The marriage contract transforms the sexual possession of another into a legal and 
moral bond.
According to Kant, marriage is the necessary condition for the existence of 
any morally permissible human sexual relations at all:
there is in [sexual] conduct itself something which is contemptible and 
contrary to the dictates of morality. It follows, therefore, that there 
must be certain conditions under which alone the use of the facultates
" Kant [1797], p. 280 
 ^Kant [1797], p. 280.
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sexuales would be in keeping with morality.... Matrimony is the only
condition in which use can be made of one’s sexuality.^
Kant holds that sex involves using another as a thing and objectifying the other and is 
therefore impermissible. Only within marriage does it become permissible. Marriage 
establishes exclusive and equal rights between partners, creating the only conditions 
in which sex can occur without moral violation. This is Kant’s moral argument for 
marriage.*
In the moral argument, marriage solves a dilemma. Human beings have an 
appetite for sex, and sex is necessary for procreation, but sex is morally troubling. 
Marriage resolves this by making sex permissible. But Kant is too quick to assume 
that there must be certain conditions under which sex is morally permissible, for if it 
is morally impermissible in the way he has argued, there is no reason to think there 
will be a case in which it is permissible. And Kant’s account of how marriage makes 
sex legitimate is, indeed, unconvincing.
I hope to show that Kant’s attempt to reconcile sex with morality fails. If his 
account of the moral difficulty of sex is correct, a contract cannot make it morally 
permissible. If, however, sex is not morally problematic, then the foundations of 
Kant’s argument are eroded, and my criticisms attack an argument already 
undermined. But, while I will reserve judgement on whether sexual desire inherently 
objectifies its object, Kant’s reasons for finding it morally troubling are persuasive. 
Barbara Herman, in a sympathetic analysis o f Kant’s argument, points out that there 
are parallels between his thesis that sex is morally problematic and some 
contemporary feminist views that sex “turns women into things ... [and] is not 
compatible with the standing of the partners as equal human beings.”  ^ There is good 
reason to think that sex often involves inequality, domination, and objectification in
 ^Kant [ca. 1780], pp. 165-167. Since marriage only comes about through a contract, one might 
wonder how sex can be permissible in the state of nature. This is just what justifies the existence of 
a political institution of marriage — like a political institution of property, it is morally necessary.
* Emphases vary between Lectures on Ethics (ca, 1780) and The Metaphysics o f  Morals (1797);
Lectures is concerned with rights of disposal. Metaphysics with the use of another as a thing.
 ^Herman 1993, p. 56. She cites Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon as holding this view. |
à
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the way he describes, especially given almost universal gender inequality and 
objectification of women.
Sex — Kant’s claim goes — entails objectification, making a person into a 
thing for use:
Sexual union ... is the reciprocal use that one human being makes o f  
the sexual organs and capacities of another.... [T]he natural use that 
one sex makes of the other’s sexual organs is enjoyment, for which 
the one gives itself up to the other. In this act a human being makes 
himself into a thing, which conflicts with the Right of humanity in his 
own person.
Man is not his own property and cannot do with his body what he 
will.... A man cannot make of his person a thing, and this is exactly 
what happens in vaga libido [prostitution].... Concubinage 
[unmarried consensual sexual relations] consists in one person 
surrendering to another only for the satisfaction of their sexual 
desire.... But the person who so surrenders is used as a thing; the 
desire is still directed only towards sex and not towards the person as 
a human being.
The use of another as a thing, or allowing oneself to be used as a thing, clashes with 
one of the fundamental principles of Kantian ethics. This principle, familiar as the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative, enjoins us to “always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as 
a means, but always at the same time as an end.”*^  But sexual desire violates the 
imperative. It does not respond to the humanity of another person, but only to their 
sexual characteristics. Sex is “a degradation of human nature” which causes “all
10Kant [1797], pp. 277-8.
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 166.
Kant [1785], p. 429 (standard German edition pagination).
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motives of moral relationship [to] cease to function.” Human nature is 
“dishonoured” by, “subordinated,” and “sacrificed” to sex, and humanity is made 
merely “an instrument for the satisfaction of ... lusts and inclinations.” '^^  Sex is “a 
moral risk” because it involves using others as things. Also, it debases the human 
nature of both parties, since each both gives himself or herself up to the other and is 
driven to do so by sub-human inclinations.
There are three important charges made by Kant against sex. The first is 
objectification. A person uses another as a thing (an object) in sex, and sexual desire 
is directed towards another person as an object, a set of sexually attractive qualities 
or parts, not as a person. This need not imply that sexual desire does not respond to 
personal qualities as well, but insofar as it is a sexual feeling, it is responsive to the 
biologically sexual aspects of the other. There are two elements to the claim that one 
uses another as a thing in sex. First, sexual use is incompatible with treating another j
as a person. Kant makes this claim, but he suggests another, that, in sex, a person jjtreats another as an object, and this may lead to treatment inconsistent with that |
Iowed to persons. Kant thinks that sexual desire overrides the sense of moral duty: I
■'1“as soon as a person becomes an Object of appetite for another, all motives of moral I
relationship cease to function, because as an Object of appetite for another a person I
becomes a thing and can be treated and used as such by one.”^^ The second charge, i
o f exploitation, suggests — as I will seek to show later — that Kant is thinking in 
gendered terms, so that a woman who surrenders herself to a man, even when she /
wishes to do so, is used by him as a thing, and not vice-versa. This non-reciprocity j
suggests exploitation. Finally, sexual desire causes the individual to forsake his ]
rational and human nature. As a result the moral point of view (one’s duty to oneself
and to others) is abandoned. J,1Exploitation and abuse are connected to objectification. If sexual desire 
causes one to view someone as a thing, then one is more likely to treat that person as l
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 163.
''^Kantfca. 1780], p. 164.
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 165. |
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 163. |
j
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a thing. In Catharine MacKinnon’s thought, “[s]exual objectification is the primaiy 
form of the subjection of women,” objectification being the process in which women 
are seen and treated as sexual objects, particularly in pornography.^  ^ The use and 
viewing of women as objects is connected, according to MacKinnon, to the 
relationship of domination and submission which is constitutive o f gender and which 
is the basis of male and female inequality.^* As Herman points out, this view is 
similar to Kant’s, except that objectification of the sexually desired woman is 
explained by MacKinnon as a consequence of socially constructed masculinity. I 
want to endorse this much of MacKinnon’s account; pornography, rape, and the 
battering of women by their partners suggests that objectification of women — 
viewing them as sexual objects and treating them as such — is a widespread 
component of sexuality. Combined with socio-economic inequality which makes 
sexual exploitation of women by men possible, this gives reason to believe that it is 
legitimate to hypothesise that sex is, as Kant argued,' an issue of moral concern. As I 
will argue in section 4, there are reasons to think sex may cause less moral damage 
when it occurs within committed, caring relationships between equals, and thus 
within equal marriages. But although Kant offers marriage as the solution for the 
morally troubling aspect of sex, his rationale is entirely different from this suggestion. 
I will now consider why his account fails.
2. Why Kant’s solution fails
Kant holds that the sexual use of another is morally permissible only within 
marriage, that is, when it occurs between two people who have contracted certain 
rights over each other. Equality of possession and reciprocal rights o f disposal flow 
from the contract, creating the conditions in which sex may be morally permissible.
^^Hmnml995, p. 191.
*^ See Haslanger 1993, pp. 98-101, and my discussion on MacKinnon in Chapter VI.2. This 
position is also held by Andrea Dworkin.
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The explanation of how it becomes permissible, however, contains a number of 
inconsistencies.
For one thing, Kant holds that unmarried sexual relations in which “both 
persons satisfy their desire mutually and there is no idea of [financial] gain” (he calls 
this “concubinage”) are impermissible because the rights held by the parties involved 
are unequal. He writes that the contract is “one-sided; the rights o f the two parties 
are not equal.” Yet the marriage contract itself incorporates inequality: due to “the 
natural superiority of the husband to the wife,” “he is to be [her] master (he is the 
party to direct, she to obey).”^^ Marriage, on Kant’s account, is necessarily unequal.
And yet since he gives inequality as a reason for the impermissibility o f  
‘concubinage’, he is inconsistent in holding that sex may be permissible when 
inequality still exists. Kant addresses this problem by arguing that it is consistent for 
the parties to have equal rights over each other and yet hold unequal shares o f power 
in the relationship. But this is not convincing. Kant’s claim that the concubinage 
contract is one-sided is based on an assumption of gender difference: “In this pact 
[concubinage] the woman surrenders her sex completely to the man, but the man 
does not completely surrender his sex to the w o m a n . K a n t  argues that 
concubinage produces unequal rights of possession, wliile marriage institutes equal 
rights of possession, although unequal power. But the concubinage contract, in 
which both parties satisfy their desire, can only be unequal due to gender inequality, 
which is equally present in marriage. Marriage does not alleviate this cause of 
exploitation.
There is a more fundamental inconsistency in Kant’s account, however. His ■
claim that marriage legitimates sex rests on an argument that in certain conditions it is 
permissible to use another as a means only, contradicting the categorical imperative.
The right gained in the marriage contract, by which spouses acquire each other and 
can therefore legitimately engage in sexual relations, is named by Kant a
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 166.
Kant [1797], p. 279. The sexism of Kant’s writings is discussed in Mendus 1987 and Okin 1982, 
pp. 78-82.
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right against a person ... akin to a right to a thing [and it] rests on 
the fact that if one of the partners in a marriage has left ... the other 
partner is justified, always and without question, in bringing its partner 
back under its control, just as it is justified in retrieving a thing.^^
This right, also called ‘personal right’ or a ‘right o f disposal’, “is that of possession of 
an external object as a thing and use of it as a person,'’^  It allows a person “to 
make direct use of a person as o f a. thing, as a means to my end, but still without 
infringing upon his personality.” '^^  It is a right held by husbands over wives, masters 
over servants, and parents over children. Kant’s description of how the right is held 
in marriage contains two puzzling inconsistencies. “A man acquires a w//c” yet the 
partners enjoy ""equality o f possession”: the rights are reciprocal, yet in some places 
Kant speaks as if they are held by the husband over the wife.^  ^ Second, the marriage 
right o f possession is “realized only through the use of their sexual attributes by each 
other.”^^  How then is the right o f possession over a child or servant realised? Kant 
does not comment on how the right of possession is realised in those relationships.
The right to a person akin to a right to a thing makes sex allowable by 
permitting the use of another person. This right appears to be an ad hoc exemption 
from the categorical imperative, which enjoins that we should not use others as 
means only. But Kant provides no independent argument for the justification o f this 
exemption, beyond the fact that we need to use others for procreative purposes. 
Kant’s argument that sex is permissible within marriage forces him to contradict his 
own most fundamental moral rule. The moral consequences are dire. Since there is 
no justification given for this exemption, there is no rationale for why it licenses using 
others only for sex and domestic services. It is not clear that, if one may dishonour 
another’s humanity by using him for sex, one may not by the same token imprison.
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 169. 
Kant [1797], p. 278. 
Kant [1797], p. 276. 
Kant [1797], p. 359 / .
Kant [1797], pp. 277-8; compare 248, 359. 
Kant [1797], p. 280.
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humiliate, or abuse him when circumstances make this the only way to achieve a 
desired end (just as procreation justifies sexual use).
. The right to a person akin to a right to a thing also clashes with the Kantian 
principle that “man is not his own property and cannot do with his body what he 
will.”^^  If one does not own oneself, one cannot contract away one’s person as 
property. But the right gained in marriage “is that of possession of an external object 
as a thing ... this kind of right is neither a right to a thing nor merely a right against a 
person but also possession of a person.” *^ Kant does hold that persons can forfeit 
their personalities through crime and become “bondsmen,” or human p r o p e r t y B u t  
marriage cannot be made to fit this explanation. Kant was aware of this discrepancy 
(“a human being cannot have property in himself, much less in another person”) and 
attempted to explain it by arguing that under personal right, one does not possess 
another as property but as “usufruct... to make direct use o f a person as o f a thing, 
as a means to my end.” ®^
The distinction between possessing another person as property or as usufruct 
is not purely abstract. If we own another as property, we need not respect them as 
persons, for they become things. If we possess them, but not as property, we must 
respect them, except — and Kant does not define the limits of use — when we are 
using them as a thing. The distinction between use as property and as usufruct is 
tenuous. Possession of another under personal right entails that the owner may use 
the other’s body for pleasure. This is disanalogous to possessing' a field only in 
possessing its fruits. As Kant knew, the goods enjoyed in sexual use are not alienable 
from the person, as a person is a unity. This description o f personal right seems 
closer to slavery (possession of others as property) than usufruct.^  ^ Personal right 
appears incompatible with the principle that persons cannot be property as well as 
with the categorical imperative.
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 166.
Kant [1797], p. 276.
Kant [1797], p. 358, 330.
Kant [1797], p. 359.
Carole Pateman compares marriage contracts and the civil slave contract in Chapter 5 of The 
Sexual Contract.
Chapter I: Kant’s Contractual Account of Marriage 11
The marriage contract removes the immorality which Kant attributes to sex 
only if we accept that the right to a person akin to a right to a thing has moral 
standing. Why should we imagine that use of another becomes permissible, contrary 
to the categorical imperative, through the mechanism of such a right? The right to a 
person akin to a right to a thing is intended to explain how the marriage contract 
makes sex permissible. But this project fails. Rather than removing from sexual 
relations the morally undesirable feature of use, it licences use. It makes use of 
another as a thing permissible because, according to Kant, “one person is acquired by 
the other as if  it were a thing, [and] the one who is acquired acquires the other in 
turn."^  ^ Herman elucidates this: “I give myself (or rights over myself) and you give 
yourself; but since you have me, in giving yourself to me you give me back to me.”^^  
In other words, one is using oneself. But the argument that reciprocal exchange of 
rights entitles a couple to use each other neglects the separateness of persons. Two 
people cannot form a single moral unit wherein they can violate each other’s rights 
without transgressing the moral law. Herman suggests a more positive interpretation, 
that the institution of marriage establishes rights and obligations which locate sexual 
activity in a context of legally imposed responsibility. But in fact, if Kant’s diagnosis 
of sex is correct, there is no way a contract of any sort can make it permissible, as I 
will try to show in the rest of this section.
In general, contract diminishes the likelihood of abuse by allowing contractors 
to consent to an arrangement. But Kant holds that the immorality of sex cannot be 
morally transformed by consent. It incorporates a basic disregard for human nature. 
In the concubinage contract, both parties give their consent, but the act is still morally 
impermissible. One cannot rightfully consent to being used as a thing. Elsewhere 
Kant claims that no lawful non-marital contract for sex is possible, since one may be 
consumed by sexual use (either through pregnancy, death resulting from pregnancy, 
or “exhaustion of [the man’s] sexual capacity”):
Kant [1797], p. 278. 
Herman, p. 60.
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carnal enjoyment is cannibalisiic ... each is actually a consumable 
thing ... with respect to the other, so that if one were to make oneself 
such a thing by contract [other than the marriage contract], the 
contract would be contrary to law.^ '^
Sexual use cannot be made allowable by a normal contract or by mutual consent, 
which is why the marriage contract contains the extraordinary rights which permit 
moral violation.
The marriage contract, by establishing mutual rights of disposal between the 
parties (rights “over the welfare and happiness and generally over all the 
circumstances of that person”), ameliorates the moral difficulties of casual sex by 
directing concern to the whole person, not just his or her sexual aspects.^  ^ But 
having rights over the whole of the other’s person does not amount to such concern 
for the other. Kant is clearly right to think that reciprocity and concern for the whole 
individual, as instituted by the marriage contract, are morally important in this 
context. But he is wrong to identify these qualities with possession. I may be 
concerned for my cat or my car because I possess it — it is mine — but this 
proprietorial concern is different from the altruistic concern found in loving 
relationships. If sexual relations are essentially exploitative, objectifying, and 
dehumanising, as Kant holds they are, the presence of reciprocal rights o f disposal 
does not alter that fact, and thus Kant is forced to argue that use of another is 
allowable under certain conditions. The marriage contract sets up safeguards, but it 
does not alter the moral nature of the sexual act itself.
Herman suggests that the most useful interpretation of Kant’s claim that 
reciprocal rights alter the moral status of sex is this: by making spouses into equal 
juridical persons with mutual responsibilities, these rights create conditions in which 
spouses treat each other as persons and not simply sexual objects. Herman’s claim 
that instituting equal civil rights for husbands and wives will work against 
objectification is plausible. Her claim, however, bears little resemblance to Kant’s
Kant [1797], p. 360.
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view, since the marriage right is a right of ownership by which women are owned, 
and, moreover, in Kant’s political theory women lack civil rights/^ Her 
interpretation of Kant’s charge against sex is also too optimistic. First, Kant 
condemns sexual objectification because one must always respect the essential 
humanity of other people. Sexual desire intrinsically denies the humanity of the 
desired, according to Kant, and does so even in marriage.^  ^ Second, on Kant’s 
account, sex is inherently degrading to the sexual agent him- or herself, not just to the 
desired and used object. One’s dereliction o f moral duty to oneself cannot be 
remedied by gaining a right over the other.
Kant claims that in sex one uses oneself as an object and subordinates human 
to animal nature. The use involved in sexual acts is not only use o f one’s partner, but 
violation of one’s duty to oneself, as Kant’s discussion of masturbation makes clear. 
Masturbation “makes man ... an object of enjoyment” and is worse than suicide, “a 
violation in the highest degree” of a perfect duty of virtue to oneself.^* But non- 
procreative sex is a similar violation, only o f lesser degree because not ‘unnatural’. 
Non-procreative sex between a man and a woman is also “inadmissible as being a 
violation of duty to oneself ... by it a man surrenders his personality (throwing it 
away), since he uses himself merely as a means to satisfy an animal impulse.”^^  But 
the submission of humanity to desire must be equally present in procreative and non- 
procreative sex.'^  ^ Although the purpose of procreation is said to legitimate sex, the 
elements which make non-procreative sex a violation of duty will still be present in 
procreative sex (unless it is only done without enjoyment or sexual desire, which
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 167.
“On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice,” in Kant 
1996, p. 295 (standard German edition pagination).
See quotes below, at footnotes 41 and 42.
Kant [1797], p. 425. See also Kant [ca. 1780], p. 169-70. A perfect duty is “one which allows no 
exception in the interests of inclination”; Kant [1785], p. 422, footnote. Duties of virtue are those 
which cannot be externally legislated “because they have to do with an end which (or the having of 
which) is also a duly,” Kant [1797], p. 239. Duties to the self follow from the categorical imperative 
(see for instance the formulation at footnote 12 above).
Kant [1797], p. 425.
Procreative sex may even involve a further violation when a woman is forced to conceive children 
against her will.
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make instruments of both self and the other, for the sake of the ‘duty of species 
preservation).
Since the sexual agent violates the categorical imperative by using herself as a 
means, and not simply by using another, rights which are instituted to make one’s use 
of another (but not of oneself) licit cannot make sex morally permissible. Even within 
the marriage contract, sexual activity violates human nature: “even the permitted 
bodily union of the sexes in marriage ... is in itself merely an animal union.”'^  ^ Non- 
procreative sex within marriage is admissible only due to
a permissive law of morally practical reason, which in the collision of 
its determining grounds makes permitted something that is in itself not 
permitted ... in order to prevent a still greater violation [i.e. 
masturbation or adultery].'^ ^
This reasoning sounds suspiciously utilitarian! The marriage contract does not 
remove the moral illegitimacy of intercourse. Its degrading aspects overflow into 
marriage. Kant’s moral argument for marriage as a contractual exchange o f rights 
clearly fails, for the contract does not render sex permissible.
While sexual objectification and exploitation present grounds for moral 
concern — particularly to feminists — it might seem unclear why the claim that sex is 
dehumanising should now raise a moral issue. The claim suggests a natural law 
perspective that certain distinctively human goods and activities should be valued as 
such, and that acting without respect for such goods is immoral.'*^  Even if one does
accept that there is a duty not to degrade one’s humanity (and I think that an ethics
Iacceptable to feminists will need to value human dignity), the claim that sex is |
idehumanising seems to emanate from a philosophical tendency that feminists have 4
Kant [1797], p. 425.
Kant [1797], p. 426.
For example, Finnis 1993.
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criticised in Kant and others. This is the prioritisation of mind over body, reason 
over emotion, which feminists equate with the valuation of male over female.'^ '*
Kant’s remarks seem to fit into this scheme by claiming that sexual experience 
is not fully human, but animal, a degradation of humanity. This sort of claim is 
particularly worrying to feminists since women’s roles have trçiditionally been 
associated with bodily and sexual fimctions: childbearing, domestic service, and 
sexual service. Kant’s views certainly fall into this pattern, but there is a distinct and 
more significant aspect to the thesis that sex is dehumanising. If morality is essential 
to humanity (to rationality, as Kant thinks), then a drive may dehumanise by reducing 
moral capacity. And it is clear that Kant has this in mind in writing that when desire 
takes hold, moral motives are driven out.
This is a more compelling reason for finding sex a moral risk. The force of 
the point differs from the charge of objectification, in which treating the other as an 
object for use may lead to abuse or exploitation. The focus here is on the individual’s 
relation to herself, not to the other, and the fear is that the operation of sexual desire 
may overwhelm moral obligations. The appetite for sex is not unique in this respect. 
The appetite for hunger may drive one to steal food. Of course, the drive does not 
determine action, as one may also abstain to let a hungrier person have the food. But 
the threat is double, for sexual desire competes as a reason with moral reasons for 
action, and the object of sexual desire, unlike the object of other drives, is a person, 
Thus both the opportunity and the motive for moral violation are greater, relative to 
other drives, in the case of sexual desire. Given that sex does constitute a moral risk, 
one might wonder why Kant defends such an inconsistent and inadequate solution. 
The answer lies in what I will call his prudential argument for marriage. While the 
moral problem of sex which Kant sets up is irresolvable, so that sex is not 
transformed by marriage, Kant has other, economic, considerations, to which I will 
now turn, for holding that sex should be confined to marriage.
The critique of the cultural devaluing or condemnation of the body and the bodily is central to 
most forms of feminism; see for instance (post-modern feminist) Cixous, 1980; (feminist moral
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3. Kant’s prudential argument for marriage
We have seen that the marriage contract cannot remove the morally troubling 
aspects from sex. Personal right does not suffice to remove objectification and the 
related threat of exploitation. In fact, a close reading of Kant’s account reveals that 
there is another justification of the centrality of contract to marriage. His argument 
that only marriage, through contract, makes sex legitimate stems from prudential 
considerations. In short, women’s end is the preservation o f the s p e c i e s . T o  
accomplish this, they need male protection and economic support.'*  ^ Without a 
binding contract, men will not carry out this role. Thus, the marriage contract creates 
the social conditions necessary for the reproduction of society. These consequences 
are not simply accidental side-effects of marriage, but are the true rationale behind 
Kant’s argument that sex is only permissible in marriage, and that the moral status of 
marriage rests in contract.
Although Kant usually gives gender-neutral reasons for the moral 
impermissibility of sex, his specific arguments against extra-marital sex turn on 
gender difference. For example, the existence of this second, prudential, argument 
explains the apparent discrepancy in Kant’s account of the exploitation involved in 
concubinage:
a contract to be a concubine also comes to nothing: for this would be 
a contract to let and hire a member for another's use, in which, 
because of the inseparable unity of members in a person, she would be 
surrendering herself as a thing to the other's choice.'*^
philosopher) Held 1987; (early ‘second-wave’ feminist) Ortner, “Is female to male as nature is to 4
culture?” in Rosaldo and Lainphere, 1974. j
Kant [1798], p. 169. j
Kant [1798], pp. 80, 130, 167, 169-70. “A woman, regardless of her age, is under civil tutelage 
[or incompetent to spejik for herself (unmundig)].... her husband is her natural curator." Kant |
[1798], p. 79 ^
Kant [1797], p. 279. j
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‘Concubinage’ refers to mutually desired sexual relations, not to prostitution. Both 
parties involved in the transaction are surrendering themselves sexually to the other, 
so why does Kant locate the moral illegitimacy of concubinage in the fact that “she 
would be surrendering herself as a thing”? So would he. This may reflect a view that 
women's moral selves are more intrinsically connected to their sexual activity.'^ * But 
a reason supplied repeatedly in Kant’s discussions of marriage is that a woman giving 
herself to a man without a contract of marriage is left without the economic 
protection, assured social status, and continuing relationship which is gained through 
marriage.
Kant views marriage as an economic necessity for women, but they can 
benefit from marriage only if sex is restricted to marriage. In the state o f nature, 
woman is merely "a domestic animal," and in barbarism, polygamy is the rule.'^  ^ But 
in civilisation, women gain power through the manipulation of male desire and 
resistance to extra-marital sex,^ ®
Scepticism about marriage ... is bound to have bad consequences for 
the entire female sex; for woman would be degraded to a mere means 
for satisfying man's desires.... It is by marriage that a woman becomes 
free: man loses his freedom by it.^ ^
Marriage is largely instrumental for women, as the advantages o f protection and 
status which it bestows are its whole point. Thus, women always desire to flirt with 
"the whole male sex":
“Honor is her greatest virtue, domesticity her merit,” quoted in Buchner 1904, p. 226. Sexual 
activity is closely linked to women’s “end” — the perpetuation of the species — and assumes 
disproportionate importance since this is their only end (Kant [1798], p. 169). "The woman does 
not ask whether the man was continent before marriage; but for the man, this question about his 
wife is of infinite importance." Kant [1798], p. 171 
Kant [1798], p. 168.
See Kant [1798], p. 168.
Kant [1798], p. 172.
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For a young wife is always in danger of becoming a widow, and 
because o f this she scatters her charms over all the men whom 
circumstances might make potential husbands for her, so that, should 
this situation occur, she would not be wanting for suitors/^
Kant’s prudential argument for the contractual nature of marriage reflects social 
structures which make women economically dependent on men and render it 
desirable that procreation be carried out in marriage. This argument rests on 
prudential concern about the likely consequences o f sex without marriage, rather than 
on the principle of humanity.
Kant's language of acquisition and possession arises from the perceived need 
for a woman to have legal protection against the man whose children she bears, in 
order to provide for her and their social and financial standing.^  ^ This imperative 
explains why contract must be so central to marriage, for it ensures that husbands and 
fathers meet their responsibilities. The right to a person akin to a right to a thing 
which allows one to use another sexually has as its central feature the right to reclaim 
and retrieve a run-away spouse. '^  ^ The prudential argument suggests contemporary 
feminist claims about sex as well, since Kant condemns extra-marital sex as 
exploitative in the context of women’s socio-economic inequality.
Kant’s project in “The Doctrine of Right” is, as mentioned earlier, to explain 
the basis of property rights, of moral connections between persons and things.^  ^ His 
discussion o f the household fits into this as an attempt to explain how individuals can 
come to have special moral bonds, akin to possession, over each other. The right to 
a person akin to a right to a thing explains how “I [can] call a wife, a child, a servant, 
or, in general, another person mine.”^^ The prudential argument shows why these 
rights are necessary as the moral argument does not. Prudential concerns show why 
Kant takes contract as the essence of marriage, for he holds that it is necessary that
Kant [1798], p. 168, also p. 173.
See his concern over the problem of illegitimate children, Kant [1797], pp. 326-7, 336-7. 
Kant [1797], pp. 276, 278, 282-4.
See Kant [1797], pp. 245 ff., and Herman 1993, pp. 52-54.
Kant [1797], p. 248.
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women come to possess men in order to receive support for themselves and their 
children. Marriage does not solve the moral problem of sex, but it does solve the 
prudential problem. In the next section, I will take up the question o f how a solution 
to the moral problem might be approached, an issue which will reappear in my 
consideration of the moral value of marriage in Chapter III.
4. A better solution
Kant’s charges against sex and sexual desire do have moral fprce. Within an 
ethic which values respect for persons (and here we can include Kantian ethics and 
ethics informed by the feminist aim of equality for men and women), moral motives 
are subverted by the sexual impulse, at least in one of its aspects.”  Objectification is 
plausibly part of all sexual desire, for one views someone as a object if  one views 
them as something to be used, for the purpose o f pleasure. If sexual desire merely 
objectifies the other, it fails to respect him as a person, and insofar as sex involves 
using the other as an object, it may involve a failure to treat him as a person. Perhaps i
the pronouns in the last sentence should be feminine, since feminists claim that the 
objectification in both cases is systematically directed at women. Additionally, 
objectification combined with gender inequality can lead to exploitation, and the 
pressures of desire can lead to abandonment of the moral point o f view.
We cannot conclude from all this, though, that sex is morally impermissible.
So long as it is the morality of actions which are to be evaluated, the objectification 
inherent in desire and the abandonment of the moral point of view are only of moral 
concern in that they may lead to immoral actions. Likewise, exploitation o f women 
as sexual objects (e.g. in prostitution, the widespread existence of which depends 
upon women’s economic inequality with men) is not immoral because it involves sex.
But compare Hobbes: “The appetite which men call lu s t. . .  is a sensual pleasure, but not only 
that; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, to please, and 
to be pleased; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the 
mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please,” Human Nature, ix.
10, in Hobbes 1994, p. 55. I will take up this topic again in Chapter 111.
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but because it involves exploitation. The question of moral permissibility revolves 
around the question of what it means to treat another as a person. ^  Is sex morally 
impermissible because it necessarily fails to treat the other as a person (that is, does 
the definition o f treating someone as a person exclude the kind of interaction that 
takes place in sex, as Kant seems to think), or is it rather morally troubling because 
treating another person as a sexual object seems too close, motivationally and 
functionally, to treating them as an object in an impermissible way?
One might find either view odd — that in sex one is either treating, or close to 
treating, another person in a morally impermissible way. Instead of referring to 
someone’s co-participant in sex as his sexual object, we are used to speaking o f his 
sexual partner. One might even conclude that Kant’s belief that the sexual partner is 
treated like an object does not correspond with any necessary fact about sex, but 
reflects Kant’s acceptance of the sexist paradigm that heterosexual sex is a subject- 
object (male-female) relation. In other words, one might claim that Kant’s objection 
to sex is based not on its intrinsic moral properties but on his internalisation o f beliefs 
about sex which Dworkin and MacKinnon claim construct social reality. Yet even if 
this were true, there is still some force to the ‘gender-neutral’ claim about the 
objectifying nature of sexual desire (i.e. that sexual desire intrinsically objectifies, 
apart from social construction of men as objectifiers of women) and o f sex. To 
articulate where Kant might be right, I will turn to another analyst o f sexual desire.
Roger Scruton attributes two major oversights to Kant. He claims that the 
“individualising intentionality” of desire and its “focus on ‘embodiment’” are absent 
from Kant’s analysis.Scruton’s normative account of sexual desire contradicts the 
Kantian claim that the other is desired as a sexual object, not as a person, at least in 
‘true’ desire;
In true sexual desire, the aim is ‘union with the other’, where the
‘other’ denotes a particular person, with a particular perspective upon
Scruton 1986, p. 85.
    -     '■ ■’
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my actions.... [T]he aim of desire ... must involve the other 
essentially.^^
Even so, the other is still rendered an object. Sartre saw a paradox in sex: “you can 
desire another only as an individual, and therefore only as a subject. And yet you can 
possess him only as an instance of his species — since you can possess him only as an 
object.” ®^ Sex, and sexual desire, make an object of the other in the sense that sexual 
desire is for contact with a body, and sex the realisation of that contact. One 
necessarily sees, relates to, and acts on the other as a body. Moreover, according to 
Scruton, personality is overwhelmed by sex, so that each partner sees the other bereft 
of personality, as a body only: “the experience of your [the other’s] embodiment in 
arousal is also the experience of your subjugation to your body.”^^
The interpretation which I am suggesting could be accused of relying on a 
mistaken subject/object distinction which assumes that to interact with someone 
physically is to treat them as an object. Why, someone might ask, is the body so 
devalued that to recognise someone as embodied is to fail to meet them morally? 
There is certainly a tension in Kantian ethics between personality, which is the source 
of moral obligations, and the body as physical object. The loss of personality in sex is 
thus a cause for worry. In Kant’s ethics, the charge that sex involves objectification 
because it involves treating someone as a body, not a person, thus has some 
credibility. While feminists rightly want to break down the hierarchical moral dualism 
of mind (personality, reason) over body, it is still the case (and a cause of their 
concern) that men sometimes see women (or people see each other) as bodies in the 
inferior, hierarchical sense, that is, only as bodies. Feminists deny the morally 
evaluative distinction between body and person, but their critique depends on the 
existence of a practice of treating women as bodies and not as persons, which they 
find morally wrong. The hierarchical distinction which is the subject of feminist 
criticism (and for which feminists might criticise Kant’s account) is also the source of
Sciuton 1986, p. 89.
Cited in Scruton 1986, p. 95. 
Scruton 1986, p. 131.
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the objectification (the equation between object/body and lack of personality/moral 
worth) which makes sex morally troubling to feminists.
Scruton’s interpretation of Kant’s concerns seems to underestimate their 
force. He argues that Kant’s analysis of sex fails to show a moral problem. He 
claims that Kant’s view of desire as degrading is “characteristic of Kant’s failure to 
see that our animal nature is not just conjoined with, but also entirely transformed by, 
... ‘practical reason’. B y  “dismissing desire as ... an animal residuum,” Kant 
cannot defend his charges against anyone who simply denies that our ‘animal’ nature 
is degraded.^  ^ Thus, “the Kantian inevitably tends towards permissive morality. No 
sexual act can be wrong merely by virtue of its physical character.” '^* Scruton’s 
thought is that Kant cannot hold that consenting, non-injurious sex is morally wrong 
if he gives up the idea that it is a reduction o f human nature. But degradation of  
human to animal is just one of Kant’s claims about sexual desire. As I said above, 
whether or not a Kantian can hold that consenting, non-injurious sex is wrong 
depends on what she takes it to mean to treat a person with respect. I cannot pursue 
these questions here, but the point I hoped to draw is not that sex is impermissible, 
but that sexual desire often objectifies the other (both in the Kantian and the feminist 
sense), that this tends to exploitation (a connection made by both feminists and 
Kant), and that moral motives are forced into competition with sexual desire. These 
aspects of sex are sufficiently troubling to warrant inquiry into how they may be 
ameliorated or neutralised.
Dworkin and MacKinnon hold that a thorough reconstruction o f gender is 
required to remove the objectifying component from sex. Liberal feminists, who 
might disagree with Dworkin and MacKinnon but be concerned by sexual 
exploitation of women, rape, and sexual abuse, suggest that the culture of treating 
women as objects could be alleviated by socio-economic gender equality, and harsher 
social and legal penalties for rape and violence towards women. If we give credence 
to the Kantian/radical feminist claim that sex and desire do involve objectification
Scruton 1986, p. 84. 
Scruton 1986, p. 84. 
Scruton 1986, p. 347.
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(which has the negative effect o f increasing the likelihood of abuse and exploitation), 
like Kant we should be impelled to ask how this can be counteracted. For this 
inquiry to be meaningful, we do not need to assume that désiré is intrinsically 
objectifying (culturally or naturally), but merely recognise the prevalence of the 
connection between desire, objectification, and women’s subordination.^^
Kant’s discussion of sexual objectification suggests a connection from which 
he fails to draw the obvious, and morally significant, conclusion:
If one devotes one’s person to another, one devotes not only sex, but 
the whole person.... If, then, one yields one’s person, body and soul, 
for good and ill in every respect, so that the other has complete rights 
over it ... and obtain the person of the other in return, I win myself 
back.... In this way the two persons become a unity of will. Whatever 
good or ill, joy or sorrow befall either of them, the other will share in 
it."'
The difficulty with his view is that persons only attain “unity of will” by exchanging a 
“right to dispose over the person as a whole — over the welfare and happiness and 
generally over all the circumstances of that person.””  We should expect the 
exchange o f rights between a married couple to make sex permissible within marriage 
because it fixes vulnerability within the context of stable and mutual relationships. It 
appears that sex within marriage is less likely to be objectifying because it occurs in 
an atmosphere of companionship and concern, where the other is recognised as a 
person, Kant seems to have it the wrong way round. If sex is somehow morally 
better within marriage, this is due to the nature of the marriage relationship, not 
because marriage grants a licence for objectification. In other words, certain aspects
Dworkin 1981 and 1987 present empirical evidence for tliis connection.
Kant fca. 1780], p. 167.
Kant [ca. 1780], pp. 166-7. This explains why marriage only exists as a consequence of the 
contract and the sexual act — one has not given oneself until one has given one’s body.
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of marriage tend to counteract objectification and prevent exploitation/^ Kant, on 
the other hand, thinks personal right allows objectification, which, as we have seen, is 
not eliminated in marriage on his account. Nor is marriage valued because it reduces 
exploitation. In exploitation, one party does not benefit, or benefits far less than the 
other. But it is not the reciprocity of benefit in marriage which makes sex permissible 
in it, according to Kant, for he has ruled concubinage, in which each gains sexual 
pleasure, impermissible.
Kant does write that “sexual love can, of course, be combined with human 
love and so carry with it the characteristics of the latter,” but he does not expand this 
point nor does he use it anywhere as the basis of the permissibility of sexual love in 
marriage.”  He does not think that sexual feelings can be transformed by love, but 
only carried along with it. He assumes that “a unity of will” and sharing of “good or 
ill, joy or sorrow” can only be created by the spouses’ ceding rights over themselves 
to each other/^ This “unity” appears not to be an emotional state but a sort of 
merger and acquisition. The feature o f permanence in a relationship is only an aspect 
of possession, not in itself a feature which makes sex morally permissible. 
Possession, rather than permanence or reciprocity, is the source — for Kant — of 
permission.
Why is the view that the exchange of rights creates a community within which 
objectification is permitted so flawed? Objectification is not neutralised by the 
possession of rights, although abuse and exploitation may be. Treating someone as a 
rights-bearer does not mean one will view them as such, as I will try to show. Rights 
are an external relation, which tell us how to relate to each other formally, but we 
must again distinguish between treating persons as persons and seeing them as such. 
In intimate relations, seeing a person as a person involves more than fitting them into 
the abstract category o f ‘person’. In civil or political life, one may recognise another 
as a fellow-citizen and treat them accordingly. But in intimate relations, these
I am aware that feminists hold marriage has been a site of women’s exploitation. I am referring 
here to marriage as an affective, life-defining relationship in which the interests of both parties are 
considered equally.
”  Kant [ca. 1780], p. 163.
Kant [ca. 1780], p. 167.
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categories are overwhelmed by knowledge of the other person as a personality. But 
knowing her as a person and recognising her as possessing the morally valuable 
attributes of a person are distinct. It is precisely because recognition o f the other’s 
formal status fades that one may cease to see what is due to her as a person.
Nor would it be appropriate continually to view one’s wife as a bundle of 
rights, although her rights must be respected. It is certainly possible that a moral 
relation constituted by punctilious consideration of rights and obligations can exist 
between spouses. However, marriage is characterised as an emotional relationship 
and (though not necessarily) a sexual one. I will argue that the emotional aspect of  
marriage is the source of the moral value of marriage, since the relevant emotions 
distinguish intimate relationships from relationships characterised by recognising 
others primarily as rights-possessors. Emotion is central to marriage, and we would 
expect its moral value to supervene on this distinguishing characteristic if we wish to 
provide an explanation of why marriage has a distinctive moral value. This account 
would mean that long-term unmarried relationships have the same moral value 
derived from emotions as marriage, but this result is not one which I wish to avoid. I 
will say more in Chapter III about the moral value of the institutional structure of  
marriage.
The moral relevance of emotions is epistemological and motivational. In 
intimate relations, where public categories of rights-ascription fade, another way of 
recognising the other as a person must come into play. This recognition is especially 
important in a sexual relationship, where one’s emotions may instrumentalise the 
other. It is preferable in marriage that recognition based on emotional response and 
concrete knowledge of the other supplements recognition of the other as a rights- 
bearer for two reasons.^  ^ First, an emotional response of the right kind motivates one 
to treat the other morally. Second, marriage is lived out through daily interaction on 
an intimate level. In these circumstances, sympathy and attention are required in 
order to know how to act for the other’s good. One can treat one’s husband morally 
without this concrete response to his needs, but only in a limited way. For a rich
See Benhabib 1987, csp. pp. 86-91, on The generalized and the concrete other’.
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interaction, one must have understanding of the other in order to know how to fulfil 
one’s duties to him/^
Emotional moral recognition is possible through an attentive, responsive 
relation incorporating concern for the other’s good. Through coming to know 
another person intimately, the public categories which mark her out as a rights-bearer 
become less visible relative to her particular personality. One begins to see her not as 
possessing obligating characteristics (human, rational, citizen, and so on) but as the 
possessor of her particular qualities. The danger is that as her status recedes in one’s 
knowledge o f her, one may begin to treat her in ways forbidden by her status.
Another sort o f recognition of the person must take place, and this recognition is also 
desirable for the reasons already cited. To recognise her as a person intimately, one 
must recognise her not just as the possessor of particular properties, but as a morally 
significant being. One does this by recognising her interests (just as rights protect her 
interests, so intimate recognition also responds to them) as morally significant, that is, 
as having a claim on oneself. Attention serves as a guide to her interests, and an 
emotional reaction establishes their claim. While her rights must always be respected, 
interacting with her morally on an everyday level will require an understanding o f her 
particular needs and desires as those of, to use Seyla Benhabib’s term, a “concrete 
other.”
In this emotional response, the other’s particular good as a person comes to 1motivate oneself because one sees from her particular point of view. This response is 4
moral because it involves taking on the other’s good and ill, joy and sorrow, as one’s jown. The response is not sufficient to motivate and guide moral conduct, and a 1
73 Iprincipled theory of moral action is also necessary. However, it is necessary to !
guide, if not to motivate, moral conduct in intimate relations. Objectification may be 
a psychological or social fact about sexual desire, but empathy and attention work 
against objectification by allowing one to enter the other’s point of view and so re- 
recognise her personhood.
See Nussbaum 1990, pp. 156-7. See her Chapters 2, 5, and 6 for an argument that “in good 
deliberation and judgment, the particular is in some sense prior to general rules and principles” (p. 
165).
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The problem with Kant’s account is that he does not recognise the 
(instrumental) moral value of this attentive, caring relationship, as he cannot, given 
his philosophical commitments:
pure reason must be practical o f itself and alone, that is, it must be 
able to determine the will by the mere form of a practical rule without 
presupposing any feeling and hence without any representation o f the 
agreeable or disagreeable as a matter o f the faculty of desire. .
This is so because:
If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of agreeableness or 
disagreeableness that he expects from some cause, it is all the same to 
him by what kind of representation he is afFected/"^
But on the contrary, as a matter of moral mechanics, intimate personal recognition 
seems to require a particular, emotional response to the other. If A wills herself from 
duty to respect B as an end while using B as a means, A’s immoral motive (the use of 
B for A’s benefit) remains and it is in fact only in virtue of this immoral motive that A  
wills herself to respect B. Given this, A’s attempt to will respect for B must be 
compromised by her reasons for wishing to do so. A must desire to respect B as a 
person, not simply will it. Through the morally transformative emotion of empathy 
tliis desire and its fulfilment in the recognition o f the other as a person can occur.
The insistence on the moral significance of emotions is in fact a Hegelian 
response to Kant’s ethics (as well as, o f course, a tenet of care ethics). In Sittlichkeit 
(ethical life) the Right becomes concrete through being embodied in the desires of the 
community: “[t]he T ight’ fully exists if and only if it is integrated into the emotional 
life as a functioning social whole.”^^ “[D]uty for duty’s sake ... is an unreality.... No
See my discussion of care ethics in Chapter IV.
Critique o f Practical Reason, in Kant 1996, pp. 157-8 or (standard pagination) 23-24. 
Gauthier 1997, p. 103.
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man is a hero to his valet,” though he may be a hero. Analogously, there will always 
be a ""moral valet” able to detect impurity of desire in actions seemingly motivated by 
duty alone.^  ^ Doing one’s duty for duty’s sake leads to hypocrisy, since selfish 
motives still remain.”  Instead, duty must become integrated with desire.
Within intimate relationships, emotions have a moral content and significance. 
I have argued that in an intimate context, respect for another as a person requires an 
emotional response, a feeling of identity with the other. Kant’s conclusion that 
intimate respect may be obtained through the exchange o f rights, rather than 
emerging from love, is seriously flawed. Sexual desire may be incorrigibly object- 
centred, but the tendency to objectification can be transformed through the fusion of 
desire with other emotions. In Chapters III and IV, I will return to the issue o f how 
features of marriage may diminish objectification. In the next section, I will return to 
Kant’s project of identifying the moral value of marriage and his claim that it consists 
in rights over the other which are contractually obtained.
5. Contract and marriage: Hegel’s charges against Kant
A contract theory o f marriage, o f course, need not look like Kant’s. 
Feminists have criticised the traditional marriage contract as an improper contract 
since in it one party illegitimately cedes her rights to the other.”  This criticism 
applies to Kant, whose account of marriage conflicts with what he elsewhere claims 
are universal moral principles. Kant holds that "no legal transaction on his part or 
that of anyone else can make him cease to be his own master,” yet this happens in 
marriage.”  As Pateman points out, Kant’s “personal right exists only in the private
”  Hegel [1807], p. 404, par. 665. (1 am including section numbers as an alternative to page 
numbers for ease of reference.)
Hegel [1807], p. 405, par. 666.
”  Pateman 1988, p. 154; Okin 1989, p. 172.
Quoted in Okin 1982, p. 79, from “On the common saying; That may be correct in theory, but it 
is of no use in practice”; see also Kant [1797] p.82.
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sphere of marriage and domestic relations.” ®^ Contractual regulation of marriage 
could be brought into line with the standards which apply to other contracts. But it is 
crucial to distinguish between historical legal marriage contracts (which were 
improper contracts), contractual regulation of marriage (which could take various 
forms), and an account of marriage as contractual, that is, a claim that contract is the 
essential or defining aspect of marriage.
Kant’s account is of the third variety, identifying the essential feature of 
marriage as the contractual exchange of reciprocal rights, followed by sexual 
intercourse. This is not just a thesis about the definition of marriage, but about its 
moral status. The moral status of marriage derives from the marriage contract and 
consists in the equal rights of possession held by the spouses over each other and 
over their material goods. Contractually established equal possession is the moral 
essence of marriage. This view should not be unfamiliar as marriage does consist of  
(among other things) contractually established rights and obligations. From a 
perspective which emphasises the institutional, rights-establishing nature o f marriage, 
Kant seems idiosyncratic only in insisting on a right of possession as the chief feature 
of marriage.
Hegel, however, provides us with a counterpoint to this account. He 
dismisses it along with accounts of marriage which claim its essential feature is sex or 
romantic love. “Marriage should ... be defined more precisely as rightfully ethical 
love,” which is the consciousness of unity, the joining of spouses into “a single 
person.”*^  Hegel shifts the morality of marriage from institutionally established rights 
(and a derivative relation of possession) to a subjective unity corresponding to an 
ethical transformation. I will discuss Hegel’s own account of marriage in the next 
chapter. Now, I will look at his criticisms of Kant.
Hegel’s criticism of a contractual account of marriage and the family is part of  
his wider argument that contract is an unsuitable basis for the kind of community
Pateman 1988, p. 171.
One could also describe Kant’s account of marriage as rights-based. But within his discussion, 
the reciprocal exchange of rights through contract is the establishing feature of mgrriage; the 
relation of possession can only be created through contract, except in the case of children.
Hegel [1821], p. 201, pars. 161 and 162.
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which the state should be. Hegel is the chief historical critic of Kant’s account. He 
writes, ""Marriage cannot ... be subsumed under the concept of contract; this 
subsumption — which can only be described as disgraceful — is proposed in Kant,” 
and “it is equally crude to interpret marriage merely as a civil contract ... [as] found 
even in Kant.”*^  Hegel recognises that marriage originates in contract, but claims it 
does so only ""in order to supersede it4'^  ^ The representation of marriage as 
essentially contractual is “disgraceful,” according to Hegel, for three reasons. 
Contract, unlike marriage (or the state), abstracts from the contractors’ identity, is 
contingent, and serves self-interest.^^
First, abstraction characterises contract because “it is only as owners of 
property that the two [contractors] have existence for each other.”*^  A marriage 
exists between two entire persons, but a contract exists between property owners 
who are only concerned about the features of the other which affect the contract. 
Kant tried to solve a parallel problem through the marriage contract — in sex without 
marriage, he claimed, partners are only interested in each other’s sexual attributes, 
but marital possession locates sexual interest in a wider context o f concern. But on 
Hegel’s account, one cannot recognise another person fully through contract. People 
cannot give themselves to each other in contract, as Kant would have it, but can only 
give services or alienable property:
For Kant, personal rights are those rights which arise out of a 
contract ... [but] a right based on a contract is not a right over a 
person, but only over something external to the person ..., i.e. always 
a thing.”
”  Hegel [1821], p. 105, par. 75, and p. 201, par. 161.
”  Hegel [1821], p. 203, par. 163. Pateman 1988, p. 179, holds that it is inconsistent for him to 
retain the contract in his account; but this misses the distinction between contractual regulation and 
contractual accounts of marriage.
See Hegel’s discussion of the family. Section 1 of “Ethical Life,” and his discussion of contract. 
Section 2 of “Abstract Right,” in Hegel [1821]. I am indebted to Westphal 1984 in this and the 
following paragraphs.
Hegel [1821], p. 70, par. 40.
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Contract implies that marrying persons exchange with each other rights to specific 
services, not their whole selves.
This Hegelian criticism seems limited since marrying couples can contract 
rights and obligations without recognising each other only as service-providers. 
However, Hegel’s criticism is crushing for theories that claim marriage is essentially a 
contractual exchange in which partners acquire each other, precisely because one 
cannot give oneself in a contract. One can only give a right against one for 
performance of a service or provision of an alienable piece of property. This claim, 
that I cannot give myself to another as property through a contract, is supported not 
only by Kantian ethics (which Kant himself contradicted in his account of marriage), 
but by a wide consensus in contemporary political philosophy.** The essential marital 
relation of possession or union of selves cannot be conceived of as contractual, for 
contract simply cannot account for such a relation existing between two entire selves. 
Likewise, the moral content of marriage cannot be said to rest in rights. Rights held 
over another person in their entirety must be posited to explain the moral nature o f  
marriage as a relationship between whole persons. Yet rights over whole persons 
(rather than just the performance of discrete services) would be unique to marriage as 
well as contradicting Kantian ethics and liberal theory.
Second, Hegel criticises contract as contingent, or optional. For Kant, the 
moral importance of marriage is instrumental. It makes sex and procreation 
permissible. Hegel insists that marriage is itself an ethical duty.*  ^ Contract “is the 
product of an arbitrary will,” and it implies that the decision to marry and the 
commitment to the ensuing marriage are contingent in the individual will.^  ^ The will 
which has contracted contingently may capriciously turn from the contract. Kant 
certainly did not consider commitment to marriage contingent on the will, since the 
contract was lifelong. But the choice to enter it he held contingent, since marriage is 
necessary only for sexual relations. The criticism that contract makes the decision to
*^  Hegel [1821], pp. 71-2, par. 40.
** Rawls is only one example. Nozick is a — libertarian — exception in defending the permissibility 
of slave contracts in a free society; see Nozick 1974, p. 331.
*^  Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 162.
^  Hegel [1821], pp. 105-6, par. 75.
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marry contingent is plausible only to someone who holds that marriage is an ethical 
duty, but the criticism that commitment to a marriage should not be represented as 
contractual is more convincing.
Hegel’s thought that marriage should not depend upon the vagaries of the 
individual will has an intuitive appeal. The validity of this criticism depends upon the 
views one takes on the nature of marital commitment and of contractual commitment. 
If marital commitment is viewed as always dependent on continuing emotions and 
free individual choice, then the contingency of contract is not a problem. If, 
however, commitment to marriage is held to be irrevocable, or if marriage is 
understood as an institution with claims on the individual which override his changing 
attitudes, the contingency of contract will prove a stronger criticism. I think that a 
balance must be reached between these two positions, the individualistic and the 
institutional views of marriage, and I will pursue the question in Chapter III. The 
second variable on which the criticism of contract as unsuitable for marital 
commitment depends is the claim that contract is contingent. Surely a contract is the 
strongest possible external sign of commitment of the will.
Finally, Hegel claims that contract wrongly represents marriage as self- 
interested. Marriage supersedes “the point of view of contract — i.e. that of 
individual personality as a self-sufficient unit.”®^ “One is present in [the family] not as 
an independent person but as a m e m b e r Marriage may serve our interests, yet 
that is not its rationale. It is, like the state, an end in itself. The appropriate attitude 
to marriage, as to the state, is not to ask what benefit it will provide to oneself. This 
criticism is true in one sense. Altruism combines with self-interest in marriage, and 
someone who seeks their own interest in marriage is as misguided, and as unlikely to 
succeed, as the utilitarian who sets out to find friends because he thinks they will 
make him happy. This is a reason against viewing marriage as essentially a 
contractual exchange from which both parties benefit. Representing it as a contract 
to aggrandise one’s interests is to misrepresent it. Hegel’s account of marriage, as I
91
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Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158.
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will show in the next chapter, goes too far in the other direction. He claims not only 
that self-interest is superseded, but that the individual self is too.
Kant’s account of the moral status of marriage as essentially contractual 
neglects important features of marriage. More attention must be paid to the 
relationship between the individuals, rather than to the rights they have over each 
other. Among the chief moral qualities of marriage must be concern and reciprocity. 
Of course, these features are not only found in marriages, nor do all marriages reflect 
this ideal. But these qualities must be noted by a theory of marriage, and a view of 
marriage as essentially contractual is unable to incorporate altruistic concern. It is 
also unable to explain the relationship which exists between married persons as 
complete individuals. Ownership is an inappropriate metaphor and a dangerous 
moral fiction.
6. Developing Kant’s account
The major failing o f Kant’s account is its thesis that individuals can be owned. 
Because he argues that the salient moral feature of marriage is mutual possession, he 
is forced to the conclusion that wives and husbands own each other, a view 
incompatible with an understanding of human beings as rights-holders. Kant’s 
account fails because he was attempting to resolve an intractable problem. Given his 
view that sex is intrinsically exploitative, only an exemption from the duty not to 
exploit others could make even marital sex permissible. To avoid licensing 
exploitation, one would have to drop the thesis that sex is exploitative, or argue that 
certain situations render it less likely to be so.
This suggests one possible development of Kant’s account of marriage. A 
Kantian could agree that marriage, or mutual possession, is the only possible 
condition for use of one’s sexuality, and make such an account consistent by 
explaining how this removes the immorality of sex. The defender would have to 
allow that in some situations, sexual use is compatible with treating another person as 
an end, as Kant does not. Such an account would also have to deal with the problem
Chapter I: Kant’s Contractual Account of Marriage 34
of cashing out the notion of possession. This would prove a significant problem, 
since a Kantian would not want to allow that persons can ever be owned as things. 
Possession could be interpreted as a metaphor for sexual exclusivity, but it is hard to 
see how sexual exclusivity is sufficient to alter the moral status of sex. The Kantian 
might want to focus on how a relationship between two persons might change the 
content of one’s maxims or intentions, so that sex is no longer use but bound up with 
the larger end of the relationship. I will look at such an account in Chapters III and 
IV.
A second way of developing Kant’s account begins with his prudential, not 
moral, argument, although it is not unrelated. This is the thesis that marriage right 
protects individuals in a context of vulnerability. Sex and intimacy create special 
vulnerabilities which marriage provides some protection against by giving the spouses 
rights against each other. This account focuses on marriage legislation, not the 
morality of marriage as such. This account is also problematic. How far can the state 
protect the vulnerable without invading individual privacy? For instance, should all 
sexual relationships be accompanied by these legal rights? If not, how efficacious is 
marriage in protecting the vulnerable? I will take up this account too in the later 
chapters.
Finally, I wish to reject a third possible development o f Kant’s account. The 
prudential argument might be expanded as a claim that marriage legislation is justified 
as providing a protected arena for reproduction and stabilising the environment in 
which children mature. This account, however, is no longer an account of marriage. 
For much reproduction takes place outside o f marriage, and marriages exist without 
reproduction or reproductive intent. A reproduction contract between partners — 
although this leaves out single parents — or between parent(s) and child might be 
justified for the purpose of protection, but this is distinct from the institution of 
marriage as practised in late twentieth-century society. If we wish to come up with 
an account of this institution which justifies its legislation, reproduction cannot be the 
sine qua non of marriage in our theory.
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So they loved, as love in twain 
Had the essence but in one;
Two distincts, division none: 
Number there in love was slain.,..
Property was thus appalled,
That the self was not the same; 
Single nature's double name 
Neither two nor one was called.^
1. Self and duty in Hegel’s ethics
2. Marriage as ethical union
3. What kind of union is ethical union?
4. The threat to autonomy
5. The role of contract
6. Moral rationalism and the critique o f rationality
7. Developing Hegel’s account
Kant saw the defining moral feature of marriage as the joint possession of 
personal right. From a different perspective, feminists have argued that rights o f a 
different kind should extend into the traditionally ‘private’ sphere o f marriage and the 
family. Hegel attempted to refute Kant, and his reply prefigures modem 
communitarian responses to feminism. Both claim that individual rights are 
superseded, though not removed, by the higher virtues present in marriage. Hegel’s 
account of the family moves beyond rights in that family membership ideally takes 
place on a level at which rights are inapplicable. While this account o f marriage is 
problematic, Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics provides a resource for considering the
Shakespeare, The Phoenix and the Turtle.
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ethical value of marriage. Hegel gives the emotions a place in morality and attributes 
value to institutions which allow the appropriate systems of desire to develop.
Marriage occupies a crucial position in Hegel’s political philosophy: it is the 
immediate phase of ethical life {Sittlichkeit\ which in turn is the third, and highest, 
stage in Hegel’s system. In ethical life, freedom becomes actual, manifest; and it is 
only in ethical life that individuals are able to achieve substantial freedom, which is 
their essence and aim.  ^ Duty is the key to this fulfilment. Ethical life is the realm of 
duty, customary and habitual as well as moral. It is through the constraints o f duty 
that the individual, though she may seem to lose her freedom, actually attains it, 
through the purification of the unchosen drives of the will and the firm acceptance of 
a particular self, a particular set of goals, motives, and values.
The Philosophy of Right charts the individual’s psychological progress from 
the unlimited freedom of the arbitrary will to full personhood. In the former, she 
realises that she has a limitless choice of actions, yet has no basis for choice. In 
ethical life, by assuming a social role — a nexus o f duties — she is able to bring herself 
into the world, that is, to act in a manner which she endorses. And the family is the 
immediate, or spontaneous, phase o f this process.
■IIn section 1 ,1 will provide some background to Hegel’s ethics. His account 
of the development of the will and the stages of right will be crucial to understanding 
his account of marriage. In section 2 , 1 will describe Hegel’s theory of marriage, the 
thesis of which is that spouses are subsumed into an ethical unity. Ethical unity will 
be the subject of Section 3. Sections 4, 5, and 6 will raise criticisms of Hegel’s 
account: individual autonomy is superseded by ethical unity, the retention of contract 
as a morally significant feature of marriage is puzzling, and despite Hegel’s critique of  
rationality, he is liable to charges of rationalism himself.
1. Self and duty in Hegel’s ethics
 ^ See Hegel [1821], p. 189, par. 142; p. 192, par. 149.
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In the tradition of Platonic Idealism, Hegel holds that the universe exists only 
in thought. The universe embodies spirit (Geist), which is “self-thinking thought or 
the self-knowledge of the universe,” but it is also spirit thinking itself, manifesting or 
realising itself, like “a text in which God says what he is.”  ^ The world is developing 
to the point at which spirit is perfectly realised in it, the end of history. The system of 
right is the journey of history, and of the individual, towards the rational order in 
which spirit is fully manifest and in which human freedom is realised.
The basis of right is the realm o f spirit in general and its precise location 
and point of departure is the will; the will is free^ so that freedom 
constitutes its substance and destiny and the system of right is the realm 
of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a 
second nature."^
Becoming a substantially free person is a development towards spirit. This process 
tames the arbitrary will through “purification of the drives” and gives the will content 
through its assumption of the roles and duties o f ethical life. The reflective will, 
which has mastered its drives and posited itself as its content, is free when it thinks 
itself “as identical with the will which has being for itself,” which is “the universal 
will,” spirit or the collective spirit of the age.  ^ As the individual will travels along the 
asymptote to spirit, it becomes free. Hegel’s ethics and political theory make sense 
without reference to spirit as a metaphysical entity.®
The ultimate goal of the will is to actualise the freedom inherent to it. 
Hegelian freedom is a type of positive freedom, for it is not the absence o f restraints, 
but instead the development of personhood through integration jnto the ethical 
substance of the family, civil society, and most importantly, the state. This process 
frees the will from its drives — indiscriminate urges such as hunger and thirst — and so
 ^ Mills 1996a, p. 5 (first quote), and Taylor 1975, p. 88. Taylor translates Geist as ‘God’; I will 
use ‘spirit’.
Hegel [1821], p. 35, par. 4.
 ^Hegel [1821], p. 135, par. 106.
® See Wood 1990 and 1991 for such an interpretation.
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“from the subjectivity and contingency o f their content.” This ordering process “is 
the content of the science of r i g ht . He g e l  holds that what is usually called freedom, 
the ability of the undetermined, apparently unrestrained, will to choose among 
options, is not true freedom, because such choices are in fact determined by arbitrary 
factors:
Since I have the possibility of determining myself... I possess an arbitrary 
will, and this is what is usually called freedom.... [But] The choice lies in 
the indeterminacy of the T and the determinacy of the content... the will 
is consequently not free.... When I will what is rational, I act not as a 
particular individual, but in accordance with the concepts of ethics in 
general.*
Hegel, like Kant, holds that we only truly exercise our freedom in choosing what is 
rational.
Right is rational, and so it embodies our freedom: ^Right is any existence in 
general which is the existence o f the free will y  Right is also, in Hegel’s terminology, 
‘universal’. ‘Universal’ describes a state in which all limitations are removed, as in 
“the pure thinking of oneself,” and the “universal which has being in and for itself’ is 
the r a t i o n a l . B u t  ‘universal’ also signifies collective social practice, as “the 
substance o f self-consciousness, its immanent generic character or immanent idea; it 
is the concept o f the free will as the universal which extends beyond its object. 
Because Hegel holds that right is fully realised in ethical life, he argues that we are 
free when we internalise the practices of ethical life as the content of our wills. 
Subordinating our arbitraiy will to ethical life saves us from the contingency of
 ^Hegel [1821], p. 51, par. 19.
* Hegel [1821], p. 49, par. 15.
9 Hegel [1821], p. 58, par. 29.
Hegel [1821], p. 37, par. 5, and p. 55, par. 24. 1 will discuss the meaning of “in and for 
itself’ below in section 3.
Hegel [1821], p. 55, par. 24. See also Gauthier 1997, p. 8: “what is unique' about actions 
within tlie context of society is tlieir ‘universal’ {allgemein) character, that is, their function
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arbitrary whims. However, Hegel’s dictum, “What is rational is actual; and what is 
actual is rational,” should not be understood to mean that whatever exists is rational, 
or that any communal way of life is ethical. What is actual is what exists in a way 
which actualises spirit.
Hegel marks out three levels of the development of right, corresponding to 
the development of the individual will but also to the evolution of the human spirit 
through history. The first stage, abstract right, consists o f formal right, and the 
person in this stage is a being with an ability to make arbitrary choices and the right to 
a dominion of property (including body and life) over which she can exercise her will. 
This corresponds to Kant’s sense of personality, in which the person is conceived of 
as belonging to the rational and accountable order as opposed to the natural. In this 
sense, ‘person’ is taken from the Roman persona, defined as “man when considered 
in his social status,” and used by Kant “to indicate the capacity o f an individual to 
bear rights ... an individual ... considered as ‘status’ constituted by his or her 
community.” At the stage of abstract right, the individual is considered as holding 
the status of rights-bearer but still as separate from the social bonds o f his 
community.
The next stage is morality, correlating to the individual as subject, whose 
consciousness is reflected back into herself. This is the level of subjective freedom, 
which is the individual’s ability to form herself through her choices, and her 
consciousness of doing so. Morality is inadequate because it remains subjective 
rather than integrating with the objective good. Hegel criticises Rousseau’s appeal to 
conscience, or what he calls subjective morality, in which judgements of right and 
wrong are made by the individual independent of society. On the contrary, the 
individual must assume his ethical duties and make ethical judgements in a social 
context, because the self exists in relation to others. Abstract right and morality, 
Hegel claims, are incomplete developments of human freedom and of right.
within a meaningful system of social practices.” See also Taylor 1975, pp. 113-4: the concrete 
universal is used by Hegel to mean “the reality of the collective spirit.”
Hegel [1821], p. 20. For a discussion of the distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘existent’, see 
Wood 1991, pp. 364-7.
Roberts 1988, p. 55; he quotes from Moyle 1912, p. 86. See Kant [1793], pp. 21-3.
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“Morality and the earlier moment of formal right are both abstractions whose truth is 
attained only in ethical lifeP^  ^ The freedom of the individual is only realised at the 
level of ethical life, in which right is embodied in institutions and shared customs.
Ethical life, in each of its three levels, family, civil society, and the state, is the 
existence of freedom, “the/ûfeut of freedom ... which has its knowledge and volition in 
self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action.” In civil society, 
men exercise subjective freedom through economic transactions, and come to 
recognise their interdependence which is made explicit in the state. Here men 
recognise each other as free, so that their subjective freedom is protected, and as 
fellow members of the state. Each is in turn recognised by others, which enables his 
full self-realisation. In the state men form a universal will which allows them to 
recognise themselves in other men and so overcome the opposition between 
universality and particularity.
The family is the immediate phase of ethical life because it is held together by 
the same non-contractual bonds which characterise the state. Its ethical spirit o f non­
contractual, non-individualistic union reappears, after being dissolved in 
individualistic civil society, as the principle o f the state. In families or the state, 
individuals define themselves as members whose involvement is a duty and integral to 
the will, not alien to it or contingent. But in the family these bonds are reinforced by 
ethical love, not law. Freedom is not the principle of the family, in part because it is 
the immediate stage of ethical life, not yet self-conscious. Men are not fully realised 
in it, but only in the state. But the family is crucial for the existence o f the whole, 
since it is in the family that men — as sons and husbands — learn to belong to a non­
contractual association. In this sense the family is the “model” of the state.
Family membership is unreflective and so does not actualise the highest level 
of consciousness. Individual self-realisation is only fully achieved in the state. 
“Within the polis ‘the community is that substance conscious of what it actually
Hegel [18211, P- 64, par. 33. See also pars. 141, 207, 209.
Hegel [1821], p. 189, par. 142.1 will not discuss the nature of the Idea of freedom — whether 
it is part of an ahistorical human or spiritual essence or a historically contingent social 
construct. For discussions see Taylor 1975, pp. 80-94 and Wood 1991, pp. 378-391.
See Westphal 1984, p. 77.
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does’, which is in opposition to the family as ‘the other side’ whose form is that of 
‘immediate substance or substance that simply is’.” '^^  The family is “ethical life in its 
immediate, relatively unreflective phase in which pristine universality is present, but in 
an unconscious (and therefore inadequate) manner.” *^ The family embodies 
universality because it expresses the spirit of the collective, but it does not recognise 
this principle in itself. In the state, ethical life is expressed in definite structures o f  
laws and institutions. In the family, it is not so defined and therefore unmediated by 
the representation back to the consciousness of its nature. Feminists have noted the 
implications of the immediacy of the family. Most notably, only men can fully realise 
spirit.
Family membership, like the other roles of ethical life, paves our way to 
freedom by reconciling our desires with our duties. Hegel holds that we are free 
when we internalise the practices of ethical life as the content of our wills. In 
apparent paradox, he insists that duty is freedom: “A binding duty can appear as a 
limitation only in relation to indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom.... The 
individual, however, finds his liberation in duty.” Subordinating our arbitrary will to 
the duties of ethical life saves us from the contingency of our drives. Duty also 
liberates the individual “from that indeterminate subjectivity which'does not attain 
existence or ... action, but remains within itself and has no actuality .Subjectiv ity  
remains locked within itself until it finds expression in reality and the recognition o f  
others. Social roles are a way of imposing meaning on our experience, and the 
external world re-acts to support our interpretations.
Right consists of the actualisation of freedom in individuals within societies 
and states providing the conditions for this freedom. Individuals attain freedom when 
their desires are arranged so as to overcome the conflict between individual and 
community. The ethical takes the objective form of laws and institutions, and these 
laws are internalised so that they are “not something alien to the subject,” but ''its
Mills 1996b, p. 60; the quotes are from Phenomenology o f Spirit., pars. 450 and 268. 
1* Cullen 1979, p. 73.
See Mills 1996b; Patemaii 1996; and Starrett 1996.
20 Hegel [1821], p. 192, par. 149.
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own essence The subject defines himself (e.g. as citizen) in a way which connects 
him to the universal. These duties are “substantial determinations,” and the 
“inherently undetermined [individual] ... stands in a relationship to them as to his 
own substantial b e i n g . ” 22 Taking on ethical objective determinations is an ethical duty 
because only through them can the will be free. At the same time, Hegel does not 
disallow individual subjectivity: “The right of individuals to their particularity is 
likewise contained in ethical substantiality, for particularity is the mode of outward 
appearance in which the ethical exists.”2  ^ Subjective right is preserved in civil society 
and the state.
The duties of etliical life effect three important reconciliations in the will on 
which the attainment of freedom depends. Particularity is reconciled with universality 
when the particular content of the will is also a universal determination, such as 
citizenship. Subjectivity is reconciled with objectivity when the individual’s desire 
can be expressed in a way which others recognise and share. Determinacy is 
reconciled with indeterminacy when the will can understand its content as a 
determination chosen by the infinite, undetermined will and so recognise itself in its 
content. 24
The arbitrary, 'immediate or natural will" consists of crude appetite.2  ^ At this 
stage, the content of the will is contingent, but simultaneously, the will is infinite and 
undetermined, since it can be satisfied in multiple ways. The indeterminacy o f the will 
is the capacity of the mind to abstract itself from its contents, “in which every 3
limitation, every content ... is dissolved.” A thinking being has "an ability to abstract 
from anything whatsoever, and likewise to determine himself, to posit any content in 
himself by his own agency. "26 Despite its inherent indeterminacy, the will must have 
some determinate content because it only exists “in so far as it makes any resolutions
2  ^Hegel [1821], p. 191, par. 147; see also p. 189, par. 144. 
22 Hegel [1821], p. 148, par. 191.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 197, par. 154.
24 See Hegel [1821], pp. 37-42, pars. 5-7.
25 Hegel [1821], p. 45, par. 11; also see p. 46, par. 12.
26 Hegel [1821], p. 37, par. 4.
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at all. ” 22 Although we limit ourselves by willing particulars, and do so unffeely if 
caused to do so by the arbitrary will, we cannot be persons at all if we do not will 
anything particular:
a will ... which wills only the abstract universal, wills nothing and is 
therefore not a will at all. The particular which the will wills is a 
limitation, for the will itself, in order to be a will, must in some way limit 
itself 28
Personhood requires that the will posit a content or particularity. But the content 
must be one which the will can recognise as its own, “by wliich it is not restricted but 
in which it finds itself merely because it posits itself in it.”2^  In different terminology, 
the will affirms its content when its first-order desires are endorsed by its second- 
order desires as fitting into its plan of life.
Second, freedom requires that the particular content of the will, through 
thought, be “reflected into itself and thereby restored to universality P Here the will's 
infinity is returned to it, even in particularity, for its content is its own, chosen, and 
that content is also the universal: “[freedom is to will something determinate, yet to 
be with oneself in this determinacy and to return once more to the universal. 
Particularity and universality are united because the particular ends o f the will are at 
the same time universal, expressing and encompassing the collective social spirit.
Finally, the union of subjectivity and objectivity is a formal requirement of the 
freedom of the will. The end which is at first “only subjective and internal” to the 
individual is actualised and ceases to be limited to the individual by becoming 
objective.21 An objective determination, which is an ethical duty, gives the will a 
particular content which is simultaneously a rational form of life recognised by the 
community. By being directed at goals which are part of a larger ethical community,
22 Hegel 11821], p. 46, par. 12.
28 Hegel [1821], p. 40, par. 6.
29 Hegel [1821], p. 41, par. 7.
20 Hegel [1821], p. 42, par. 7.
21 Hegel [1821], p. 43, par. 8.
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our plans of life free us from the narrowness of the particularised will: “self- 
actualization ... includes also the actualization o f the will’s ‘universality’ ... we do not 
actualize ourselves fully as individuals unless we successfully pursue ends larger than 
... anyone’s individual good .” 22 Freedorn is only realised when the will becomes part 
of an ethical way of life. Community is not only significant because, through custom, 
it habituates the will into desiring to do its duty, but because the self exists in relation 
to others.
2. Marriage as ethical union
Hegel writes that in marriage (and the nuclear family) individuals form a larger 
union characterised by “rightfully ethical love.”^^  Contending against views that 
marriage is essentially natural (i.e. sexual), sentimental, or contractual, Hegel claims 
that “[m]arriage is essentially an ethical relationship,” and its ''ethical aspect ... 
consists in the consciousness o f this union as a substantial end, and hence in love, 
trust, and the sharing of the whole of individual existence.”^^  Marriage, like the state, 
cannot be regarded as essentially a contractual relationship, since its essence is to 
overcome the self-sufficient contractual point-of-view. Hegel’s account is explicitly 
intended as a rebuttal to the rights-based analysis of the marriage and the family found 
in Roman law and the contractual explanation given by Kant: “Marriage cannot ... be 
subsumed under the concept of contract; this subsumption ... can only be described as 
disgraceful.”^^  Instead, “the substantial basis of family relationships is rather the 
surrender of personality.”^^
Hegel’s chief claim is that “one is present in [marriage] not as an independent 
person but as a m e m b e r The ethical content of marriage is the “identification of
22 Wood 1991, pp. 378-9.
22 Hegel uses ‘family’ to refer to childless marriages as well as marriages with children.
24 Hegel [1821], pp. 201-2, pars. 161 and 163.
25 Hegel [1821], p. 105, par. 75.
26 Hegel [1821], p. 71, par. 40.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158.
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personalities whereby the family is a single person and its members are its 
accid en ts.In d iv id u al personality, and the rights which family members have as 
family members, are superseded by the union.29 Hegel reiterates the point that 
spouses cease to exist independently and exist instead as members. They “consent to 
constitute a single person and to give up their natural and individual personalities 
within this union.”'^® Marriage arises “out of the mutual and undivided surrender of 
personality” and “out of the free surrender by both sexes of their personalities.’’^ ^
The union is brought about by the paradox which love produces and resolves. 
One limits oneself with reference to another but knows oneself through this very 
limitation. The consciousness negates itself, on the one hand, by limiting itself 
through a determination, but it is with itself again as it affirms its c h o i c e . 4 2  The union 
of marriage has existence as an ethical entity in itself, just as the state has existence as 
an ethical entity. The spiritual union is “indissoluble in itself and exalted above the 
contingency o f the passions and of particular transient c a p r i c e .  ” 42
The idea that spouses form a union, relinquishing their individual personalities, 
is difficult to make intelligible. In the next section, I will attempt to make sense of the 
union which results from love’s paradox. Then I wish to make three criticisms o f this 
account. First, on the only plausible interpretation of spiritual union, marriage is an 
institution which necessarily threatens individual autonomy. Second, Hegel’s 
attribution of ethical significance to the marriage contract is puzzling, given his view 
that the ethical value of marriage is not contractual. Third, his account locates the 
ethical value of marriage in the generic roles and duties it prescribes, with the result 
that natural feeling is inessential. Hegel’s moral rationalism in fact, undermines his 
own account of the ethical value of marriage.
28 Hegel [1821], p. 203, par. 163.
29 See Hegel [1821], pp. 200-1 and 203, pars. 161-3. ‘Family’ is here used as Hegel uses it, as 
a broad term including childless marriages.
40 Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 162.
4^  Hegel [1821], p. 207, par. 167, and par. 168.
42 See Hegel [1821], p. 42, par. 7A.
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3. What kind of union is ethical union?
Hegel identifies the essence of marriage as ethical or spiritual union, the 
resolution which ethical love brings about. Ethical love is distinct from romantic or 
passionate love. Marriage should not be equated with romantic or passionate love, 
according to Hegel, “for love, as a feeling, is open in all respects to contingency, and 
this is a shape which the ethical may not assume.” 4^ Just as Hegel criticises Kant for 
reducing marriage to contract, he criticises the Romantics, particularly Schlegel, for 
identifying it with passion and the particularity of the loved one. Within the spiritual 
bond, sexual passion is subordinated to ethical love, and, contra Kant, this moment of 
marriage is not even necessary.45 In marriage, the implicit (‘in itself) union of the 
sexes is “transformed into a spiritual union, or self-conscious love,” although this 
implicit union is not the chief potentiality realised by ethical love.46
Ethical union in marriage consists of the interdependence of personal identity 
and the surrender of the personality of abstract right. First, marriage as an objective 
determination limits the spouses’ personalities (the undetermined wills of abstract 
right) so that their spousal roles are constitutive of their identities. Second, through a 
dialectic of recognition, each spouse depends on the recognition of the other for his 
or her self-consciousness. Third, the isolated personality of abstract right is 
relinquished, by which individual rights are relinquished and the good o f each 
becomes the common good. Finally, marriage actualises the potential of the spouses, 
so that their development, and so their identity, depends on the marriage.
First, marriage is an objective determination of personality through an 
assumption of duty. Hegel’s theory of personhood stresses the dependence of 
individual personalities on exterior sources. He claims, as we have seen, that one
42 Hegel [1821], pp. 202-3, par. 163. Despite this spiritual indissolubility, Hegel allows divorce 
although contingency is at odds with the “ethical substantiality” of marriage. See Hegel [1821], 
p. 213, par. 176.
44 Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 161.
45 Hegel [1821], p. 204, par. 164.
46 Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 161.
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attains freedom by taking on the determinations of right. Without this freedom, the 
individual is either a bundle of natural inclinations, an empty and undirected 
consciousness, or forced to depend on isolated subjective judgements. Through 
taking on a social role, that is, locating herself in society, the individual realises 
herself and overcomes these indeterminacies.
Identity can only be brought into being through a restrictive, and hence 
educative, socially provided self-definition. It is not inborn, but the assimilation of a 
ready-made set of values and duties. We become ourselves only through ethical 
limitation. Marriage is one such source of identity. Self-description involves 
specification o f one’s spouse as deeply and unalterably related to oneself. One’s wife 
is central to who one thinks one is, just as one’s nation is, but this has in the family a 
reciprocity unavailable at the national level. Marriage is not simply an extra self­
ascription, but a source of individual identity, so that one can never be complete 
outside it.
Second, ethical love consists in “the consciousness of my unity with another, 
so that I am not isolated on my own, but gain my self-consciousness only through the 
renunciation of my independent existence and through knowing myself as the unity of 
myself with another and the other with me.”42 Self-consciousness exists in relation to 
others. This is the point o f Hegel’s famous parable of master and slave: “Self- 
consciousness ... exists only in being acknowledged.”^^  In meeting the other, 
consciousness which is merely immediate, sunk into its own system of needs and 
desires, comes out o f itself, then returns with a new self-apprehension: “They 
recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”^^  According to Hegel, 
self-consciousness comes into existence through action, but the agent can only 
understand the meanings of her actions through “the re-actions of others,” and so 
“self-consciousness is utterly dependent upon its socially conditioned relationships 
with others in order to come to particular knowledge of itself.” '^^  The meaning of 
actions is determined by the meaning given to them by society; “the determinate
42 Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158.
48 Hegel [1807], p. I l l ,  par. 178.
49 Hegel [1807], p. 112, par. 184.
Chapter II: Hegel’s Account of Family Membership 48
character of the action for itself is not an isolated content confined to one external 
unit, but a universal content containing within itself all its various connections.”^^
The consciousness of unity which defines ethical love is the consciousness of  
one’s identity as a spouse, but it is also part of a dialectic of self-recognition. In 
marriage, spouses identify with the other so that they are incomplete on their own, 
but in gaining the recognition of the other, their own autonomy is reflected back to 
them.^2 But since the other’s recognition is necessary for self-knowledge, the other 
becomes partly constitutive of oneself. Between the spouses, this unity exists in 
consciousness and so is still ‘in itself. Its physical realisation is found in the offspring 
of the marriage:
The unity of marriage, which in substance is merely inwardness and 
disposition but in existence is divided between the two subjects, itself 
becomes in the children an existence which has being fo r  itself and an 
object which they [i. e. the parents] love as their love and their substantial
existence. 22
The marriage union realises the potentialities of the spouses, yet the union itself 
remains in a state of potentiality until it gains physical existence in the children.
However, this has not cleared up what Hegel means by saying that in marriage 
spouses agree to relinquish their individual personalities and constitute a single 
person. Because the spouses’ identities are interdependent, they no longer think of 
themselves from the point of view of isolated individuals. Rather than simply gaining 
an extra source of identity, they have lost access to the individual standpoint and thus 
relinquished their individual personalities. If one gains one’s self-consciousness from 
another, one can no longer think of herself simply in terms of ‘I’. T’ has become 
dependent on ‘we’.
20 Gauthier 1997, p. 2.
2^  Hegel [18211, P- 147, par. 119. See Gauthier 1997, Chapter I, for a discussion of Hegel’s 
notion of collective moral agency.
22 See Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 210, par. 173. Words in brackets are translator’s.
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One inadequate interpretation of Hegel’s claim is that only (!) legal 
personhood is r e l i n q u i s h e d . 24 On this interpretation, what is relinquished is not 
individual personality, but the idea of oneself as a separate legal entity. But the 
alteration o f consciousness which occurs in marriage, according to Hegel, is not 
limited to one’s self-conception as a legal entity. One renounces one’s “independent 
existence” and derives self-consciousness in its entirety through the u n i o n .22
Of course, as Westphal notes, the notions of love and trust presuppose 
difference, so that difference must survive marriage.26 The notion of spouses’ giving 
up their individual personalities in fiill would result in no content, for if both gave up 
their individual ends and preferences in order that their identities may converge, there 
would no longer be any self for the other to meet. Hegel does not imply that one’s 
particular tastes, reactions, and other accoutrements of individuality are lost in the 
surrender of personality. But he does imply the surrender of more than legal 
personality: ‘person’ technically refers to the object of abstract right.22 ‘Personality’ 
(which spouses surrender) refers to the subject’s “consciousness o f itself in general as 
concrete and in some way determined ... [and] as a completely abstract ‘I’ in which all 
concrete limitation ... [is] negated.”2*
It seems clear that ‘person’ is used in the sense of the person of abstract right: 
marriage as an objective determination limits the inherently undetermined personality, 
determining the content of the ‘I’. Spouses do not simply surrender their legal rights, 
but they bind their "infinite, universal, and free " wills, surrendering personality in its
24 Westphal takes this as obvious: he quotes Hegel, “one’s frame of mind is to have self- 
consciousness of one’s individuality within tliis unity as the absolute essence of oneself, with 
the result that one is in it not as an independent person but as a member,” and adds, “It is quite 
clear that Hegel here uses ‘person’ in its legal sense.” Westphal 1984, p. 87 and fn. 20; he 
quotes Hegel [1821], par. 158. At the crucial point in the passage Westphal quotes — “not as 
an independent person” — Hegel’s German reads “eine Person fur sich.” The German ‘Person’ 
is equivalent with the English ‘person’, and is customarily used by Hegel to refer to the 
individual in abstract right -- not just to tlie individual’s legal rights (‘legal personhood’) but to 
his consciousness in the particular stage of development that constitutes personliood and is the 
ground for his legal rights.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158.
26 Westphal 1984, p. 89.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 228, par. 190.
28 Hegel [1821], p. 68, par. 35.
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aspect as the ability to abstract oneself from any situation whatsoever.29 They also 
give up the isolated individualism of the personality of abstract right, which has 
limited itself by marriage in such a way as to connect it to the universal.^® Compare 
this passage which describes the freedom attained when the will has progressed from 
the person of abstract right to the self-determining subject of morality to the citizen 
(or wife) of ethical life:
[W]e already possess this freedom in the form of feeling, fon example in 
friendship and love. Here we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but 
willingly limit ourselves with reference to another, even while knowing 
ourselves in this limitation as ourselves. In this determinacy, the human 
being should not feel determined; on the contrary, he attains his self- 
awareness only by regarding the other as other.61
This interpretation o f ‘person’ as ‘person in abstract right’ not only corresponds more 
closely with Hegel’s customary usage than the interpretation as ‘legal person’, but it 
makes much more sense. Ethical life represents the stage o f development at which 
the will is limited and reconciled with its limitations, and marriage is the first stage of 
ethical life.
As a result of the relinquishment of the isolated individualistic viewpoint of 
abstract right, the differentiation between persons fade, to an extent, within the 
family. Trust is
the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved 
and contained in the interest and end of an other ... and in the latter’s 
relation to me as an individual. As a result, this other immediately ceases 
to he an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am f r e e .  62
29 Hegel [1821], p. 68, par. 35.
60 See Hegel [1821], p. 42, par. 7 A.
61 Hegel [1821], p. 42, par. 7A.
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Spouses are unified because they have abandoned the standpoint o f individual 
personality. When this reconciliation between the individual and the larger 
association is repeated in the state, subjective freedom and the legal personality are 
preserved.
It might seem odd that family members should surrender their abstract 
personalities, when in the state, subjective freedom is preserved. But while, like 
marriage, citizenship constitutes an objective determination o f the will, it does not 
require the surrender of abstract personality. In marriage, the personality of abstract 
right does not just receive a limitation, but is surrendered as a result of the 
dispositional state of ethical love, that is, the derivation o f consciousness from the 
other.
A person has self-consciousness "within this unity [of marriage] as essentiality 
which has being in and for itself, so that one is present in it not as an independent 
person but as a memberf This is so because the family’s determination is “the spirit’s 
feeling of its own unity, which is lovef^^ To make sense o f this we have to 
understand Hegel’s terminology. That which is an sich (in itself) is the Idea, still 
unrealised, which contains the seeds o f its essential nature (Hegel uses the 
Aristotelian plant metaphor). What is fur sich (for itself) is the Idea “exteriorized,” 
realised in the external, physical world. But at this stage its self-identity is lost 
because its self-consciousness is submerged in physical matter. When it becomes 
anundfiirsich (in and for itself), spirit’s self-consciousness returns to it in its physical 
realisation, so that it comes to self-knowledge within “fully developed external 
reality.”64
Marriage realises the individual’s essence as a married self, which was ‘in 
itself, as yet unrealised, until she married. When she becomes conscious of her 
married self as “essentiality which has being in and for itself,” she sees that her 
individuality always inherently contained this essence which has now been realised. 
And so she is present in marriage “not as an independent person but as a member.”
62 Hegel [1821], p. 288, par. 268, my italics. 
62 Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158.
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Because one only comes to existence through marriage, that is, one’s potentiality is 
only actualised in marriage, one’s existence depends on the union.
Both husbands and wives realise their potential in marriage, though women’s 
development stops at this point while men’s continues in civil society and the state. 
Note that, at least for men, other determinations play similar actualising, and 
therefore ethically necessary, roles. Due to its rational nature, the state’s existence is 
a necessity and men’s membership in it an ethical duty. Just so, the institution of 
marriage is ethically necessary and membership in it an ethical duty.62
Ethical union is ethical because this type of association reconciles the 
individual to the larger community, in this case, the community of the family. The 
reconciliation does not depend on contingent, transient passion, but a love which 
because it is ethical is removed from contingency. Marriage is the immediate moment 
o f ethical life, the natural and unmediated form of non-contractual association. The 
role o f marriage in determining the will in accordance with the universal makes it, 
according to Hegel, an objective determination, or ethical duty.
The overcoming of subjectivity plays a significant part in the realisation of
right:
Ethical life depends upon marriage because marriage is the origin o f the 
family. In the family, children learn, and adults are continually reminded 
of, what it means to be a small association based on love and trust; ... 
they gain experience of a noncontractual association and so are prepared 
— or, rather, men are prepared — for participation in the universal public 
sphere of the state.^6
However, marriage has ethical significance as a non-contractual association even 
when children are not produced by it. Husbands as well as sons internalise the spirit 
o f unity. In marriage, what a spouse is prompted to do by inclination converges with
64 Taylor 1975, p. 112. Knox translates anundfiirsich as ‘absolute’; Hegel [1821], Translator’s 
preface, p. xxxix.
65 See Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 162.
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his spousal duties, but he also develops the inclinations of trust and mutuality which 
are foundational to the political order.
Marriage is an ethical duty because it determines identity in a way which lifts 
the self out of its narrow interests. It overcomes subjectivity and purifies the drives 
of the will. It is a limitation in that spouses “give up their natural and individual 
personalities within this union ... but since they attain their substantial self- 
consciousness [the union of objectivity with subjectivity] within it, it is in fact their 
liberation.” ?^ It liberates spouses from one-sided indeterminacy and from narrow 
particularity.
Marriage is valuable, to Hegel, as a non-contractual association which 
determines the will in a way harmonious with the demands of ethical life, that is, in a 
universal determination. Its status as a social institution is also relevant in that this 
status gives objective meaning to its roles and duties. Hegel writes that “no one 
aspect [of marriage] on its own constitutes the whole extent... o f its ethical character 
— and one or other aspect of its existence may be absent, without prejudice to the 
essence [i.e. the ethical union] of marriage.”68 Sex and procreation are part o f the 
ethical aspect o f marriage, but are not necessary for it to have ethical value (though 
Hegel certainly suggests that the physical intimacy of marriage is a route to the 
merging of identities).69
4. The threat to autonomy
As a consequence of the surrender of the personality of abstract right, spouses 
become one person in terms of rights and property ownership. Hegel specifies that 
“the family’s resources ... are common property, so that no member of the family has 
particular property, although each has a right to what is held in c o m m o n . I n  giving
66 Pateman 1996, p. 215.
62 Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 162; and see p. 189, par. 144.
68 Hegel [1821], p. 204, par. 164.
69 See Hegel [1821], p. 200, par. 161; p. 210, par. 173.
20 Hegel [1821], p. 209, par. 171.
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up their personality they give up their personal right. Material wealth belongs equally 
to each family member, as if they were only one person. Equal ownership is possible 
because the rights-bearing individual who belongs to the sphere of abstract right is 
superseded in the family by the role-embedded person of ethical life.
In a functioning family, the terminology of rights is unnecessary:
the right which belongs to the individual by virtue o f the family unit ... 
takes on legal form ... only when the family begins to dissolve. In this 
situation, those who ought to be members ... receive separately and in a 
purely external manner — [in the shape of] financial resources, food, costs 
of education, etc. — what was formerly their due as a determinate 
moment within the family.21
The performance of family duties is motivated by virtue or love, not respect for 
abstract right. Further, the concept of right is insufficient because the child (for 
example) does not have an external right against the parents’ resources. The 
resources are her own, as a member of the family unit. This analysis extends to other 
types of individual rights, the liberties required by personality to one’s body and life. 22 
These rights continue to exist in family life, but they are not relevant. Hegel assumes 
that in a functioning family a member does not think in terms o f the others’ right not 
to be harmed, but rather in terms of what they need, desire, and would benefit from, 
just as she thinks of herself.
The surrender of legal personality follows from the surrender of abstract 
personality, from the surrender of the individualistic viewpoint. The family 
constitutes a single person in law because its members have lost the abstract 
personalities on which legal rights supervene. This presents a threat to autonomy. In 
Hegel’s account, the loss of abstract personality explicitly deprives women of legal
21 Hegel [1821], p. 200, par. 159.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 71, par. 40.
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rights. Hegel holds that only women relinquish their legal personalities in marriage, 
for the husband becomes the legal representative of the family.22
Like Kant, Hegel is curiously ambiguous here. He states explicitly and 
repeatedly that both spouses give up their personalities to the union. Both parties 
“feel deficient and incomplete” on their own, and “gain ... self-consciousness only 
through the renunciation of independent existence and through knowing [themselves] 
as the unity” of both.24 But it is the husband who represents the family in the outside 
world and controls its resources. This means, in effect, that the assertion o f shared 
ownership is a claim without consequences, for the wife cannot access her property 
against her husband’s wishes. She cannot cite a right to it, as rights are inapplicable 
in this context. Hegel fails to provide for the equality of which he speaks as 
belonging to the members of the family. He does not in fact support actual equality 
because he believes the sexes have different abilities: man is volitional, woman 
emotional. Hegel conflates the single person which the family constitutes with the 
male head of household.
Spouses give up their rights to each other, but the wife gives hers up to the 
husband — so he has his own back, as well as hers. But on an egalitarian conception 
of the sexes, this simply will not work. Since neither spouse is superior, neither gains 
both sets of rights, but both yield their rights before the other. And this results in a 
real disadvantage for each. The loss of rights is clearly unacceptable. It would be 
unacceptable from the point of view of someone committed to a rights-based 
approach to moral theory, and, if the theory of marriage is to underpin its legislation, 
in political theory.25
But it is more broadly unacceptable than that. Hegel wishes marriage to be 
valuable to the participants. It must have value for them since it reconciles their 
individual desires with the needs of the community. But for marriage to structure 
someone’s desires, he must internalise either a desire for it or a belief in its value.
22 Hegel [1821], p. 209, par. 171.
24 Hegel [1821], p. 199, par. 158. Roger Scruton suggests that this description of love is of 
sexual love (Scruton 1986, p. 1).
25 For example, it was the doctrine of spousal unity which underpinned coverture, and 
afterwards of the impossibility of marital rape.
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Hegel’s beliefs about the sexes enabled him to think that marriage could have value 
for a woman even though it removed her independent rights, so he was able to 
reconcile the demand that marriage be valuable with its removal of the basis for 
rights. The representation of spouses as a single person cannot survive if it is also 
held that the spouses are equal persons, neither of whom is subordinate or assimilable 
due to inferiority.
This issue is a significant difficulty for Hegel. In his account wives lose their 
identity in marriage. But if we assume that women and men are equal in all morally 
and politically relevant ways, and then follow his reasoning, it still turns out that 
either one or both of the spouses must lose his or her legal identity. This state of  
affairs is only desirable on the thesis o f sexual inequality, in which women lose 
nothing by losing themselves in the family, and men are able to leave the family to 
gain their substantial personality. Otherwise it clearly threatens an important human 
good. If marriages are valuable, their essential nature should not be such as to 
diminish this good. If independence is an important prerequisite for human happiness, 
then its loss in marriage will be a loss o f value.
It may be that marriage must deprive at least one spouse o f a basic good. 
Perhaps the thesis that it is valuable for the individual will have to go, rather than the 
doctrine of spousal unity. But there is no good reason to accept that doctrine. First 
of all, it is metaphysically mysterious how a person can ever give up her abstract 
personality. Second, if it becomes impossible to say that spouses give up their moral 
or legal personhood, what is it that they give up? Spouses retain their separateness. 
In fact, as already noted, marriage is built on difference. This last point shows that 
the thesis of spousal unity does not correctly describe marriage. Hegel’s account, in 
which individual identity is submerged in marriage, does not only fail to preserve 
individual autonomy, it fails to deliver a satisfactory answer to the question of what 
makes a marriage good. Trust and love, while drawing people together, both 
presuppose the separateness of selves.
5. The role of contract
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In the marriage union, spouses transcend the standpoint of contract, as 
citizens do in the state. Marriage “begins from the point of view o f contract — i.e. 
that o f individual personality as a self-sufficient unit — in order to supersede 
But this makes it unclear why marriage should begin in contract at all. Marriage 
cannot be essentially contractual, since persons cannot exchange rights over 
themselves through contract.22 Contract cannot bring about ethical union. So why 
retain the contract as ethically necessary? Carole Pateman asks this question and 
concludes that Hegel retains contract in order to maintain the fiction that everyone, 
including women, participates in freedom, when in fact women’s entry into the 
contract is far from free.28 But my question is not so much why Hegel is so 
inconsistent, but what the inconsistency means for the interpretation of his account 
of marriage.
There is a significant inconsistency in Hegel’s account. The individual will 
continues to exist in contract.29 But what the will decides in the marriage contract is 
to surrender itself to the determination o f marriage. As Mill pointed out in On 
Liberty, freedom of contract is inconsistent with the ability to contract away one’s 
freedom; can the will decide to unify itself with another and surrender its 
independence? In Hegel, one simply can’t do so through contract. One can’t give 
oneself but only something external, a service or alienable thing.*®
We come to a dilemma: Hegel argues that contract cannot effect the kind of 
marital union he describes (one cannot give up abstract personality, or rights over 
one’s self, through contract). Then, if ethical union exhausts the ethical essence of 
marriage (as Hegel suggests it does in paragraph 163), contract is inessential to the 
ethical value of marriage. Or else, if we insist on contract as a necessary condition of 
the ethical value (not just legal establishment) o f marriage, spiritual union is not the
26 Hegel [1821], p. 203, par. 163.
22 See my Chapter 1.5, for a discussion of Hegel’s criticisms of the contractual account of 
marriage.
2» Pateman 1996, pp. 211, 217.
29 Hegel [1821], p. 109, par. 79.
8® Hegel [1821], pp. 70-2, par. 40.
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sole ethical value of marriage. That is, contract is another source o f the ethical value 
of marriage. But Hegel has said that it is not. Hegel tries to explain away the 
dilemma — between contract as source of ethical value and spiritual union as 
exhausting ethical essence — by attributing the significance of contract to the role it 
plays in spiritual union. But it cannot play any role in spiritual union!
Hegel writes that the significance of the marriage ceremony is not, as Kant 
held, that the ethical value o f marriage flows from the rights created'by the contract, 
but that the ethical bond is expressed in language and created by the spouses’ consent 
and the recognition of the community. The “objective origin [of marriage] is the free 
consent o f the persons concerned, and in particular their consent to constitute a  
single person and to give up their natural and individual personalities witliin this 
union.”*^  This consent takes the form of a contract. But it’s unclear why contract 
plays a role in the ethical value of marriage.
Hegel wants to say that contract is more than a merely legal formality, which 
would add nothing to the ethical value of marriage but is a usefiil instrument for state 
regulation: “It is accordingly only after this ceremony has first taken place ... that this 
bond has been ethically constituted.”*^  Hegel tries to import contract as a necessary 
condition for the ethical value of marriage, not just an inessential instrument. Hegel 
states emphatically, against sexual liberals such as Schlegel, that the formal consent o f  
the parties and its recognition by the community are necessary to complete a 
marriage.
Now, either contract is a necessary condition for the ethical value of marriage, 
or it isn’t. But Hegel seems to have it both ways, because he also explicitly argues 
that contract cannot be the source of the ethical value of marriage. If it isn’t the 
source (or a necessary condition for the source), it can hardly be a necessary 
condition for the ethical value of marriage. And since the source is ethical love, it’s 
difficult to see why a contract could be a necessary condition for the source. After 
all, the same type of ethical relation exists in the state, without a contract. In trying 
to show that it is a necessary condition for the ethical value of marriage, he appears to
*1 Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 162.
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contradict his earlier statements that it is not the source of the ethical value, as well as 
his arguments for that position.
The role which contract plays in establishing the ethical value of marriage is 
the completion o f its substantial aspect by the sign, that is, by language. But in 
Hegel’s theory o f contract, the sign is used to give existence to a contractual 
agreement as a representation of the common will.^  ^ Just as the sign effects the 
transfer of property which may not yet be in actual possession, it effects the bond 
between spouses. The intention of the common will is secured and made actual 
through the sign.
Yet in contract, the sign binds wills which may prove recalcitrant to 
performance of that which the common will has agreed. Despite the agreement, the 
particular wills of the parties may be refractory. But marriage, according to Hegel, 
unites the wills of the spouses. How then could their wills be recalcitrant? Of course, 
the spouses may change their minds. But then in what sense is their common will as a 
married couple different from the common will of contract? How can the union 
Hegel imagines exists in marriage originate through contract? He has specifically 
argued that it cannot. In contract, “my will retains its determination as this will.”^^  
He explicitly states that marriage, like the state, cannot be understood as contractual.
Making sense of the role contract plays in creating ethical union illuminates 
Hegel’s account. Ethical union is reconcilable with contractual origin because the 
spouses commit themselves to conjugal roles, not to each other. They cannot give 
themselves into each other’s possession through contract, but they can contract to 
take on a set of duties. The point of the contract in Hegel’s account is communal 
recognition of the relationship which the parties are entering. In this ceremony the 
“bond is expressed and confirmed as an ethical quality exalted above the contingency 
o f feeling and particular inclination. T h e  bond is raised above natural or 
particular feeling to the substantial. The contract seals the bond by committing the 
spouses to the roles and duties of husband and wife.
82 Hegel [1821], p. 204, par. 164.
83 Hegel [1821], pp. 104-113, pars. 72-80.
84 Hegel [1821], p. 103, par. 71.
Chapter II: Hegel’s Account of Family Membership 60
This shows how contractual origin is possible for ethical unity. The spouses 
are pledging to take on the roles of husband and wife rather than giving themselves to 
the other. They are contracting to take on a status, a curious contract, but not an 
incoherent one. The relation entailed by the status supersedes the contract because it 
is not the sort of relation which contract can instantiate. But note the shift o f  
emphasis: the spouses are not pledging themselves to each other, but pledging to take 
on the status of wife or husband relative to the other. Notice too that all o f the 
components of ethical unity — self-definition in terms of the role, the realisation of 
potential, and the derivation of self-consciousness — also attach to generalised roles 
rather than a particular relation to a particular other. This explains the contractual 
origin of marriage, but it also makes it apparent that Hegel devalues the emotional 
aspect of marriage, for ethical love is the assumption of a generalised role rather than 
a particular relation to a particular other.
6. Moral rationalism and the critique of rationality
While Hegel’s system recognises the ethically motivational power o f emotion, 
his account of marriage fails to attribute ethical value to the natural emotion of  
individuals for particular others. Ethical unity is based not on particular feeling for 
the other but on the assumption of the role of husband or wife which entails specific 
duties. The basis of family unity is not sentimental, according to Hegel, “for love, as 
a feeling, is open in all respects to contingency, and this is a shape which the ethical 
may not assume.”^^ Natural feeling inclines husband and wife to perform their duties, 
but the value of their association does not spring from love in the sense o f natural or 
sentimental feeling. Ethical value springs from the nature of the family as a non­
contractual association which develops the ethical spirit of the community. Hegel 
argues that marriage incorporates a bond like the trust between citizens, except that 
its basis is emotional. A sense of identity arises between spouses through a
85 Hegel 11821], p. 204, par. 164.
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spontaneous feeling of unity, rather than being enforced through law. But ethical 
love is a different state than a spontaneous feeling of love. It is identification with a 
duty which moulds emotional life rather than an individual’s contingent feelings for 
her particular spouse. Insofar as the spouses’ mutual recognition is immediate, and 
so gives rise to natural feeling, it is not ethical: the ethical aspect o f their relation 
consists in “dutiful reverence of husband and wife towards each other.” ?^
For the wife, the particular must not enter into the ethical aspect o f marriage: 
“In the ethical household, it is not a question of this particular husband, this particular 
child, but simply of husband and children generally; the relationships of the woman 
are based, not on feeling, but on the universal.”^^  This applies to the husband too, but 
he is permitted to desire his wife as a particular woman because he can connect to 
universality in the wider sphere of the state. As a mother and wife, as object of desire 
and as somehow “evanescent” (in both o f these roles), the woman is a particular 
individual who is “for that very reason a contingent element which can be replaced by 
another individual.”^^  The role is the ethical substance; the particular individual is 
replaceable.
But what is ethical love, which does not focus on the particular husband or 
child? It is * sentimental’ love removed to the ethical realm, removed from 
contingency, no longer spontaneous, and made the tool of duty. This is no longer 
love at all, but an act of will. Hegel’s account by excluding contingency excludes 
‘natural’ love. This reflects his moral rationalism: emotion is only valuable insofar as 
it is inhabited by reason, whose actualisation in individuals and society is the true 
source of ethical value. Hegel tries to analyse “the arrangement of institutions and 
practices that would make ... a coincidence [between universal law and particular 
will] likely to occur.” °^
My aim here is not to criticise moral rationalism, but to point out a flaw in 
Hegel’s account of marriage. Hegel’s picture is something like this; The family
8^  Hegel [1821], p. 201, par. 161.
87 Hegel [1807], p. 273, par. 456.
88 Hegel [1807], p. 274, par. 457.
89 Hegel [1807], p. 274, par. 457.
90 Gauthier 1997, p. 28.
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figures as the immediate phase of ethical life, the natural face of duty, because its 
obligations are honoured spontaneously. One does not fulfil these obligations simply 
because they accord with one’s self-image, but because one authentically desires to. 
Desiring to do so is part of one’s identity. This notion obviously needs qualification: 
a spouse may desire to break her pledge o f fidelity, a mother may desire to spend her 
money on herself rather than her child. But the essential point, that the performance 
of family duties is motivated by feeling, survives these qualifications, for there is a 
clear contrast between providing food and shelter for one’s children and paying one’s 
taxes. Both, according to Hegel, are species of duty, but in family life duty is 
encouraged by one’s emotions, whereas in the state it is promoted by the law. Hegel 
explains the naturalness of performing duties within the family as an effect of the 
merging of selves which takes place between family members. What’s wrong with 
this picture is that ethical love carmot reconcile desire and duty. Ethical love is 
divorced from natural emotion, so it is not a desire inhabited by reason. It is not a 
desire at all, but a attitude appropriate to a role. As the essence of marriage, ethical 
love cannot actualise freedom, since it is not authentic desire. Of course, it is mixed 
with natural desire. But it is ethical love which is meant to do the work of reconciling 
desire with duty, since natural feeling is always contingent.
The integration of duty and desire is significant within Hegel’s ethics as the 
source of freedom. The recognition of inclination as ethically valuable forms a 
distinctive component of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s ethics. Hegel thinks, as Kant 
does not, that universal law can be embodied in the particular will. The alignment of 
inclination and right is not just instrumentally valuable, in predisposing individuals to 
perform duties, but it contributes to freedom and to the realisation of right. When 
people internalise ethical life, their particular wills are reunited with the universal. 
The performance of duties ceases to represent a limitation and instead becomes an 
acknowledgement of one’s freedom as a rational and social being: '"concrete freedom 
requires that personal individuality ... should ... knowingly and willingly acknowledge 
this universal interest even as [its] own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as
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[its] ultimate end"^  ^ The conflict between the individual and the community is 
happily resolved, since ethical conduct “fulfills me through satisfying society's 
demands on me. It takes care of my interests ... and it leads me without reluctance ... 
to help those to whom I am bound by concrete ethical relationships.”^^  On the other 
hand, right is not fully actualised unless expressed in the desires of individuals: “the 
universal does not attain validity or ftilfilment without the ... volition of the 
particular.” )^ Not only does individual freedom depends on the unity o f desire and 
duty, but so too does the existence of right: “‘right’ fully exists if and only if it is 
integrated into the emotional life as a functioning social w h o l e . ” ^^ But ethical love is 
not rooted in emotional life.
Freedom and the realisation of right follow from the embodiment of the 
universal in individual emotional life. Nevertheless, Hegel has been criticised as a 
moral rationalist, identifying morality with reason and devaluing e m o t i o n . 95 Indeed, 
Hegel does not attribute ethical value to emotional experience in itself. We saw that 
Kant identifies the moral value o f marriage in reconciling sexual use with human 
rational nature, corresponding to the emphasis throughout his ethics on human 
rationality as the source of the moral law and o f human moral agency. Kant’s view 
can be accused of over-moralisation, that is, o f being unable to account for certain 
kinds of value because it assigns moral worth only to moral motivations. Thus, for 
instance, a Kantian might explain a painter's devotion to his work as morally worthy 
because of the moral duty to develop talents. Kant can also be accused o f over­
rationalisation since he attributes moral value only to acting out of reason. Hegel 
gives the emotions a place in ethical life. As we have seen, Hegel locates the ethical 
worth of marriage in its non-contractual nature, corresponding with the larger thesis 
of the Philosophy of Right, But he still does not locate value in particular emotional 
responses.
91 Hegcl [1821], p. 282, par. 260.
92 Wood 1991, p. 381.
93 Hegel [1821], p. 282, par. 260; see also pars. 124, 130, 187, 260, 263, 268.
94 Gauthier 1997, p. 103, and see p. 28. See also Cullen 1979, pp. 94-5.
95 See Gauthier 1997, pp. 109-11 for analysis of the charges.
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While ethical life preserves subjective freedom, the highest stage of ethical 
development is communal, and in this sense Hegel is an anti-individualist, for his ethic 
of self-realisation involves transcending individualism. While Kant held up the 
cultivation of reason as the method of self-realisation. Romantics claimed the 
development of feeling was more important. Kantian self-realisation involves a 
universal self, a self motivated by reason and morality, which will be constant in all 
the individuals who embody it. The Romantics, on the other hand, aim towards 
development of the individual’s particular faculties, especially those of the emotions.
Hegel accepts Kantian rationality although he criticises it as limited. 
However, he also criticises the Romantic emphasis on feeling. The Hegelian notion 
o f self-actualisation is development towards spirit, so that particular emotional and 
personal development is o f ethical value only insofar as it converges with dutifulness. 
Conjugal love is valuable in terms o f the correspondence of the roles and duties it 
provides to reason, not on its own account. Lacking an ability to value emotion as it 
is actually experienced by particular human beings, Hegel’s theory cannot locate the 
ethical value of marriage in the emotions which are central to it. Ethical love, as he 
has it, is but a dutifiil revenant o f these feelings.
7. Developing Hegel’s account
Despite its failings, Hegel’s account, in its focus on the psychology of 
marriage, was a substantial contribution to the philosophy of mamage. He drew 
attention to the internal and emotional aspects of marriage, its state o f mind, and 
turned attention away from the marriage contract and the rights it creates. This is not 
to say that rights terminology is inapplicable: over the past decades, feminists have 
drawn aside the traditional veil of privacy shielding marriage from public scrutiny and 
legal jurisdiction. Rights are crucial within marriage, not least to protect spouses 
from each other. But the rights accounts which Hegel dismissed, those found in Kant 
and in Roman law, understood the right central to marriage as a right of possession
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(in Roman law, of the husband over the wife). Also, a rights-based account alone 
fails to differentiate marriage from other types of institution and to explain why it is 
an end in itself, not a means to some other goal. Hegel’s theory is able to include the 
strong psychological bonds that characterise marriage in an account of its value. By 
avoiding the external concepts of contract and rights, he concentrates on the unity of 
spouses rather than emphasising their ultimate separateness.
Hegel’s account can be developed in various directions. The first is a neo- 
Hegelian account o f the moral value of marriage in terms of natural and sentimental 
love. Such an account would have to attribute value to natural love, similar to that 
given by proponents o f an ethics of care. In Chapter IV, I will argue that care ethics 
is inadequate and that a care-centred account of the moral value of marriage, which 
attributes intrinsic value to love, likewise fails.
In Chapter III, I will make positive use of the ‘virtue’ aspect of Hegel’s 
account. This is the claim that family membership prepares individuals for 
relationships o f commitment and trust in the world outside the family, This attributes 
instrumental, not intrinsic, ethical value to love. I wish to show that, while this 
account of the value o f marriage shares some features with communitarianism, a 
liberal can accept it as a reason for marriage legislation.
One could also develop Hegel’s account by attempting to rewrite it without 
Hegel’s sexist premises. Hegel believed that women’s ethical nature was unreflective 
so that they were limited to the inadequate sphere of the family. If the premise that 
women’s ethical nature is unreflective is subtracted, then what role does the family 
play in ethical life? Could it cease to be inadequate, or, when women seek to 
actualise their freedom as men do, must the family dissolve?
Finally, how must the family be changed in order to correspond to right? 
Social practices must meet the criteria of right or the ethical development of the 
society and its members is limited. In a slave-owning society, for instance, true 
recognition of the value of human beings cannot occur. If Hegel’s belief that women 
are subordinate to men is removed, then the institution of marriage, as he has it, 
would look veiy much like slavery. It would then require fiirther developments in 
order to realise the universal, although Hegel would not call on the state to intervene
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to effect this change. However, insofar as the family is a legal and not just a social 
institution, its legal structure could be made more rational. A Hegelian could develop 
Hegel’s account of marriage in this third direction. However, as I will seek to show 
what legal structure marriage must have in a liberal state, I will lay this task aside.
CHAPTER III: THE MORAL VALUE OF MARRIAGE
1. Claims for the value of traditional marriage
i. Marriage and morality
ii. Citizenship
iii. Society
iv. Children
2. Other accounts
3. Kantian accounts
4. Hegelian accounts
5. Aristotelian accounts
6. The rationale of marriage law
Kant’s discussion of marriage in The Doctrine o f Right attempted to show 
that the political institution of marriage is morally required as a precondition o f  
procreation, just as he had earlier demonstrated the moral necessity for legal property 
rights as a precondition for ownership. In this chapter, I will argue for the 
justification o f the legal institution of marriage in terms of its moral value. I will 
discuss the moral value of the institution of marriage independently from its legal 
status (until section 6). I will claim, first, that an individual marriage has no ‘added’ 
moral value above the moral value of the relationship itself. However, given that this 
type of relationship does have moral value (as I will argue here and in Chapter IV), 
the institution of marriage is morally, and politically, valuable just insofar as it 
promotes or enables relationships like these. I will argue, in section 6, that marriages 
are necessarily constituted as state-recognised contracts. Given this, the legal 
institution of marriage is justifiable, as the state has a legitimate reason to recognise
.................. ...__________________
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marriage, and as the institution depends on this recognition. Unlike Kant, I will not 
argue that marriage legislation is morally necessary, but rather that the institution of  
marriage plays a socially valuable role which it can only perform with the backing of 
the state.
In this chapter, I will survey several attempts to attribute moral value to 
marriage. Then I will develop the previously suggested possibilities o f Kantian and 
Hegelian accounts of marriage. I will defend a virtue account of the ftioral value of  
marriage. In the next chapter, I will argue against the ‘care’ account o f the moral 
value o f marriage and offer an alternative account of the moral value to be found in 
the relationships promoted by marriage. A fuller consideration of marriage and 
gender inequality will be pursued in Chapter VI.
1. Claims for the value of traditional marriage
What I will refer to as the traditional marriage contract is the marriage law of  
Britain and America from the 1880’s to the 1970’s, that is, marriage as a 
monogamous, heterosexual, ideally lifelong institution. This form o f marriage has 
been defended as morally and instrumentally valuable. In this section, I will examine 
some of these claims.
The value attributed to marriage and its effects on society have been used to 
justify marriage legislation, as in the following ruling:
[Marriage] is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity
the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and
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of society, without which there would be neither civilization or 
progress. ^
Traditional marriage has been claimed to contribute to social stability and public 
morality. From this viewpoint, easy access to divorce and the prioritisation of  
individual fulfilment over duty in marriage have been said to lead to a range o f social 
ills, from undisciplined children to poor single-parent families to a breakdown of  
communal bonds.
Both instrumental and intrinsic value have been attributed to traditional 
marriage. Instrumental value has been claimed for the efifects which it has on society 
or the benefits which accrue to the state fi’om the institution. This claimed 
instrumental value of marriage legislation encompasses “promoting public morality, 
ensuring family stability, assuring support obligations, and assigning responsibility for 
the care of children.”  ^ The instrumental economic value o f marriage derives from the 
fact that it shifts obligations o f support to spouses, not the state. The work done by 
parents can also be included in marriage’s economic value. However, these benefits 
could be achieved through many different kinds of legislation (such as the Poor Law) 
and in any case do not seem to amount to moral value.
Claims for the instrumental moral value of traditional marriage do not rest on 
its economic benefit, but on the contribution made by the practice to social stability 
or public morality. One claim is that marriage has instrumental value which 
supervenes on an intrinsic moral value, so that the legal institution promotes a form 
of life good in itself. This presupposes that traditional marriage has intrinsic moral 
value, that it is itself a morally good form o f life — or, even stronger, that it is the only
^Maynard V. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888), quoted in Weitzman 1974, p. 1242. See Freeman and 
Lyon 1983, pp. 184-9, for rulings in British law based on the claim that restrictive marriage law 
safeguards public morality.
2 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1242-3.
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condition in which sexual intercourse is morally permissible.3 A particular marriage is 
not only morally valuable in itself, but it also serves as a model of this form of the 
good life for the rest of society. This comes under the heading of promoting public 
morality and is dependent on the claim that it is morally valuable in itself. A second 
claim is that it has an instrumental value independent of any intrinsic value it has, in 
promoting social stability or fostering associative bonds.
In this section, I will look at arguments focusing on traditional marriage 
(heterosexual, monogamous, with an aspiration to permanence), as opposed to rights- 
based, virtue, or care approaches to establishing the moral value of institutions with 
certain features resembling those of marriage.^ I will survey claims that traditional 
marriage is an inherently valuable form of life (and so promotes public morality), then 
look at two versions of the claim that it promotes social stability. Proponents of the 
first claim, that traditional marriage itself is a morally good form of life, may hold that 
other forms of sexual relationships are immoral, and thus properly excluded from the 
benefits o f marriage. The second claim I will inspect is that the institution of I
traditional marriage creates stable and committed citizens. The third claim is that the 
affirmation o f communal standards of right and wrong as embodied in the marriage 
contract enhances communal coherence and stability.
I will endeavour to show that claims that traditional marriage holds a unique 
moral value which cannot be found in other similar relationships, which differ by 
being unofficial, non-permanent, same-sex, non-sexual, or containing more than two 
partners, cannot be supported. The claims I will examine here appeal either to 
religion or custom. But in both cases, the controversy surrounding the conceptions 
of marriage makes them inadmissible as reasons for legislation in a liberal state on the 
basis o f religious belief or established practice. I will argue that marriage law cannot 
be used to enforce a conception of the good, such as a particular sexual morality.
3 This claim is made for marriage independently of its legal status. It serves as a reason for shoring 
up marriage law; tlie value is attributed to a specific conception of marriage, which law should 
reflect.
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Other forms o f relationship can make similar contributions to social stability as 
traditional marriage, and in some respects would be better able to do so.
i. Marriage and morality
I will first examine the claim that traditional marriage is a uniquely morally 
valuable form of life. To this end, I will briefly list the major arguments one might 
advance for the moral value of marriage, and show that the only possible arguments 
are based on moral qualities which can be found outside traditional marriage: e.g. in 
same-sex marriages or relationships, unmarried cohabitation, marriages of more than 
two people, and friendships. The only arguments available to defenders of traditional 
marriage are arguments from religion, which are not adequate to the purpose o f  
establishing the moral value o f marriage, or custom, which do not purport to give 
marriage an intrinsic moral value. Further, arguments from custom or religion cannot 
be adduced as reasons for legislation o f traditional marriage.
The value of traditional marriage is claimed to be intrinsic to it: in itself, 
marriage is part o f the good life. According to this view, traditional marriage — a 
monogamous, sexually exclusive relationship between a man and a woman 
established by a legal, and sometimes religious, ceremony — embodies the only 
permissible form of marriage. Where is the intrinsic moral value to be found? The 
central elements of traditional marriage are the contract, and the rights established 
thereby, the type of relationship found in marriage, and sex and reproduction. A 
marriage must be established by the marriage contract. Therefore, a defender of  
traditional marriage will have to explain the moral necessity of the contract as well as 
of the requirements of heterosexuality, monogamy, endurance. Taking the elements 
which constitute marriage by turn, we can see that no intrinsic moral value attaches to
4 This is to exclude religious claims, in the tradition of modern moral philosophy.
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any of these elements which would not attach to relationships which are not 
traditional marriages.
Locating the moral value of marriage in the contract itself is futile. There is a 
moral value to contract — one ought to keep one’s promises —, but this applies to all 
contracts, not just marriage. Is there something special about the marriage contract 
which gives it value? It cannot be (as Kant had it) because the marriage contract 
establishes rights of possession, since people cannot be possessed. Rights to sexual 
exclusivity, so far as they are cast as rights over another, are similarly dubious. First, 
the right to exclude others from sexual use of one’s spouse raises the same difficulties 
involved in possession. Second, while sexual exclusivity between partners may 
involve virtues such as trust, it is unclear why a right to such exclusivity would have 
moral value, and in fact this may be a case where the right (for instance, if there are 
legal penalties attached to adultery) undermines the virtue. Rights to support — 
safeguarding vulnerabilities — are possible legal rights and more clearly valuable, but 
this explanation does not tally uniquely with traditional marriage. S'omeone might 
want to say that the contract establishes safeguards for love and trust. But again, if it 
is the type of relationship, or some combination of type and contract, which is 
valuable, the value extends beyond traditional marriage. Why should it only be found 
there? One answer is that it is the type of commitment to another made in the 
contract. But again, there is no unique correlation between this commitment and 
traditional marriage.
To defend traditional marriage, one must fall back on nature or reproduction. 
Neither provide overwhelming support for monogamy. And, besides, nature does not 
give us a test for moral value: the laws of nature are descriptive, not prescriptive. 
What, then, about traditional marriage as a stable site for reproduction? Again, 
polygamy, homosexual adoption, or unmarried cohabitation might be equally stable. 
But moreover, shifting the focus to reproduction effectively changes the discussion 
from the modern institution of marriage to an institution whose primary rationale is
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reproduction. A virtue account might argue that commitment to a partner was a 
good.5 But again, this can extend to non-traditional relationships and non-marital 
relationships. Also, the virtue account may find marriage instrumentally valuable, but 
it cannot locate intrinsic value in the contract, since (according to it) moral value is 
located in dispositions.
There is no possible argument for the value of traditional marriage which does 
not also grant value to other kinds of unions, except for arguments derived from 
religion. But religious reasons cannot appeal to everyone as moral reasons. 
Arguments from custom may seem more promising, but these do not establish any 
intrinsic value for traditional marriage. Custom does not entail anything about the 
moral value o f a practice. Conservatives claim that traditional marriage promotes 
sexual morality, appropriate gender roles, and the natural form of the family. We will 
see the difficulties with an account which attempts to locate the unique value of  
traditional marriage in human nature in section 5. Such an argument must show 
(among other things) that same-sex relationships cannot possibly have the same moral 
value as heterosexual relationships.
Further, we are looking for arguments which establish the moral value of  
marriage as a legal institution. But from a liberal viewpoint, the attempt to establish 
marriage law based on arguments fi*om religion or custom runs contraiy to the moral 
principles guiding social organisation. Religious arguments can never justify 
prescriptive marriage legislation in a liberal society. Arguments from custom too fail 
to justify legislation of traditional marriage since there is great controversy 
surrounding the value of marriage. The conservative notions of sexual morality, 
gender roles, and the family are likewise deeply controversial. There are many 
dissenters to the claim that marriage embodies the morally good life. Therefore, 
prescription of traditional marriage on these grounds clearly adopts one conception of 
the good at the expense of a number of others.
5 See such an account in Scmton 1986. For a comparable argument that parenthood is a virtue, see
I
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Prescriptive legislation of traditional marriage cannot be justified by the fact 
that some social group attributes moral value to it, for it is illegitimate for the state to 
impose a single contested conception of the good on its citizens. It is widely agreed 
by liberals that respect for liberty requires non-intervention in certain choices 
regarding one’s personal life.  ^ While government may attempt to preserve the 
necessary conditions for a life perceived as good, it should not do so by limiting 
individuals’ abilities to choose different projects (under certain legal and moral 
restraints).7 Traditional marriage legislation which excludes other forms o f marriage 
cannot, therefore, be defended by the claim that it promotes a morally valuable form 
of marriage. Insofar as the state excludes certain types of relationships from the 
benefits of marriage, and forces marriages to conform to a single norm  ^it violates the 
liberal principle of neutrality.
One voice of dissent to the claim that traditional marriage is part o f a morally 
good life has come from feminists. Feminists claim that the division o f labour in 
traditional marriage disadvantages the married woman and thereby shores up 
patriarchal power.8 Social policy — in taxation and benefit distribution — and courts’ 
rejection of women’s claims to equality have explicitly justified discrimination against 
women on the basis of the role proposed for them by marriage.  ^ On this view, 
traditional marriage is not morally good, as conservatives claim, but a threat to 
women’s independence and equality.
Traditional marriage has also been accused of being intimately related, even 
foundational, to the system of private property ownership. The tie to private 
property ownership may not worry liberals, but the claim that marriage right is
Hursthouse 1991.
 ^Deriving from Mill’s On Liberty, see Kymlicka 1990, pp. 247-262, and, for instance, Hart 1963.
7 See Rawls 1971, p. 61 (basic liberties), sections 32-34 (liberty of conscience), and section 24 
(members of the original position are ignorant of their conception of tlie good).
8 See Okin 1989; Pateman 1988, Chapter 5; Sachs and Wilson 1978, Part Two; my Chapter V.2.i.
9 For example, this rationale was given for excluding women from the vote, entrance to the 
professions, the right (for married women) to hold property in tlieir own name, to transact on the 
stock exchange or to tend bar. See Weitzman 1974, Shultz 1982, and Sachs and Wilson 1978.
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ownership o f another person is worrying to those who value personal autonomy. 
Marxist critics have argued that marriage is private property in another person: "the 
maintenance by one man or woman of the. effective right to exclude indefinitely all 
others from erotic access to the conjugal p a r t n e r Indeed, Kant’s account of  
marriage supports this view. The Marxist critique alleges that traditional marriage 
reinforces or underlies the idea, fundamental to capitalism, that the basic relationship 
between persons and need-satisfying things (including persons) is that o f the 
ownership right. It is not appropriate to take up this line here. However, a feminist 
might wish to qualify the Marxist account of the patriarchal right of men as an effect 
of capitalism with the point that patriarchy has existed independently o f c a p i t a l i s m .
Conservatives may respond that even if these analyses o f the origin of 
marriage in patriarchy and capitalism are correct explanations o f how traditional 
marriage came to be structured as it is, traditional marriage is still a part o f the good 
life. But my point is simply that the conservative position is deeply controversial. It 
is one conception of the good among others. Further, the particular good that has 
regularly been ascribed to marriage in 19th and 20th centuiy American and British 
law — the promotion of public morality — is exceptionally controversial and inimical 
to liberty. Legal prescriptions concerning gender roles and sexual behaviour are now 
widely seen as invasive. Traditional marriage law has reflected patriarchal and 
religious conceptions, which have been understood as moral due to the connection 
with religious doctrine or with what was presumed to be the natural order o f gender 
relations. A liberal society, however, is justified in framing law only around the 
companionate ideal of marriage, in which individuals freely choose an association 
which suits their needs.
McMurtry 1972, pp. 594-5; his italics. Compare Engels [1891], p. 104, “This was the origin of 
monogamy.... It was not in any way the fruit of individual sex love.... It was tlie first fonn of the 
family based not on natural but on economic conditions, namely, on the victory of private property 
[in the wife and children] over original, naturally developed, common ownership.”
McMurtry 1972, p. 597.
2^ See Pateman 1988, Ch. 2.
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To summarise, the position that traditional marriage has unique moral value is 
deeply controversial. Any plausible claims about the moral value of marriage are true 
also of non-traditional marriages (such as same-sex marriages), so it is extremely 
difficult to defend a position that traditional marriage is the only morally good form 
of marriage. Moreover, liberalism is committed to state neutrality between 
competing conceptions o f the good. Therefore, there is no basis in the intrinsic moral 
value o f traditional marriage (even if someone were able to give a plausible account 
o f this) for legislating it and not non-traditional forms o f marriage.
Rawls 1971, p. 212.
ii. Citizenship
While the state must remain neutral between conceptions o f the good (or at 
least not intervene to prevent the pursuit of non-harmful conceptions), individual 
liberty “is limited, everyone agrees, by the common interest in public order and 
securityFurthermore, stability is a virtue in political systems, although one o f less 
priority than justice. Traditional marriage has been claimed to increase social 
stability. First, the increase in stability it may provide is not sufficient to outweigh the 
right to liberty. I also wish to dispute the claim that traditional marriage is |
foundational to social stability. This claim is that the traditional institution o f |
marriage creates committed, responsible citizens, so that its breakdown has had 
terrible consequences for society. Loving relationships may promote the virtue of 
commitment. But there is no necessary correlation to heterosexuality, monogamy, 
lifelong endurance, or even the marriage contract.
In the first place, the de-privileging of marriage as an institution has been 
blamed for causing male irresponsibility, at a cost to women and children. This 
criticism points out that traditional marriage met a social need, that of women and
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children who benefited from the patriarchal system of male support of dependent 
families. But as traditional family structures have lost their dominance, men have 
refused to undertake these obligations, leaving impoverished single mothers and 
abandoned wives. But the prevalence o f divorce and the crumbling o f male 
commitment to marriage produces socio-economic hardship for women only when 
their social and economic status depends on marriage. The problem is underlying 
social inequality, not male irresponsibility.
The claim may be interpreted more forcefully, however. The absence of  
pressure to commit to long-term obligations creates men and women who pursue 
their own interests at the cost of maintaining relationships, undermining the 
interdependence necessary for social stability. Allan Bloom links the disintegration 
of social cohesion with divorce — both as an effect and a cause — which evidences the 
failure o f married couples to unite their “particular wills” into a “general will”: “In the 
absence of a common good or common object ... the disintegration of society into 
particular wills is inevitable.... Children who have gone to the school o f conditional 
relationships should be expected to view the world in the light of what they learned 
there.” For this reason, the “decomposition of [the unbreakable marital] bond is 
surely America’s most urgent social p r o b l e m . ”
But same-sex relationships and unmarried cohabitation can manifest the same 
level o f commitment as traditional marriage. To require parents, or partners, to 
adhere to a traditional family structure is arbitrarily to privilege heterosexuality and 
monogamy. Further, Bloom assumes that commitments to others can be established 
only through traditional marriage. The creation of stable, responsive citizens does 
not depend on marriage, but begins with schools and parents and may be maintained
4^ See for instance Rawls 1971, section 29.
5^ See for instance Melanie Phillips, ‘Losers in tlie war’. Times Literary Supplement 20/3/98, p. 5. 
Francis Fukuyama gives a similar analysis — female independence encourages male irresponsibility 
which leads to tlie “plague” of family breakdown -  in ‘Who Killed tlie Family’, The Sunday Times, 
21/9/97, News Review, p. 6 and Fukuyama 1997.
•^5 Melanie Phillips, as cited in fn 15, p. 5.
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through friendship and larger affiliations. The claim also, again without sufficient 
reason, maintains that permanent commitment within sexual relationships is more 
fundamental to social cohesiveness than commitments in other settings. This claim 
may be plausible insofar as a consequence of committed sexual relationships is the 
raising of children in committed and stable environments, when they are produced by 
or brought into such relationships. But one parent can provide just as stable an 
environment as two. Commitment and sympathy, as character traits, can be fostered 
in a variety of ways.
However, although the inculcation of personal reliability does not depend on a 
social practice of stable marriages, it is also arguable that legal non-traditional 
marriages would not reduce the incidence of commitment but in fact increase it. 
Making marriage legislation less prescriptive would give it an advantage over the 
traditional arrangement in promoting committed relationships. Indeed, the 
requirement o f permanence is decreased by making divorce accessible, but why need 
marriage be lifelong to create attitudes of commitment?
Bloom’s point is that “conditional” commitment, which ‘alters when it 
alteration finds’ or ‘bends with the remover to remove’ in Shakespeare’s phrase, is 
not true c o m m i t m e n t . 8^ gut our commitments to projects or goals may be frill and 
v/hole-hearted without being permanent. They come to an end. A marriage may be 
such a goal. Indeed, this is plausible, for our commitments to other people — in 
various roles — change with circumstances, their needs, and our ability. It is true that 
‘commitments’ which shift like weathervanes are not commitments. Certain levels of 
reliability and constancy must be achieved. But why should the marriage commitment 
be lifelong, unlike other commitments? Friendships may be lifelong, but a lifelong 
commitment is not part of the plan. It is unclear why the marriage commitment 
should be for life in order to be true commitment.
17 Bloom 1987, pp. 118-9.
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Emotions can be brought in on both sides of the argument. We know that 
emotions are inconstant, which might seem to imply that the emotional commitment 
in marriage cannot possibly be lifelong. But this is precisely why marriage must be 
lifelong, will come the reply, in order to safeguard the attachment from contingency 
and change. But again, this does not show why the relationship should have a right 
against ending, or why the commitment must be lifelong (although there is reason to 
provide safeguards for the spouses when it does end). The motive force here seems 
to be an idea that marriage entails an unbreakable unity. i9 But we have seen, in 
Chapter II, that this notion of unity cannot be rendered intelligible without 
threatening autonomy.
Perhaps the ideal of romantic love does require such a commitment. Certainly 
the intention o f a lifelong commitment has value. But my point is not that spouses 
should not make such a commitment, but that the state should not recognise only 
marriages founded on such a commitment. First, this prefers one conception o f the 
good — what I have called the ideal of romantic love. Second, I have been discussing 
commitment in the context of creating committed citizens. The virtue o f commitment 
may be developed in associations which are not lifelong. And one may question the 
value of inculcating citizens in unconditional commitment. Civil disobedience, like 
divorce, may be morally justified or even morally required.
Let me return to the point that legalising non-traditional marriages will in fact 
promote commitment. For a social practice to be stable, an equilibrium must be 
reached between desires and obligations. Commitments must be reconcilable with
8^ Sonnet 116. “Love is not love/ Which alters when it alteration finds,/ Or bends with the remover 
to remove:/ ... Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,/ But bears it out even to the edge of 
doom.”
9^ “Have you not read that tlie Creator from the beginning made them male and female and tliat He 
said: This is why a man must leave father and mother, and cling to his wife, and the two become one 
body? They are no longer two, therefore, but one body. So then, what God has united, man must 
not divide.” The Vatican 1975, section VII. The text cites Matthew 19:4-6.
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individual needs and wants.20 Non-traditional marriage will not only open marriage 
to more people, it will allow marriage to match their needs more c l o s e l y . T h i s  
represents a step towards the reconciliation o f obligation and volition. Not only 
would it make honouring one’s commitments more natural, it would also extend the 
appeal of marriage, since marriage in its current form has many disincentives and few 
incentives. It is likely that non-traditional ordering would increase the rate o f  
marriage and make it easier to conform to marital obligations and to fully accept them 
as one’s own choice.
iii. Society
The claim that virtues of commitment, trustworthiness, and the like can only 
be promoted through traditional family structures is highly implausible. Let us now 
turn to an argument put from a communitarian or conservative point of view: 
marriage is a shared practice which for this reason has value as a form of social life.
It is “a tradition — a smooth handle on experience,... worn ... into the shape required 
by human nature,” and also a kind of narrative or archetype which informs our 1
expectations and creates recognition, in our own marriages as well as those of others. q
“[RJespect and ... understanding” follow this recognition.22 To reformers, “the fact 
of familiarity itself counts for naught”; ideal institutions are weighed against the 
actual, ignoring the value that accrues to practices just because they are ours.23 
Protecting traditional marriage does not simply promote virtues of commitment in
2® Compare Hegel: “Hegel is centrally concerned here that the demands of the moral law find 
expression in and tlirough the desires of the individual, and witli the arrangement of institutions and 
practices that would make such a coincidence likely to occur.” Gauthier 1997, p. 28  ^ See Hegel 
1821, paragraph 7.
2  ^ In Chapter 5 ,1 will argue that most terms of marriage should be left to individual choice. But 
this argument also applies to legalising same-sex, non-monogamous, non-exclusive, or non-lifelong 
marriages (all of which would be legally recognised under my proposal).
22 Scruton 1986, p. 356.
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individuals, but promotes a shared value-system which knits the social fabric 
together. Endorsing and perpetuating this set o f social understandings and values 
promotes social cohesion and stability.
It would be entirely inadequate to claim that traditional marriage promotes 
stability due to the socially divisive nature of marriage reform (such as same-sex 
marriage). Marriage is central to the organisation of individual lives, and as such, 
one’s own marital preferences outweigh others’ feelings about those preferences, as 
long as such preferences do not materially affect third parties.^  ^ The importance of 
marriage to the individual over the course o f her life outweighs other people’s 
interest in suppressing her choices. Secondly, social instability caused by marriage 
legislation which those unaffected by it dislike does not give reason to avoid such 
legislation- On this criterion of the general palatability of a particular change, many 
morally necessary legal reforms (the abolition o f slavery or extending the vote to 
women) would be precluded.
The same holds true for the claim that the endorsement o f a shared practice 
in itself promotes social good. This claim has some initial plausibility. Fostering civic 
harmony through shared practices seems likely to create stability. However, it fails 
since social practices must be evaluated on other criteria than the breadth of their 
acceptance. Nor do (or should) social practices entail supportive state legislation. In 
Chapter V, I will argue that a prescriptive traditional ordering o f marriage is 
discriminatory and inimical to liberty. Weighed against these violations, its 
prevalence does not provide sufficient reason to protect the traditional institution of  
marriage. The argument that prescriptive traditional marriage law should be retained 
in order to promote the social good parallels another argument made by
23 Lomasky 1987, p. 249.
24 This raises tlie question of how to distinguish what effects on third parties are unacceptable.
What if tax breaks extended to gay marriages raise taxes slightly? Unacceptable preferences are 
those having consequences which otliers may reasonably refuse. For example, if a gay couple moves 
in next door, the distress it may cause tlie neighbours doesn’t justify heterosexual-only zoning
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conservatives: that the social good is being harmed due to women’s economic 
independence, which has brought about family breakdown and u n e m p l o y m e n t . ^ ^  But 
the evident solution — encouraging or forcing women out of the marketplace — is 
untenable because women’s freedom (as individuals in a liberal society) takes priority 
over the possible gain in social stability achievable through curtailing their freedom. 
Similarly, preferences about marriage, as I argued in the last paragraph, are of greater 
priority than the possible harmony achievable through limiting their exercise. Further, 
the predicted harmony is a risky prospect. Just as forcing women out o f the 
marketplace would bring widespread and vehement reprisal, so too a shared 
understanding of marriage enforced by discriminating against homosexuals, restricting 
divorce, and reinforcing gender roles in marriage will result, as it has in recent 
history, in persistent discontent.
It is implausible that traditional marriage is a linchpin of social stability. But 
there is a more important question than the empirical issue of how marriage 
legislation affects society. The contribution, if any, made by traditional marriage to 
social stability cannot be secured without restricting liberties. This claim reflects a 
position in a higher-order debate over what kind of social effects should be taken as 
reason to limit individual freedom. This dispute reflects conflicts between liberalism, 
perfectionism, and consequentialism. As I have indicated before, I will take the 
liberal view that government should not interfere with liberty in the name of enforcing 
behaviour corresponding to a certain conception of the good or maximising such a 
good. In other words, I assume that the government should display neutrality 
between conceptions o f the good.2^
regulations; it is only if they infringe upon the neighbours’ own civil liberties that they materially 
aJOFect them.
25 Bloom 1987, pp. 122-132: women’s adoption of male roles at work conflicts with their traditional 
roles; Scruton, ‘The Party of Humbug’, The Times 6/11/96, p. 18; Fukuyama 21/9/97, cited above in 
fn. 15; Phillips 20/3/98, cited above in fn. 15.
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iv. Children
Traditional marriage may seem to be justified by its reproductive role, which 
provides an explanation for the requirement of heterosexuality, life-long commitment, 
and monogamy. As stated in my Introduction, marriage in its contemporary form has 
many aspects other than child-rearing. But I will say a little to clarify how the two 
issues can, and should, be separated here. Marriage is clearly not the only institution 
through which the raising of children can be accomplished. Various reforms have 
been suggested to the current practice of child-raising, from licensing parents to 
state-run child-raising which promotes equal opportunity.^  ^ None of these may prove 
to be compatible with liberal neutrality. However, the connection between marriage 
and child-rearing is by no means necessary.
Separating the issue of child-raising from marriage makes sense conceptually 
and socially, as the two practices become increasingly distinct. Some proponents of  
contractual ordering of marriage suggest that issues concerning children, such as 
child-care and support, could be settled in the marriage contract.28 But there are 
stronger reasons against incorporating decisions about children into the marriage 
contract.
A separate child commitment contract would allow parents to decide on the 
distribution of obligations at an appropriate time.29 Further, separating commitments 
to children from commitments made to spouses in marriage contracts would extend 
the scope of the contract to unmarried partners and single parents. It would make the 
commitment to children a separate issue from marriage, creating a binding
2<^ This is a standard liberal view: see Kymlicka 1990, pp. 199-205, and 1989; Lomasky 1987, p.
250; Rawls 1971, p. 94; Dworkin 1985, p. 127; Nozick 1974; Ackerman 1980; and Nagel 1987.
27 See LaFollette 1980, Rawls 1971, p. 511, and Munoz-Dardé 1998.
28 See for example Weitzman 1974, p. 1245.
Chapter III: The Moral Value of Marriage S4
commitment in the case of divorce. Not only would the contracts be separate, they 
would be independent of each other in the sense that neither was a prerequisite for 
the other. The creation of two contracts, one for marriage, and one for children, 
allows the greatest possible number of people to avail themselves of either or both. 
Governmental regulation of child-care and child commitment contracts is desirable, 
for children need protection. However, the issue of what this protection should be 
and how it should be effected is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2. Other accounts
I will now take up the possible developments o f Hegel’s and Kant’s accounts 
o f marriage which I briefly raised at the end of Chapters I and II. We have seen 
already that an account of the moral value of marriage must explain the role o f the 
contract, or at least the legal institution of marriage (could it be established some 
other way than contract?). There is no plausible argument to establish the intrinsic 
value o f the contract, and thus of marriage, although there is sufficient reason to 
justify its legal establishment.
The developed Hegelian and Kantian accounts, and one Aristotelian 
argument, exhaust the array of possible types of arguments for the moral value of 
marriage. Its value must be located in the type of relationship (love and commitment) 
or in the contract, or some combination of these aspects. Again, while someone 
might argue that reproduction plays some role, basing the moral value o f marriage in 
reproduction does not make the value intrinsic to marriage. The argument from the 
type of relationship (that drawn from Hegel) must be that there is some moral value 
in love or in its effects on the individual. (Here we see Hegel’s ethics as virtue
A recent report from the (British) Institute for Public Policy Research recommended legally 
binding ‘child commitment’ contracts. The report is entitled ‘A Complete Parent — Towards a New 
Vision for Child Support’ and was released on April 6 1998.
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etliics: marriage, like other objective determinations, develops character so that 
morality and self-interest coincide). The argument from rights (that drawn from 
Kant) must be that rights transform the relationship morally, or that marriage rights 
are morally valuable because they protect the vulnerable. Another type of virtue 
account, not previously mentioned, is that marriage is part of human flourishing. 
Unlike the Hegelian account, this argument does hold that there is a given human 
nature which will only flourish in committed relationships. Roger Scruton articulates 
such a view.
These possibilities also exhaust the different range of moral approaches (at 
least in the major moral theories).^® A rights-based approach, which focuses on 
applying general principles to the issue of marriage, is represented here by the 
Kantian arguments. So too is virtue ethics, in Scruton’s Aristotelian account. 
Reading Hegel’s ethics as a type of virtue ethics (but one here focused on the 
consequences rather than the expression of virtues), I see his account of the 
transformative power of family relationships over individual character as explaining 
how proper dispositions can be fostered in us through this educative institution. This 
is not to say that other philosophers within these traditions might not have different 
things to say about marriage, but that the main types of possible arguments are 
discussed here, with the exception of a utilitarian argument. But a rule-utilitarian 
argument will have to be some variation on the theme of justifying the institution o f  
marriage for the utility such an arrangements brings, either through protecting the 
vulnerable, or the virtue approach, so I will consider it dealt with there. I will discuss 
in turn the (Kantian) accounts that marriage rights morally transform the relationship, 
that they protect the vulnerable, the (Hegelian) account that love develops a
See Minow and Shanley 1996 for an account of the ‘three main orientations’ of theories of the 
family as contract, community, and rights-based. The contract approach, which I will take myself, 
will be discussed in Chapter V; this view does not attempt to attribute intrinsic value to marriage.
J l .  ....
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disposition which is ethically valuable, and Scruton’s Aristotelian account. In the 
next chapter, I will discuss the claim that love itself has intrinsic moral value.
3. Kantian accounts
I will try to develop Kant’s account as sympathetically as possible. Two 
renderings, one of the moral argument and one of the prudential argument, are most 
plausible. First I will examine the claim that sex is morally dangerous but that altering 
the content of the maxim of the act through the exchange o f rights makes it 
permissible. Second, I will turn to the argument that individuals will be protected 
against vulnerabilities associated with sex, including reproduction, by the exchange of 
rights.
Remember that Kant’s moral argument for marriage, that marriage rights 
instituting possession of the spouses by each other create the moral conditions 
necessary for sex to occur, was flawed because of the problem of reconciling 
possession of another with Kant’s ethics, which hold that one does not and cannot 
possess oneself, let alone another. As well, the moral problem o f sex (on Kant’s 
account, that it involves use of another as a means only) was irresolvable, since 
marriage could not transform it. Now a Kantian could develop this kind o f account, 
either keeping sex central to it or not. First, a Kantian could argue that sex does 
involve treating others as means, but that marriage right transforms this. Or, he could 
argue that the rights have some other moral content. These lines of argument, it 
seems to me, are susceptible to Hegel’s criticism of Kant. One cannot have a right of 
ownership over another person. Nor can one have a right to unlimited use of  
another, and so on. Accounts which want to give some value to the institution of  
marriage will have to locate the value in the relationship and then explain the rights or
This is not supposed to be Hegel’s thought but to develop his account that ethical love is ethically
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contract in terms of this. Both of the Hegelian accounts and Scruton’s account can 
be read this way. I will first address a Kantian version of the same, which is closely 
tied to some of what Kant writes in the Lectures on Ethics.
People can use one another as means only in sex. This property can be 
removed, or contained, when a relationship is reciprocal and the parties respect each 
other. One route to this sufficient degree of reciprocity and respect is commitment. 
Marriages create a context of commitment. But this account fails,to show why 
marriage itself is necessary. It safeguards commitment but isn’t necessary to establish 
it. Nor is a life-long relationship necessary to establish reciprocity and respect. This 
just shows marriage is one form of the good among many, that whatever moral value 
it has may be possessed by other types of relationship or encounter. On Herman’s 
interpretation of Kant, marriage right establishes the juridical equality of spouses and 
so creates conditions for respect. But their juridical equality is established simply by 
their both being citizens!
The second rights-based theory is drawn from Kant’s prudential, not moral, 
argument. On this account, sex and intimacy create special vulnerabilities which 
legally sanctioned marriage provides some protection against by giving the spouses 
rights against each other. The moral value attributed to the marriage contract on this 
account is not a sui generis value held only by marriages. It applies to marriage the 
standards o f justice which apply in cases where special vulnerabilities exist. This 
account might be thought to explain why the rights created in the marriage contract 
are morally necessary in the context of intimate relationships, as well as explaining (in 
Kant’s manner) why the legal institution of marriage is morally necessary.
I noted in Chapter I that many feminists make a connection similar to that 
made by Kant between sexual desire, as constructed in our society, and 
objectification and exploitation. One theme here is the amoral nature of desire. Kant 
argues that as appetite for another it obliterates moral regard for that other. On this
valuable by considering whether natural love could be ethically valuable.
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picture, hunger and thirst too might count as appetites sufficiently powerful to 
overwhelm reason, and in themselves amoral. But sexual desire, as appetite for 
another human being, is far more troubling. Hunger may lead to moral violations 
only in cases where one may have to steal, or kill, to get food. But it is in the nature 
of sexual desire, as appetite for another person, to overwhelm moral judgement 
precisely where the treatment of another person is at stake.
Insofar as the question is empirical, this is not an issue that I can resolve here. 
Biology and psychology play a role in the a n s w e r . ^ ^  But Alan Goldman’s analysis of 
sex is relevant here. According to him, sexual desire is simply desire for contact with 
another person’s body, and so has no special moral significance related to its natural 
end (procreation, love, communication) as some philosophers (Finnis, Scruton, 
Nagel, Solomon) claim. But this begs an important question. Is sexual desire merely 
desire for contact with another, or is it a desire to dominate, injure, or dehumanise 
him or her? For the purposes of the argument (since it makes my task more difficult), 
I will assume for a moment that sexual desire is intrinsically linked to violent 
impulses, either biologically or psychologically. Even so this (hypothetical) fact alone 
does not show that special rights and obligations — marriage right — must, morally, 
accompany sex. Use of someone who has not consented to sex, or someone 
incompetent to consent, is wrong, as in other circumstances. But are impulses to 
violence themselves immoral? On this (hypothetical) account, sexual desire and 
violent urges are one and the same. In one respect, the morally relevant issue seems 
to be what acts ensue. One might think if no-one is illegitimately harmed as a result, 
the act is morally permissible.
For instance, psychologist Robert J. StoUer argues that sexual desire is linked to a desire to harm. 
See Stoller 1976. This is not to say that 1 find such claims plausible, but to point to work done in 
other fields which is relevant here. His work is cited in Garry 1978.
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But Kant’s worry is that the moral nature o f the action is determined by the 
maxim.33 fh e same act may be wrong or right, depending on the maxim under which 
I do it. If the maxim under which sexual acts occur must contain violence (or 
exploitation), because the sexual impulse essentially is a violent (or exploitative) 
impulse, then the act is morally troubling. However, biological accounts of a 
connection between sex and violence do not show that maxims are configured this 
way. One impulse may be linked to another, but they are conceptually separable. 
Our chosen maxims are not biologically determined. Some psychological views, as 
well as feminist views which hold that desire is socially constructed by dominance and 
submission, are more problematic. '^* If the meaning of sexual words and acts is 
permeated with violent overtones, then maxims under which sexual acts occur are 
morally troubling. (For example, if an intrinsic part of having sexual intent regarding 
X is a desire to dominate X.)
If this troubling state of affairs is the case, we are back in Kant’s dilemma. 
Let us see how Kant’s solution — that o f the parties sharing joint ends — works here. 
If the parties’ union is an end other than sex, the maxim is altered in  ^relevant way. 
The intent is not just sexual, but includes an expression of love, or plans to create a 
child. But there are several problems here. One is the problem which Kant’s moral 
argument faced: sexual intent remains part o f the maxim. At least one component of  
the maxim remains treating the other as a means only. And if the act can be morally 
changed by taking on a broader significance, why think that it can only change in 
marriage or committed relationships where ends are shared? If the maxim can 
change, then why does it not change when the agent respects (as opposed to loving, 
or sharing ends with) the other as an end in herself? And, vice-versa, why think that 
sexual acts will always have this broader significance in marriage or in committed 
relationships? This is why Kant still holds that non-procreative sex in marriage may
See Kant [1785]: “An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained 
by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon; it depends ... solely on the 
principle of volition^ p. 13 (standard German edition pagination).
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be licensed only by a permissive principle o f practical reason, which makes 
permissible something in itself impermissible in order to avoid a still greater violation.
If sexual desire includes harmfril intentions, or intentions to use others as 
means only, then the only way the maxims of sexual acts can respect persons as ends 
is if they are broader than sex itself (on the assumption made for the purposes o f this 
argument that part of the sexual intention is a violent, or exploitative, intention). But 
if maxims can be changed in this way, they can be changed simply by respecting the 
other. This can conceivably occur in a one-night stand as well as in a marriage. 
Having joint ends may or may not help. For example, A can share an end with B yet 
use B as a means only (for example, a company director and employee, or a 
commanding officer and a soldier). Even if A’s end is the good of B, this is still 
compatible with lack of respect for B as an autonomous being. A could want B ’s 
good simply to discharge an obligation to a third party, for instance. Seeing B as an 
autonomous agent might be understood as being part o f what it is to desire B ’s good. 
But while the marriage contract may be thought to force this recognition o f the other 
(since she is capable of entering contracts), it is not a necessary condition o f such 
recognition. Nor is it efficacious in doing so. Carole Pateman argues that 
historically, the marriage contract maintained the fiction that all human beings were 
treated as autonomous beings while it, in effect, deprived women of their autonomy, 
and did not represent an autonomous choice for them, since they were coerced into 
it.^  ^ Certainly it is not empirically true that every spouse has his spouse’s good 
(either in the sense of interest, or in the sense of seeing her as an autonomous agent) 
as his end. And people cannot form associations where respect is built into the 
maxim by circumstances, such as sharing an end. Respect must be internal to the 
agent.
One could argue that Rousseau’s contract of mutual surrender does provide a 
model of a collective association within which members do not use each other as
See my Chapter VÎ.2 for a discussion of Catharine MacKinnon, one proponent of such a view.
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means only, since their purposes are jointly held. Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts echo 
this social contract, in which we surrender ourselves collectively, so that the will by 
which we are governed is our own and we are not subject to external authority. But 
they cannot consistently apply it to marriage, since neither recognises self-ownership, 
nor do they see contract as the basis of political authority. Recall Kant’s argument 
that spouses are allowed to use each other since they have surrendered themselves to 
each other, so that each is simply using himself. But this was inconsistent, since Kant 
also argues that no-one is entitled to use himself. Similarly, even if marriage is seen 
as an association in which spouses have mutually surrendered and formed a general 
will, problems with a general will with violence as its content remain, even if we can 
(on this interpretation) see the violence as being directed by oneself at oneself. 
Willing violence against oneself raises moral problems too.
I have argued that even if sex is intrinsically linked to violent' or demeaning 
impulses, marriage, love, and/or commitment are not morally necessary conditions for 
sex. Respect, or appreciation o f the other’s humanity, are possible outside love, 
commitment, and marriage. There are all sorts of situations where people may use 
one another as means only. In all of these, love and commitment are not thought to 
be moral preconditions. The postman, taxi driver, shop attendant, dentist, and all 
those whom one uses for some other end are treated as ends in themselves simply by 
respect. The nature of the relationship does not seem relevant — even on the 
assumption that sexual intentions are exploitative or violent, these sorts o f intentions 
arise in other circumstances as well. There is no reason why love should be necessary 
only in sex, since it is not elsewhere invoked as a precondition of proper regard. 
Even if sex is linked to violence or disrespect in the agent’s intentions, there is no 
reason why love should be the precondition of respect. The moral rules appropriate 
to sex are those which govern other relationships. Further, as I will argue in Chapter
See my discussion of this claim at VI.2.
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VI, the claim that sex is intrinsically linked to a socially constructed dynamic of 
dominance and submission (which I have assumed here) is implausible.
It might be thought that I have not met the feminist claim mentioned above. 
Sexual desire is constructed as the urge to dominate or submit. A desire to dominate 
cannot be made more morally palatable by being part of a larger end, or by being 
combined with respect (it might be thought). It is quite clear that love or 
commitment cannot solve this problem, for they would simply be built upon 
dominance and submission, and would even mask inequality in sentiment. The 
feminist critique does not present a justification of marriage, but a condemnation, 
from the moral point of view, of heterosexual desire (and, according to MacKinnon, 
homosexual desire, which is constructed by the same mechanism of inequality as 
heterosexual desire). If the feminist critique is right, then we can never escape the 
violence inherent in desire, although future societies may. On this account, the nature 
of desire as an urge to dominate may only be altered (at least for social 
constructionists) by reconstruction of the human psyche.
Ironically, one could imagine a justification for marriage from the feminist 
critique which proceeded upon Kantian lines. Women are vulnerable in heterosexual 
relationships because of socio-economic inequalities and the intertwining of desire 
and domination. The rights established in marriage could act to protect women from 
this vulnerability by giving them legal claims upon their husband’s income. These 
legal rights are morally necessary in the context of vulnerability. However, as a 
justification of marriage law, this is problematic.
First, as I shall argue at length in Chapter VI, a liberal state cannot intervene 
to protect people from their adaptive preferences, the desires internalised in 
oppressive circumstances. The state’s efforts to protect the vulnerable should not 
extend (when they are competent) to protecting them against their will. This would 
amount to an invasion of individual liberty. So the state may offer marriage to the 
vulnerable as a means of protection, but leave the decision to enter marriage to
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individual choice. In this case, marriage is not protecting all the vulnerable — perhaps 
not those who need protection most.
If we claim that marriage law is morally necessary to protect the vulnerable, 
then we assume that protecting the vulnerable is morally necessary, and this seems to 
license too much protection. On the other hand, if marriage is not invasive because it 
is voluntary, then how is it supposed to fiilfil its fiinction of protecting those in 
unequal relationships? One might say that marriage is at least available for protection 
to those who want it. But why then have an institution of marriage, and not simply 
allow people to make contracts for their future protection?
Second, the institution justified by this account no longer seems to be 
distinctively marriage. If the purpose of marriage law is to protect the vulnerable, 
should not all sexual relationships be offered these legal rights? If sex is the source o f  
the vulnerability which justifies marriage, then why should marriage law (as written 
for this justification) not apply to all (and only) sexual relationships?^  ^ Other features 
of marriage have dropped out of the legal picture. And how do we mark off sex? 
Shouldn’t any relations characterised by unequal power dynamics be covered by such 
laws establishing positive rights of the parties against each other? This principle 
seems too wide.
What I have tried to argue here is that even if sex is linked to drives which 
threaten moral consciousness, this does not show a moral necessity for rights 
governing sexual relationships. On the Kantian account, all that is required is respect. 
On the feminist account, the rights would stretch over an intolerably Tvide range o f  
cases. The link between sex and inequality has difficulties as the rationale of marriage 
law. However, as I will argue in Chapter VI, it might be used to constrain marriage 
legislation. I have argued in this section that marriage right has no special moral 
content, since possession is illegitimate. It may be valuable because it secures or 
promotes a certain kind of relationship. But then that kind of relationship has such
r 1 A.  I l l
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value, marriage or no marriage. I will focus now on such accounts. Marriage itself 
does not make a moral difference. Is there enough reason to think certain kinds o f  
relationships have moral value to justify a legal institution of marriage?
4. Hegelian accounts
I will argue that marriage legislation can be justified through a virtue account 
drawn from Hegel, an account acceptable by Rawlsian liberals. On Hegel’s account, 
humans are inherently undetermined. We can be satisfied in a variety of ways. I take 
Hegel’s writings on the will in the Philosophy of Right in the spirit o f the claim that 
‘existence precedes essence’, at least as a description of the human condition from 
the inside.^ '^  However, Hegel also emphasises that in order to be particular people 
(and beyond that, in order to resolve the contradiction between our capacity for 
abstraction and our finite condition as humans) we must determine ourselves in 
concrete ways.
Hegel argues that rationality is expressed in our identities when we become 
determined in ways which will make for social harmony and at the same time in a 
social system which reflects and protects our freedom. Hegel’s virtue account is not 
based on eudaimonia, a state of flourishing natural to humans. We could flourish in a 
variety of ways. But Hegel’s emphasis is on the institutions and states o f character 
required for the flourishing of a whole system within which human freedom is 
respected. A rational way of life must give human consciousness its due. Ethical life 
directs our growth in a way which is good for society and for us. It builds trust, 
which forges a unity among individuals, and at the same time inculcates respect for 
the freedom of others. The central point is that society should direct human
Here I am still focusing on the claim that the central dynamic of sex is inequality. In Chapter VI, 
I will discuss how tlie socio-economic inequalities between the sexes affect marriage law.
See for example par. 35.
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development so that our flourishing is achieved through trust and respect. Morality 
and self-interest are reconciled, as in Aristotle. Society should educate its members in 
such a way that what is required for their flourishing is identical with the demands of  
others.
Aristotelian eudaimonia is replaced in Hegel’s theory by an artificial construct. 
Our social role makes us so that carrying out the demands of morality is fiilfilling to 
us and determines the content of those duties (so that as a citizen, or husband, my 
duties are defined by my role). These ‘objective determinations’ (citizen, husband, 
civil servant) don’t just define us but also create our dispositions. It is this which 
brings me to call Hegel a type of virtue theorist. On his account, the state should 
educate individuals to have certain dispositions. Though not necessarily part of each 
individual’s flourishing (one can flourish many ways), they will contribute to the 
flourishing of all concerned in the modem state. These dispositions unite the 
demands o f morality and self-interest.
I will say more in section 6 about how a Rawlsian liberal can accept this. 
Three distinct questions appear. Can the state engineer individuals in this way? How 
can it do so? And, most important in our inquiry, should it do so? My answer will be 
that a liberal can accept the virtue account o f marriage as a reason for marriage 
legislation. The demand for a well-ordered society justifies the creation of 
institutions which will sustain social order, as long as liberty has priority over such 
institutions. For ease, I will refer to this as the virtue account o f marriage (to be 
distinguished from Scruton’s Aristotelian approach, to be discussed in the next 
section).
Hegel’s virtue theory o f the family is the claim that family membership creates 
dispositions of commitment and trust in individuals and so prepares them for 
relationships outside the family. This attributes instrumental, not intrinsic, ethical 
value to marriage, and gives a reason for its legislation. In l.ii above I criticised the
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idea that only traditional marriages can build commitment. But it is possible that 
commitment can be taught and that it is socially beneficial.
Dispositions can be developed through behaviour. The way we live, our 
customary activities, affect the way we respond and our knowledge o f how to 
respond. We may not be determined by these processes, but we can be trained.
Making a commitment to another person, sharing the details, crises, and goals of 
existence with him or her, and thinking not just in terms of oneself alter one’s 
perspective on the world, one’s dispositions, one’s knowledge. In the next chapter I 
will argue that while this form of life has no intrinsic moral value, it does shape our 
dispositions in morally useful ways. In section 6 I will argue that these are ways the 
state should, and may, promote.
What are these virtues? Marriage habituates the individual into a frame of 
mind which does not instinctively put the self first, which considers other’s needs, 
which relates to others rather than setting the self apart. Marriage does not 
necessarily do this, nor does love, which may set the couple apart from the world or 
even from each other. But as a mode of living it changes one’s perspective. This is 
the value Hegel attributes to ethical union.
The moral value to be found in marriage is instrumental — in promoting j
virtues — not intrinsic, and in fact is not unique to marriage but found in committed 
relationships, as a matter of degree. This account does not make the institution of 
marriage morally necessary. As I argued in l.ii above, to promote these values a J
marriage need not be traditional, and it is only one among many practices which can 
have the effect of promoting these habits and dispositions. This -account does, 
however, begin to explain why the state has reason to recognise the institution. The 
relationship between spouses creates habits of commitment and altruism. The legal 
structure and element of legitimisation may also strengthen the commitment involved.
Further, legitimising commitment as a way of life shows the value placed on it by the 
state. (Does this discriminate against those who choose not to commit? Not so long
j
4
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as there is a distinction between legitimisation and preference.) For precisely the 
virtue-creating reasons, however, marriage should not be made lifelong. Not only 
would this violate freedom — our freedom to break contracts so long as 
compensation is paid — but the attitude of ownership implicit in this is not virtuous.
The issue of divorce brings us to the question raised in Chapter I about 
individualistic and institutional accounts of marriage, and that raised at the end of  
Chapter II about the success of a Hegelian account when women’s equality to men is 
recognised. Recall the questions. Hegel argued that the individual’s commitment to 
marriage should not be represented as contingent, as it is (he claims) by contract. We 
saw that two views of marriage were to be contrasted: the institutional view, which 
emphasises the nature of marriage as an institution with claims on the individual 
which override his changing attitudes, and the individualistic view, which places the 
value of marriage in individual fulfilment and sees it as dependent on continuing 
emotions and free individual choice. The institutional view implies that divorce 
should be more difficult than does the individualistic.
The inferior status of the family in Hegel’s system is related to the question of 
which view o f marriage to adopt. Hegel held that women’s natural inferiority meant 
that they would be fulfilled in this sphere, while men could leave it to seek their 
fulfilment elsewhere. But if the premise o f women’s inferiority is dismissed, and it is 
assumed that both men and women will seek their fulfilment in the public sphere, then 
what role does the family play in ethical life? Will the family dissolve as women are 
freed from it, due to its inadequacy? But Hegel sees family life as fulfilling for all 
parties. It is simply that a higher fulfilment and self-realisation is found in public life. 
It is central to Hegel’s view that family life, while an unreflective stage of ethical life, 
is satisfying for its members. And this has repercussions for the virtue theory of 
marriage.
If the institution of marriage is justified by its inculcation of virtues, it must be 
fulfilling in order to habituate individuals, to change their dispositions. This is why
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the loss of individual rights in Hegel’s account (see my Chapter II, section 4) is such 
a bad result, since one must come to desire and enjoy this mode of being, not feel 
threatened by it. This forces a compromise between marriage as fulfilling for the 
individual and marriage as an institution whose duties must be carried out even at the 
expense of individual fulfilment. On the Hegelian line, the institution doesn’t make 
sense if  it is not fulfilling for the individual. The rationale for its establishment can 
only be attained if it is fiilfilling. This suggests, appropriately enough, that the 
individualistic and institutional views must be superseded. The duties generated in 
marriage, through the contract and promises, do not vary with feeling. But the 
marriage itself must be supported by feeling and so dissoluble when appropriate. 
Duties taken on in marriage are not for life, but for the duration of the marriage. The 
constraints on this claim, in terms of property division on divorce, will be discussed in 
Chapter VI.
5. Aristotelian accounts
Scruton gives us another virtue approach to love, sex, and marriage, in which 
the relevant virtue is linked not to political values but to essential human nature, to 
flourishing or eudaimonia?^ The ability to experience erotic love is a virtue 
necessary for self-fulfilment. Scruton’s estimate of the value o f love echoes Hegel: 
“in erotic love the subject becomes conscious of the full reality of his personal 
existence, not only in his own eyes, but in the eyes of another.Fulfilment requires 
that we have the capacity for erotic love, since in order to receive it we must be able 
to give it. Nurturing this capacity requires that we train ourselves through habit, 
cultivating the appropriate disposition. This rules out (at least as habits) sexual
See Scruton 1986, p. 326. 
Scruton 1986, p. 337.
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fantasy, obscenity, pornography, prostitution, masturbation, promiscuity, and 
‘perversion’.
Scruton also claims that the end or ielos of desire is love.'*® His argument 
depends on this, since if love is not the end of desire, then he does not have the 
connection he needs between sex and love. Scruton’s argument goes like this: Sexual 
desire is uniquely fulfilled by erotic love. Erotic love is part o f human flourishing. 
Destroying the capacity for erotic love is therefore vicious. The capacity can be 
destroyed by misuse of sexual desire. So we should habituate ourselves to desire as 
reason requires.'** A defence of marriage comes out of this. The marriage ceremony, 
according to Scruton, endorses virtuous (chaste) sexuality. Marriage draws its 
meaning from erotic love. The legal institution protects erotic love from society, 
carving out a private realm for it. The “‘ethical idea of marriage’ ... lies at least partly 
in this subsumption of the ‘merely private’ bond of love under laws that are open, 
disputable, and a matter of moral and legal right.”'*^ The privacy o f love is both 
endorsed and protected by marriage law.
Scruton says that the view that “the obligations o f love are private, [and so] 
they need no public institution to protect them” underestimates social pressures which 
threaten relationships.'*  ^ Society puts “public pressure” on individuals, judging them. 
Marriage excludes others, removing their judging gaze. Scruton goes on to say that 
this judgement, when turned on ourselves, is the root of the moral sense. First, it’s 
not clear that marriage is needed to turn away the public gaze, Scruton’s metaphors 
of watching mislead: what kind of space is the private? He claims that the legitimacy 
o f marriage creates a private space in moral consciousness. People avert their moral 
gaze from the married (Scruton cites Husserl who writes that ‘the domestic’ is “a 
separate ‘phenomenological category’”).
'*® See Scruton 1986, p. 339.
'** See Scruton 1986, Chapter 11, “Sexual Morality.’ 
'*^  Scruton 1986, p. 357.
'*^  Scruton 1986, pp. 358-9.
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This is rather contentious. Creating a space from which others are excluded - 
- beyond property rights and rights against trespassing, and so on — may be an effect 
o f marriage. Legal rights or religious vows may deepen the spouses’ sense of this 
space. But this privacy seems to be a feature of the relationship itself, not o f the 
established bond. Second, especially from a feminist perspective, the idea that 
marriage is removed from the judging gaze of society is chilling. A better definition 
of privacy needs to be given than the space inhabited by lovers. Some aspects of love 
are private. But even from those, the moral gaze should never be averted. Indeed, 
rather than averting the moral gaze, marriage invites fiirther judgement, for instance, 
o f how the spouses are meeting their obligations as spouses.
Further, I wish to dispute the claim about the relation between sex, erotic 
love, and flourishing which is the basis for Scruton’s attribution of value to the 
sacrament and institution of marriage. Sexual desire, he writes, is “a social artefact,” 
yet one “natural to human beings.”'*'* This is the kind of approach which Wood 
names in Hegel ‘historicized naturalism’, essentialist claims about human nature based 
on social structures rather than ahistorical, or biological, characteristics.'*  ^ But 
Scruton’s account still seems liable to the criticisms which can be made o f essentialist 
accounts. He has nothing to say to individuals whose sexual and romantic needs 
differ. If someone’s flourishing truly does not lie in ‘erotic love’ and mutual 
recognition, then chastity and purity may not contribute to the development of 
capacities which he or she needs to flourish.
Again, it is not clear that the sexual habits Scruton denounces will destroy the 
capacity for erotic love. This seems to be an unsupported empirical claim. There is 
no reason to think that, so long as promiscuous behaviour preserves the agent’s 
capacities for respect and openness to others, his ability to love will be diminished. 
The habits are not intrinsically debilitating. Much seems to depend on how sexual 
acts are undertaken. A law of diminishing returns might be called upon here by a
'*'* Scruton 1986, p. 348.
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defender of Scruton. Too many sexual encounters or fantasies will numb the agent’s 
appreciation and thus make him unfit for love when he finds it. This seems to be the 
heart o f Scruton’s attack on sexual fantasy.'*^  But first, the fact that some amount 
may be too much does not exclude all such activity. And again, it might be 
questioned whether the law of diminishing returns operates here. There is no a priori 
reason to think that promiscuous people cannot have virtues such as sensitivity and 
honesty which cultivate respect for others.
Finally, Scruton’s approach to sexual morality becomes implausibly inward- 
looking. He writes that “the prime focus of sexual morality is not the attitude to 
others, but the attitude to one’s own body and its uses.”'*'^  In order to prepare 
ourselves for love, we must focus on our bodily integrity, so that sexuality remains an 
expression of the self rather than slavery to a drive. But here his account seems to go 
off the rails. Certainly, if sexual encounters are to be valuable to individuals, they 
must have a proper respect for their bodies. But insofar as there is a specific morality 
governing sex, its demands must focus as much on how one treats others in situations 
of intimacy with unique possible consequences — pregnancy, disease — and distinctive 
circumstances — exposure, privacy, the societal norms governing sex.
Neither Kant’s arguments not Scruton’s show, I believe, that sex has specific 
moral circumstances which generate their own rules. Rather, its circumstances 
require us to apply general moral rules in special ways. Sex may be exploitative, as 
Kant claims, due to the social construction of gender, or to facts o f human biology or 
psychology (this is at least possible). Even if this is true, what is required morally 
seems to be respect and sensitivity to the circumstances, not chastity. This weak 
criterion of respect seems to be all that is required for morally permissible sex by the
See Wood 1991 and Wood 1990, pp. 33-5. 
See Scruton 1986, pp. 344-6.
Scruton 1986, p. 343.
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exploitation thesis. And Scruton’s sexual virtue theory seems to make too many 
assumptions about human nature.'*^
There are other accounts of sex which attempt to attribute it a special moral 
status through ‘means-end’ analyses, for example, the idea that sex has as a goal 
communication or interpersonal awareness, so that sex failing to reach this goal is 
perverse or morally w r o n g . I  refer the reader to Goldman’s rebuttal o f these 
accounts. Surely it is clear that sexual desire is desire for physical contact, as 
Goldman claims, not necessarily for love, interpersonal connection, and so on. Love 
(or communication or awareness) and sex are distinct experiences. Another claim 
might be that the emotions and expectations associated with sex are intense, and so 
sex may be more likely to cause emotional pain than other sorts o f interaction. But 
even so, this requires only sensitivity, honesty, and directness in sexual behaviour, not 
chastity.
Marriage may be defended — as Scruton and Michael Bayles defend it — as an 
institution which contributes to human flourishing by protecting, legitimating, and 
strengthening a valuable kind o f interpersonal relationship. This may be another 
reason for the legal institution of marriage. But such accounts do not show that 
marriage is a necessary moral condition of sex. Nor — as Bayles admits — would 
such arguments even show that traditional marriage, as opposed to polygamy for 
instance, is uniquely valuable.^® Indeed, if marriage is justified by such reasons, there 
is all the more reason to legitimate same-sex and polygamous unions and unions of 
indefinite extent.
Michael Bayles also gives a eudaiinonistic account. See Bayles 1998.
See Goldman 1977.
®^ Bayles 1998, p. 127. “[It maybe objected that] neither of tlie arguments [interpersonal relations 
or the welfare of children] supports monogamous marriage per se. Logically, the objection is quite 
correct. But it is a misunderstanding of social pliilosophy to expect arguments showing tliat a 
certain arrangement is always best under all circumstances.” But if the justification supports, for 
instance, polygamy, tliis gives the state reason to legitimise tliat as well as monogamous marriages if 
some members of society so wish.
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6. The rationale of marriage law
Both the Hegelian virtue account and Scruton’s eudaimonistic accounts put 
forward in the last section purport to show that there is a distinctive value of 
marriage, which law should preserve. I will defend the Hegelian rationale for 
marriage. I challenged the universality of the eudaimonistic account, but if it holds 
true for a number of people, this may suffice to justify the legislation of marriage in 
order to provide for individual’s ability to realise their conceptions of the good. But 
two considerations detract from this. Is marriage really necessary to enable this form 
of life? And why is it necessary for the state to provide marriage? If someone’s 
conception of the good includes getting married, why should they not purchase their 
marriage from a religious or secular organisation? First, the state should provide 
marriage because citizens need it to pursue their conceptions o f the good. But this 
really isn’t an answer. Other things which citizens need to pursue their conceptions 
of the good — careers, consumer goods — are not provided by the state. The state’s 
role is not to promote such conceptions but to deal equally amon^ them by not 
privileging any.
A second, more relevant, reply is that only the state can enforce marriage 
right. If marriage right is necessary for the interpersonal relationships at stake, this 
might be a reason. But is it truly the case that state enforcement — rather than 
community or religious enforcement — is necessary to legitimate, strengthen, and 
protect these kinds of relationship? Why should the state provide this opportunity for 
individuals to pursue their conceptions of the good? Of course, only the state can 
enforce contracts. But why is it justified in recognising and providing a marriage 
contract, as opposed to an ordinary contract covering terms of individuals’ lives 
together?
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The rationale for the institution — and the source of the state’s justification in 
recognising marriages — lies in the first, Hegelian, account. The institution of 
marriage, on the virtue account, contributes to a well-ordered society. The institution 
of marriage does not just allow individuals to pursue their conceptions of the good. 
It creates citizens with traits conducive to the stability and good o f the state. 
However, this does not explain why marriages must be recognised by the state. If 
such traits can be established through marriages not backed by the state, then the 
state need not be involved. However, in the absence of state legislation, the 
institution of marriage cannot perform its socially valuable function. Marriages must 
be constituted by state-recognised marriage contracts.
The state’s involvement is necessary for two reasons. First, it offers unique 
legitimisation and authority to marriages (at least from a secular perspective). 
Second, it provides a means to distinguish marriages. By recognising marriages, the 
state creates a category o f marriages. Some relationships will fall outside this 
definition. This enables discriminations to be made between types of relationships. 
While a liberal state should not promote marriage by providing benefits, since this 
would be to prefer it as a form of life, marriage is sometimes rightly used as a 
category to discriminate legitimate claimants o f entitlements. Consideration in this 
form offered by the state has been diminished by attempts to increase toleration of 
personal life. For instance, official discrimination against ‘illegitimate’ children has 
ended, and there is legal permission for cohabitation and sex between consenting 
adults.^* But employers, insurers, immigration authorities, and others may still use 
marriage as a means to establish entitlements.
There is a more important purpose to state recognition of marriage, however. 
Consider a state in which marriages were offered by private contractors, with no state 
licensing or control. While religious ceremonies would still offer, to some, 
authoritative blessings to some marriages, it would become difficult to distinguish
Shultz 1982, pp. 228-9.
. .  ...............
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between legitimate marriages, those fitting the general definition, among those 
supplied by independent contractors. With no restrictions or regulations, marriages 
could be sold to any couples or groups, one person could buy multiple marriages, and 
nothing — except the absence of companies providing this service — would prevent 
someone from marrying an animal, or a possession, or providing a marriage ceremony 
for their pets.
Complete deregulation of marriage will allow marriages to be sold under any 
terms. In these circumstances, marriage will lose definition and value, except for the 
marriages provided by established religions. One might respond that some marriage 
providers will emerge as reputable. But, without state endorsement, what value will 
marriage have (for those outside religious traditions)? There is no apparent reason 
why people would choose to buy marriages rather than exchanging vows in private. 
This is why continued existence of the institution depends on state recognition, so 
that its value as a social institution can only be realised so long as the State continues 
to endorse it.
Additionally, if marriage entails obligations, it must be constituted by a 
contract which the state will enforce. I will argue in Chapter VI that gender 
inequality necessitates the imposition of certain financial obligations between spouses 
in heterosexual marriages. If marriage were completely deregulated, these 
obligations would no longer be imposed or enforced. For these reasons, marriage is 
necessarily constituted by state recognised contracts. The actual performance of 
marriages could be still devolved from the state: the ceremony could be performed by 
private contractors (religious or not), with the state endorsing only relationships 
which meet certain criteria as marriage ceremonies, or licensing and regulating these 
suppliers.
For the institution of marriage to continue, the state must endorse individual 
marriages. But why does the virtue account justify a liberal state’s doing so? That is, 
given that state involvement is necessary for the institution of marriage to exist, why
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is the state justified in enabling this institution? The answer lies in Rawls’ conception 
of a well-ordered society in A Theory o f Justice. In a well-ordered society, members 
desire to act justly. A well-ordered society has a stable conception of justice: “One 
conception o f justice is more stable than another if the sense of justice that it tends to 
generate is stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the 
institutions it allows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act u n j u s t l y . ” ^^ And 
those in the original position, Rawls claims, will choose a more stable society over a 
less stable one when other things are equal.
The point is still Hegel’s: relationships based on trust and love will foster the 
virtues o f the well-ordered society. The state’s recognition of marriage will maintain 
the institution, thereby promoting these types of relationships. Rawls himself gives an 
account o f how the sense of justice is developed in the family. Of course, a major 
criticism o f Rawls’ Theory o f Justice is that its principles o f justice are not applied 
within the family. It is unclear how children can develop a sense of justice when 
inequality exists between their parents and in society at large.53 For now, I want to 
see how marriage can create a more stable society, thus giving individuals in the 
original position reason to allow the legal institution of marriage.
Rawls argues that children first develop a moral sense in the family, acquiring 
through reciprocal love and trust ‘the morality of authority’, followed (developing 
within and without the family) by ‘the morality of association’, and finally ‘the 
morality of principles’. R a w l s ’ own description of the development o f the sense of 
justice depends on the family. But his description is also relevant to adults in the 
context of marriage. The morality of authority is developed in children from love of 
their parents. The morality of association is developed as children and adults take on 
various roles and learn the corresponding ideals. But attachment to the morality of 
principles also grows out of personal attachment:
52 Rawls 1971, p. 454.
53 See Okiii 1989, pp. 97-101.
54 Rawls 1971, pp. 486, 488-9, 490.
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once the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feelings and mutual 
confidence, have been generated ... then the recognition that we and 
those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and 
enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding 
sense of justice. 55
Further, ties of care deepen the moral sentiments.^  ^ On this account, ties formed in 
loving relationships between adults strengthen commitments to justice and the feeling 
of moral sentiments.^? The value of marriage is as a social practice which inclines 
participants to attitudes of trust and a commitment to justice. This justification 
requires that liberal principles be applied to marriage, so that no controversial 
conception o f the good life is preferred to others in marriage legislation.
Finally, there is another way in which marriage could contribute to the 
development o f a sense of justice. This account is drawn from John Stuart Mill. He 
argued in The Subjection o f Women that women’s equality would require reform of  
the family and of marriage law. But he also endorsed marital friendship. Mary 
Lyndon Shanley concludes that “Mill’s final prescription to end the subjection of  
women was not equal opportunity but spousal friendship; equal opportunity was a 
means by which such friendship could be encouraged.”5^  Through personal 
interaction as equal companions, men would gain regard for women as equals. Of 
course, marriage, romantic love, and the family have been used to oppress w o m e n .  5^  
But real acceptance of women’s equality by men may also be promoted through 
friendship. This may be another value of (heterosexual) marriage. For now, I will
55 Rawls 1971, pp. 473-4.
5^  See Rawls 1971, p. 475.
5? Rawls does criticise the expression of a well-ordered society in 4  Theory o f  Justice as unrealistic 
in Political Liberalism (Rawls 1993, p. xvi-ii). However, he retains the notion in a revised form.
58 Shanley 1998, p. 416.
55" See for example Firestone 1998.
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leave the issue of gender and pursue the question — left unanswered above — o f what 
moral value love may have, and what virtuous dispositions it may create.
Certain virtues are fostered in marriage. In the next chapter, I will examine 
their value more closely. I have argued so far that these virtues are o f value to the 
state, or society. Participation in certain types o f relationships helps to develop these 
virtues. This development can occur within or without legal (or religious) marriage. 
However, the institution of marriage promotes these relationships and helps to 
maintain them (through peer expectations and the pressures of the contract). Without 
state recognition, this socially valuable institution might no longer be able to perform 
this ftmction. This account justifies a liberal state in recognising marriages, although 
it does not necessitate the state’s doing so. In Rawlsian terms, the institution is 
justified by its ability to promote a well-ordered society. One set o f principles will be 
chosen over others in the original position if it offers greater stability. However, as I 
have argued above, marriage is not uniquely able to provide such stability. Other 
forms of association may develop similar virtues. What I have been concerned to 
show in this section is that the state is justified in recognising and regulating marriage 
contracts.
CHAPTER IV: LOVE, VALUE, JUSTICE
L Care ethics and marriage
2. Love’s value
3. Love and justice: their compatibility
There are two distinct ways in which moral value could attach to marriage. 
First, moral value could be generated by the institutional structure, so that the 
contract morally transforms the relationship. I argued against this view in Chapter 
III. I argued for a second view, which holds that loving relationships are valuable, 
and that the institution o f marriage is only morally valuable because it promotes these 
relationships. The first type of account is exemplified by Kant’s account, in wHch the 
moral value depends on the legal structure. The exchange o f rights through contract 
which is identical with the marriage ceremony is the source o f the moral value o f  
marriage, and this value cannot be found in relationships outside marriage — in fact, 
these are impermissible. The second type o f account is represented by the Hegelian 
account, in which the moral value o f marriage is found in the type of relationship, that 
o f ethical love, enjoyed by the spouses. This emphasis, o f course, forces Hegel into 
an inconsistent justification o f the necessity o f the marriage contract, since it seems 
that ethical love could occur outside marriage.
I have argued that moral value attaches to loving relationships, and so is not 
tensive with marriage. Marriages can lack this type of relationship, and 
hips outside marriage can possess it. The institution of marriage has 
 ^ moral and political value insofar as it promotes loving relationships, 
e certain virtues. This value justifies state recognition of marriage 
aluable quality found in the marriage relationship can also exist
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outside legal or religious marriage, but the existence of the institution is justified as 
promoting this kind of relationship. Further, the relationship may be fortified by the 
contract. The institution does not add extra value, but enables trust and love to 
develop by fixing it in communal regard and by creating a framework of expectations 
and responsibilities. The usefulness of the contract in this regard may vary fi’om case 
to case. In this chapter, I will discuss more fully the value of love, and hence, of  
marriage.
While the love relationship itself produces these virtues, the, institution of 
marriage has instrumental moral and political value just so far as it recognises, 
endorses, and in some ways enables love relationships. Social pressure and the 
marriage contract provide support to the married couple. In section 1 ,1 will discuss 
and reject one account of the moral value o f love, the care ethics account of love as 
morally valuable independently o f principles o f justice. In section 2, I will outline a 
more plausible understanding of the moral value associated with love. I will argue 
that the type of love relationship associated with marriage is morally valuable in (at 
least) three ways: educatively, epistemologically, and motivationally. Finally, in 
section 3, I will defend the application of principles of justice to marriage against 
claims that justice is inimical to love. I will argue that the opposition between love 
and justice is misguided. To the contrary, love is only valuable in a context o f rights, 
justice, and respect.
There are different senses o f ‘love’ and ‘care’. There is first, the bare feeling 
or sensation which, following Hegel, I call ‘natural love’. In another sense 
(corresponding with Hegel’s ‘ethical love’ or Noddings’ ‘ethical caring’), love is a 
more elaborate set of dispositions. I am focusing on natural love, first to argue that it 
is not sufficient for moral value, then to explain how it may be valuable when 
combined with attention to rights and duties. One viewpoint might be that only the 
more elaborate set of dispositions (‘ethical love’) is properly called love, and (in this 
sense) love is intrinsically morally valuable. This value would be compatible with my
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claims. I will argue that natural love is only valuable in the context of rights, justice, 
and respect, so that if love is taken to include these, it has intrinsic moral value. I will 
not undertake a complete analysis of the value of love here, however, but only 
attempt to show that natural love may be morally valuable in the context of rights and 
justice.
1. Care ethics and marriage
My account of the justification o f the political institution of marriage turns on 
a claim for the moral (and, derivatively, political) value of love. In this section, I will 
show that an account which locates moral value in love independently of justice, the 
kind o f account which would attribute moral value to marriage precisely as a loving 
relationship, has serious difficulties. In Chapter II, I suggested a possible 
development o f Hegel’s account of marriage which would assign moral value to the 
emotion o f love. While Hegel’s account assigns value to ethical love, I queried 
whether one could attribute moral value to natural or sentimental love, that is, the 
bare emotion o f love for a particular other. Such an account of the moral value of 
natural love would have similarities with care ethics. My purpose is not to attack 
care ethics, but to criticise any account (such as that put forward by some proponents 
of care ethics) which describes love, independently of rights, justice, and respect, as 
the source of moral value. ^
Care ethics has been one of the most influential products of feminist theory. 
However, I should note here that, apart from the problems which I will discuss, I do 
not believe the ethics of care to be central to a feminist ethics. First, since the 
redistribution o f the sexual division o f labour is necessary to empower women, it is 
unfortunate that care ethics emphasises qualities associated with traditional
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femininity, especially with domesticity. Second, a feminist ethics should be 
intrinsically concerned with justice between the sexes.
Care ethics originated as an attempt to gain recognition for female qualities 
which differ from the male qualities prescribed as normative. This project was based 
on a belief that the perspective claimed as normative in ethics and other areas of 
philosophy was in fact distinctly male. Women’s perspective had been excluded from 
the account of humanity. In excluding women, philosophers have also crucially 
neglected those areas of experience historically relegated to women. For example, 
the assumption that women will perform necessary domestic work and child-care 
prompts its omission from accounts of the social distribution of labour.  ^ In some 
arguments, the methodology of reason and abstraction is also connected with 
misogyny. The cultural opposition between reason and emotion as male and female, 
which takes reason as normative and sees emotion as an impediment to rationality 
and autonomy, has been linked to the personification of free and rational agents in 
moral theory, just as philosophical abstraction has been charged with valorising 
mentality, culturally identified with maleness, over the body, identified with women.^ 
The features attributed to women in such arguments tend to be emotional capacities 
for empathy and compassion, and an epistemological stance marked by intuition, 
subjectivity, and attention to particularity, as opposed to abstract rationality.
Different theorists disagree about whether the qualities attributed to women 
are innate or historically conditioned and whether the attribution is even true. 
Psychological research done by Carol Gilligan purported to show that in considering 
moral dilemmas women do tend to believe that the narrative context and 
particularities of the case are morally relevant, whereas men judge from generalised 
principles. The moral perspective attributed to women is characterised as caring and
 ^ For critical work on care etliics, see Hoagland 1991, and for a sympathetic attempt to advance 
beyond these problems, see Friedman 1987.
 ^This is tlie theme of Okin 1989.
 ^This is a point made in Ruddick 1990, for example pp. 194 ff. See also Cixous 1980.
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as aware of interdependence with others/ But the claim that moral theory should pay 
more attention to caring relationships need not presuppose anything about the 
relation between women and caring. The key argument is that these human features 
have been excluded from the account of humanity, and that this omission is connected 
with women’s inferior status. This school of thought contends that philosophy has 
consistently undervalued or ignored important facts about human nature and 
interrelation. The ethics of care attempts to correct for a perceived bias towards 
impersonality and abstraction in ethical theory.
Care ethics furnishes a view of the self and of ethics which suggests that the 
concepts of autonomy and justice must be adapted in light o f the fact of human 
interdependence and the moral power of natural sentiment. I will examine the claim 
that moral value is located in natural love and argue in this section and the next that 
love is only morally valuable in conjunction with universal moral rules. So far as love 
is part of the moral value of marriage (or other loving relationships), this is not 
because love is the only source of moral value, but because love can help agents 
perform their moral duties.
Nel Noddings’ theory of care begins from the observation that relationships 
with and emotional response to other people are “a basic fact o f human existence.”  ^
Human infants require nurture and most adult pursuits are impossible without co­
operation. This is not a controversial claim. But Noddings holds that morality is 
only possible through emotion. She traces moral impulses to the basic fact of  
affective response to others. “The foundation of ethical response” lies in “caring and 
the memory of being cared for.”  ^ She proposes that an action “is right or wrong 
according to how faithfully it was rooted in caring ... in a genuine response,” rather 
than in its compliance with a universal principle.^
 ^Larrabee 1993, p.4.
 ^Noddings 1984, p. 4.
 ^Noddings 1984, pp. 1, 4. 
Noddings 1984, p. 53.
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Noddings’ argument that natural sentiment is the source of ethical action 
involves several claims. Ethical feeling is derived from the caring relations which are 
basic to human life. From these natural experiences, humans develop an ideal of 
themselves as carers. In practice, ethics depends on caring in two ways. First, it is 
only through caring that agents can behave ethically towards others. When one is 
dealing with, for instance, strangers, this may take the form of ethical caring rather 
than the natural sentiment. But, secondly, ethical caring is impossible if the agent has 
not experienced natural affection.^ Only through a recollection of natural care can 
one care in other circumstances. This account is what I have described as attributing 
moral value to love, where love is a positive emotional response toward a particular 
other (as we will see, this is what Noddings means by care). Love is the source of  
moral value, since one cannot act morally without acting out of love (natural or 
ethical) for the other, and one can only do this if she has experienced natural love.
I have said that Noddings defines caring as an emotional response toward a 
particular other. Her claim is that morality requires full perception of other persons 
in the context o f their lives and with an awareness of one’s own relationship to them. 
The defining quality of the carer is receptivity to “the reality of the other.”  ^ This 
insight prompts the carer to act “as though in my own behalf, but in behalf o f the 
other. This pattern of reception and response occurs spontaneously in (natural) 
caring relationships, where one learns moral behaviour. Thus morality is achieved 
through a translation of natural caring to ethical caring, that is, caring for everyone 
one encounters. Ethical caring focuses on the immediate other, which prevents the 
sacrifice of people to rules and abstract principles. Noddings’ objection to universal 
moral principles is that they cannot meet the particular needs of individuals in specific 
contexts and so may cause more harm than good. In ethical caring, moral action
 ^Noddings 1984, p. 79.
 ^Noddings 1984, p. 14.
Noddings 1984, p. 16. 
 ^  ^ Noddings 1984, p. 4.
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responds to individual needs, and moral judgements cannot be made without 
consideration of particular individuals.
There are many problems with this account of love as the source of moral 
action. I will focus on two. First, Noddings’ claim that caring is the locus and well- 
spring of all moral behaviour lacks plausibility. Caring, or love, is insufficient as a 
guide to moral action. In the first place, one can’t always fiiUy guess or understand 
another person’s needs. Even when one can, caring may cause harm.' For instance, 
an agent may disclose information about her friend’s state of health to his co-workers 
thinking it is in his best interests. Or she may decide not to tell her father that he is 
terminally ill. Or she may provide alcohol to an alcoholic to save him from short­
term suffering. These dangers make an alternative ethical viewpoint (one which 
prescribes rights and duties) necessary. Noddings’ insistence on eschewing principles 
in order to appreciate particular situations thus leads to a dangerous subjectivism. 
Love alone is not sufficient to guide moral behaviour.
Someone might respond that my counter-examples model the wrong kind of  
care. A caring person would consider the alcoholic’s long-term best interests as well 
as his immediate suffering. She would consider her father’s right to know the truth 
and respect her friend’s autonomy. In other words, care presupposes judgements 
about rights and duties. If these constraints are built into love, then it does indeed 
begin to look morally valuable. But in Noddings’ account, moral value comes from 
the emotion alone, which is quite independent of — indeed opposed to, due to her 
particularism — the rights and duties of justice. It is my claim that the emotion alone 
cannot be morally valuable, unless it is thought to contain intrinsically the desire to be 
just. Love is only valuable in the context o f justice.
Second, on Noddings’ account, moral value does not merely consist in acting 
towards others with care, or as if one cared for them, but in actually caring for them. 
Ethical caring depends on natural caring. However, on the contrary, the emotion of 
love is not required for an action to have moral worth. Loving another person may
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motivate or enable one to act towards him or her in a praiseworthy way. But the |
emotion o f love is separable from the moral action. |
First, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, to some extent love involves 
receptivity, a focus on the other. (I will discuss the nature of love in section 2.) If in 
love the other’s project becomes my own, then I am only acting out o f self-interest. j
This is what Noddings wants to capture: there is no distinction between ‘ought’ and j
‘want’ in natural care.^  ^ Calling this ‘selfrinterest’ may seem mean-spirited or *j
preposterous. One could also describe it as altruism. But the partiality here is j
^ 'jtroubling. For instance, if an agent takes on another’s project and strives to help him |
accomplish it, her concern is limited to how best to help him. Why should she care |
about the effects on others? Noddings argues that she should. As it were, an infinite «
chain o f caring should extend in the agent’s deliberations, so that she cares for those IIwhom her fiiend’s action may affect. But what is really required, if that is the case, is 
'^ ' ian impartial extension o f caring to everyone involved. This impartiality at first glance |
seems to conflict with the impulses o f natural love, which singles out the beloved S
above all others. In short, the only way to make care ethics plausible as a moral i
theory is to argue that care should be impartially distributed. But this conflicts with i
the claim that love alone, independent o f principles of application, is the source o f |Imoral value, since now we see that impartiality plays some role as well and in fact ^
must even restrain natural love. JI
Universal impartial love might be possible. Noddings envisions concentric 1
Icircles of love, at the centre of which are those close to the agent, at the periphery
strangers. This is not identical with the concept o f universal impartial love, since only |
those one encounters or comes into relation with come within the remit o f care. j
Universal impartial love seems to require a principle of impartiality. As a J‘1
particularist, Noddings cannot provide one. Noddings’ account is vulnerable because |
it lacks this impartiality. Caring only for those whom one encounters creates
Noddings 1984, p. 81.
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unfortunate lacunae in moral consciousness; morality should not function on an ‘out 
o f sight, out o f mind’ basis. Also, Noddings’ caring calls for 'engrossment' in the 
other, a quality one can't spread very far!
Second, persons are considered praiseworthy and blameworthy as moral 
agents, but not for their feelings. Aristotle writes that virtues are not passions, or 
feelings: “For we are called excellent or base in so far as we have virtues or vices, not 
in so far as we have feelings. We are neither praised or blamed in so far as we have 
feelings.” We may be praised or blamed for our feelings in some instances (or is it 
only for our failure to control them, or how we express them in action?). One can 
control how one acts. However, emotions are not perfectly subject to rational 
control. Hegel therefore writes that “love, as a feeling [Empfmdung\ is open in all 
respects to contingency, and this is a shape which the ethical may not assume.” 
Morality cannot depend on caprice. Love’s partiality, independence of will, and 
contingency mark it off from the dispositions required for moral action.
Sara Ruddick’s Maternal Thinking improves on Noddings’ Caring in that 
Ruddick claims that love contributes to the moral consciousness, not that action is 
judged by its fidelity to love. Unlike Noddings’ ethical ideal, in which the agent was 
assessed by how faithfully her action was rooted in caring, the maternal agent is held 
successful insofar as she protects the other from damage. Like Noddings, however, 
Ruddick also asserts the value of (maternal) love, rejecting abstract principles as the 
basis of morality. She argues that the practice of mothering provides a morality 
superior to abstract principles of justice. Mothering involves the primary goals o f  
preservation and encouraging growth, what she calls “the logic of mothering.” The 
characteristic attitude of the maternal viewpoint is a protective response to the 
vulnerable. Ruddick sets the protectiveness and concreteness of maternal practice 
against abstract theories or principles which deflect attention from concrete
Aristotle 1985, p. 41 or 1105b. 
Hegel [1821], par. 161, p. 201. 
Ruddick 1990, p. 166.
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individuals. Knowledge of the other, or recognition of her life’s value, is necessary 
for moral judgement. Loving attention to another prevents one from seeing the other 
as a means, for example, reducing him to an economic or military unit.^ ^
In fact, maternal practice has a political dimension. Ruddick argues that 
bonding between mothers will cut across nations, race, and class to promote non­
violence. In part, this involves “an imaginative grasp of what other children mean to 
other mothers.”^^ This loyalty, not mediated through the state, should promote non­
violence because it undermines nationalism and distorting abstractions.^  ^ Yet it still 
involves an impartial application o f concrete recognition o f others’ value — an 
inconsistency in the account as well as an impossible task! Impartial, universal justice 
is inconsistent with the particularised attention Ruddick promotes.
Both Noddings and Ruddick challenge the demarcation between private and 
public good, applying a single standard o f moral good, drawn from the parent-child 
relationship, to all situations, as an improvement upon abstract principles of justice.
But care contains no intrinsic guidelines for fairness. Noddings suggests that agents 
should display care to everyone they encounter, but not that they should actively seek 
to encounter people who might need it. The ethics of care cannot prompt a 
commitment to correcting injustice so long as the injustice in question remains 
unencountered. Some degree of abstract concern is necessary to bring a privileged, 
sheltered individual to act on behalf o f those less well-off. But as an ethic, care does 
not suggest any theoretical obligation for the better-off to care for the worse-off.
Worse, without rights, caring for others may involve paternalistic (or matemalistic) -■
protection infringing on what are generally thought to be individual liberties.
Ruddick conceives of the family as a system which maintains respect and mutuality 
among non-equals, as children’s inequality causes their parents to protect them.
Ruddick 1990, p. 150.
17 Ruddick 1990, p. 177. 
l« Ruddick 1990, p. 240.
1^  I understand fairness to presuppose abstract and universal principles of justice. At least for 
Noddings and Ruddick, care does not contain these.
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However, this cannot translate through analogy to a vision of mutuality between 
unequal power groups. Change would then depend on the voluntary gift o f the 
powerful.
While Noddings and Ruddick insist on particularism at the expense of 
principles of justice, Marilyn Friedman argues that the dichotomy between care and 
justice is misguided. Justice is not irrelevant between those closely related by love, 
since among other things, one wishes to be just to those one loves. One’s behaviour 
with loved ones, no matter how close, should be constrained by justice, particularly 
given the injustices wrought by the historical (and theoretical) removal o f justice from 
the private sphere of the family.^o This seems right. Care alone cannot guide moral 
behaviour. (Perhaps neither can justice alone, in all circumstances.)
The question is how the relation between love and justice should be modelled. 
We may think of the desire to be just as part o f love, but the agent still needs to go 
outside love, as it were, to consult the principles of justice. Or we may think that 
justice is intrinsic to love, properly understood. When we begin evaluating love 
morally, it appears that ordinary usage is no longer a guide to love, and that only 
some forms of love pass the moral bar. But this again suggests that that bar is 
distinct from love. This question I will leave aside, since my intention is merely to 
show that love is only valuable in the context o f justice, whether justice is considered 
necessarily connected to love or distinct from it.
Care ethics risks overlooking the necessary normative standards for 
interaction. For example, one effect of the feminist movement has been to bring 
justice into the home, from which it had been separated by laws protecting privacy. 
Domestic abuse, spousal rape, and divorce necessitate using principles of justice to 
arbitrate between parties whose involvement might seem to render them irrelevant. 
One might reply that care is absent here. But surely Victorian patriarchs, some of 
them, loved the wives over whom they exercised their power. Natural love alone is
70 See Friedman 1987, also reprinted in Larrabee 1993.
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not sufficient for moral behaviour, although, as I will argue in the next section, it may 
be helpful in treating others morally.
2. Love’s value
I have argued that the moral value of the institution of marriage consists in its 
promotion o f a type of loving relationship which is in itself morally valuable. In this 
section I will offer an account of what moral value natural love does have within 
loving relationships. Natural love — the affection found in marriages and other 
relationships — is characterised by intimacy and sympathy with another person. 
These qualities help individuals to fiilfil their moral duties to others.
Different accounts of the moral value of marriage have started with a theory 
of value and tried to read that particular account into marriage. So Kant sees it as 
preserving human freedom in the face of animal nature, and Hegel as a kind o f  ethical 
glue. The priority should be reversed. What is characteristic o f marriage is 
sympathetic intimacy, and the function it performs is morally relevant in any account 
of morality which holds that agents have duties to consider, in some sense, the 
interests o f others. Sympathetic intimacy is instrumental in fulfilling, towards the 
person loved, the moral duties which agents have towards everyone, as well as the 
particular obligations created in the relationship.^^
The moral value of marriage consists in the loving relationship typical of  
marriages. The institution of marriage is valuable because it promotes these 
relationships and reinforces them. The moral value of the loving relationships 
consists in the dispositions that they promote. Within the relationship love motivates
71 See Friedman 1991 for a discussion of the ‘partialist’ claim that “we are entitled to show 
favoritism, preferential treatment, partiality toward loved ones,” or, stronger "that we have tire 
obligation to show such treatment,” p. 162.
a
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moral behaviour. The relationship itself provides particular knowledge of the other 
which provides an epistemological aid to moral behaviour.
Politically, loving relationships are valuable because they create dispositions 
to trust and to regard others as particular others, enlarging the sympathies of the 
agent. A central feature of moral development is learning to perceive others. Loving 
relationships offer an education in this, since they necessarily involve deepening 
knowledge of another person over time, and this knowledge is conjoined with a 
desire (found in love) for the good o f the other. I will make a case for the moral 
value o f seeing the ‘particular other’, but argue that this does not lead to 
particularism and is in fact compatible with universal moral principles. Loving 
relationships on this account have the political value of educating the moral 
sensibilities o f those who experience them.
First, I will discuss the moral value of loving relationships. Such relationships 
are characterised by sympathetic intimacy. This shares features with Noddings’ 
caring, defined as receptivity and response. Sympathy suggests the emotional 
response to the other person, in which one is drawn to protect and further his 
interests and to share his projects. The intimacy developed in relationships is 
knowledge of the other in detail, not just recognition of the particularity of the other 
as an embodied self with his own interests, a recognition of what Benhabib calls ‘the 
concrete other’, but also particular knowledge of him, his history, psychology, and so 
on. Taken together, the knowledge of the other’s self and desire for his good create 
a unique attentiveness.
This account may sound over-rational — what about passion, transport, and 
rapture? They may co-exist with sympathetic intimacy, or exist without it. I am not ^
trying to characterise all occurrences of love, but to gather features common to love 1
between partners. 72 For the reasons already discussed, love is not sufficient to guide 
moral behaviour, but it can enable moral behaviour. It does so in two ways;
A. ■'.'r -■-J- J- i 'Y v '/ l
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motivationally and epistemologically. Sympathy draws one to support the beloved, to 
weigh his interests when shared daily existence may make the question of conflicting 
interests a constant one. It motivates one to treat the other morally. Intimacy reveals 
what these interests are, so that they can be weighed. Love has moral value within a 
relationship because it motivates each to fulfil his duties to the other.
Part of the moral value love has within relationships is in motivating the 
parties of the relationship to Mfil their moral duties to each other. Noddings’ central 
claim that behaviour towards others is only moral as it originates in caring is false. 
But it is true that natural love can motivate moral behaviour towards others. Kant 
wrote that actions done from sympathetic motives and not from duty have no moral 
worth.73 (Incidentally, this makes it hard to see how love could effect the moral 
transformation of sex, as one might be tempted to read some o f Kant’s remarks in the 
Lectures on Ethics.) First, if we understand Kant to mean that one may enjoy doing 
one’s duty, so long as one is doing it from the motive o f duty, then the presence of 
love will not detract from the action’s moral worth.74 But this reply is not available 
to me, since I am assuming that love plays some role in determining action (since it 
‘motivates’). It is clear, at least, that Kant’s view in the Groundwork is that only the 
motive of duty has moral worth.
Perhaps at this point, without broaching the questions about the nature of 
love which I set aside earlier, my account must part ways from the Kantian. That is, I 
might reply that love contains the desire to do one’s duty by another. But this reply 
seems unavailable since I am explicitly focusing on natural love, not the more 
elaborate ethical love which contains such a notion. However, perhaps natural love
77 What of Catullus’ line, “Odi et amo,” “I love and I hate”? Or love between strangers? This is not 
tlie place for an extended classification of love relationships.
73 Kant [1785], pp. 8-13.
74 Paton rejects the interpretation of Kant which commits him to the “absurd” view that “the 
presence of a natural inclination to good actions ... detracted from tlieir moral worth.” Paton argues 
that Kant is merely trying to show that it is the motive of duty which gives an action its moral worth, 
not tliat other motives detract from moral worth so long as tlie motive of duty is present. Paton 
1963, p. 19.
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can sustain some of this burden. The sympathy which constitutes part of it includes a 
desire for the good of another (in the sense of desiring what is in her interest). I have 
argued above that this sympathy is not a sufficient guide to moral action, since this 
also requires principles of justice. (The question I have set aside is whether or not 
these principles are contained within love.) But sympathy, which motivates one to do 
one’s duty by another, is in part the desire to behave morally by her. If Y loves X, Y 
will wish not to violate X’s rights, though Y may have to look outside love to learn 
what those rights are. This sympathy may fail, as in the case of Othello. But we may 
say there that love has been outweighed by other motives.
The reply to the Kantian is that sympathy motivates one to do one’s duty 
because it essentially contains a desire to do one’s duty, so that acting out o f  
sympathy is acting from the motive of duty. The sympathetic philanthropist in Kant’s 
example was acting from duty all along. Love of humankind is in part the desire to 
do one’s duty by them. His philanthropy expressed what he thought was the right 
thing to do by them. Love would not have led him to an action he knew (after 
consulting principles of justice) to be wicked. I have argued that love is o f value, 
within relationships, as an aid to fulfilment of moral duties, because love contains the 
element of wishing for the good of the other and hence not wishing to act wrongly 
towards her, since to violate one’s duty to another constitutes a harm to her. Now I 
will turn to the moral value of intimacy. From this is derived the political value of  
loving relationships, which provide an education in moral behaviour in complex 
interpersonal situations.
Loving relationships teach one how to see another person in the light o f his 
particular needs, desires, and history, and in the context of one’s own relation to him. 
I will argue that the moral value of love is linked to its focus on a particular other. 
The attention to another in her particularity is a component of moral awareness. The 
suggestion made by Noddings and Ruddick that morality requires full perception of  
other persons in the context of their lives and with an awareness of one’s own
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connection to them is important. The sense of connection to the other referred to 
here is not the connection forged by shared humanity, but the role one has played in 
their lives and the responsibilities one has assumed towards them. I will review the 
moral importance of attention for moral action, arguing that this attention to the 
particular other is compatible with universal moral principles. I will then show the 
relation between this attention and loving relationships.
The importance of framing morality in terms of a particular, or concrete, other 
emerged from the feminist debate over care, in conjunction with attacks on moral 
u n i v e r s a l i s m . 7 5  Seeing someone as a particular other involves seeing him as a person 
with a certain history and personality, in terms of his distinctness from others. This is 
contrasted with the universalist standpoint in which persons are morally identified by 
what they have in common: rationality, autonomy, the ability to suffer. Seeing 
morality in terms of the particular other is a moral viewpoint from which other people 
are recognised as situated within the concrete contexts of their lives, and these 
contexts are taken to be morally significant. Persons have moral value due to their 
histories, relationships, and contexts, not simply in terms of abstract, general human 
characteristics. They have moral value because of their location within a social 
context, not as (impossibly) independent, autonomous agents.
I have criticised particularism above. In order to avoid moral oversights, care 
must be supplemented by universal moral rules of impartiality and justice. For the 
same reasons I do not find the replacement of universalism with the standpoint of the 
particular other plausible. For one thing, universalism is able to explain why rights 
attach to individuals whatever their context. Second, when we reflect on why 
recognition of another as particular is morally compelling, the dichotomy between the 
abstract view and the particular view of others seems fades. If others are valuable 
because they are in the process of leading a life, in which they have certain valuable 
relationships, a series of past experiences, and plans for the future, then the
75 See Benhabib 1987, esp. pp. 86-91.
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description once again rises to a certain level o f abstraction. Individuals are valuable 
because they share this feature of pursuing plans of life in the context of certain 
histories.
However, seeing others as particular — recognising that they have specific 
needs, desires, and histories — is part o f moral understanding. In order to act morally 
towards another person, one must react to him as an individual, not simply as a 
human possessed of certain characteristic human traits. One must take into account 
his needs, desires, history, and other particularities: these make a moral difference. 
This attention to the other is stressed by Martha Nussbaum in her work on Henry 
James. She claims that James promotes the paradigm of “moral attention,” that is, 
deep perception o f others, o f situational complexities, and of one’s own 
responsibilities. He suggests, in Nussbaum’s account, that moral action occurs as a 
response to others — “without reliance on rules o f duty” — and that “[o]ur highest 
and hardest [ethical] task is to make ourselves people ‘on whom nothing is lost’,” 
that is, people o f unbiased and full a w a r e n e s s . 7 6
Seeing others as particular in this way is compatible with moral universalism, 
despite arguments against this claim. Arguing for the primacy o f the particular over 
the general standpoint, Seyla Benhabib claims that universal moral principles fall into 
incoherence because they fail to recognise the concrete other. The “disembedded and 
disembodied” moral self — the “generalised other” — “is incompatible with the veiy 
criteria of reversibility and universalizability” required by a universalist e t h i c s .  ^ 7 
Although in universalist theories, “moral reciprocity involves the capacity to take the 
standpoint of the other,... under the conditions of the ‘veil of ignorance,’ the other as 
different from the self, disappears.”^^  If other people are represented solely as (for 
example) free, rational agents, the very individual who should be the subject o f moral
76 Nussbaum 1990, Chapters 4 and 5, and pp. 148-9.
77 Benliabib 1987, p.81. See also Whitbeck 1992, for an argument that liberal individualism loses 
sight of the particular other.
7* Benhabib 1987, p.89. She refers to Kant as well as to Rawls.
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reflection disappears. But it seems mistaken to say that universalist theories like 
Rawls’ or Kant’s cannot consider the particular other.
Benhabib’s criticisms seem misguided because moral judgements always, by 
definition, require full apprehension of the context, that is, of all the features which 
are morally relevant. (Of course, we may need to revise our understanding o f which 
features are morally relevant. But this does not undermine universalism.) For 
instance, Rawls’ contract theoiy requires that each puts herself into the position o f all 
other members of society. It is unclear how universal moral rules obscure the 
particularity of persons and situations. In a complex situation, it may require a good 
deal of investigation and deliberation to work out how they apply. But surely it is 
just their application which responds to the particularities at hand.
Seeing the particular other is not incompatible with the application of  
universal moral rules. But one can see why the complaint has been made. Rules 
rigidly applied may in some cases cause only harm. For instance, why does Kant, in 
“On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives,” not see that the case at hand 
could be better described as a lie-in-order-to-save-a-life? As Anscombe points out, 
the Categorical Imperative must be supplemented with a description o f what features 
of the situation count as morally relevant.^  ^ This is a difficulty for the Formula of  
Universal Law, since it is supposed to generate moral principles, not presuppose them 
before it does its work.
However, the charge that the Categorical Imperative is insensitive to 
particular circumstances seems misguided. All distinctive features of an action, 
including circumstances, consequences, and motive, can be counted in the maxim: 
“the maxim is always of the form ‘if I am in certain circumstances, I will perform an 
action likely to have certain c o n s e q u e n c e s ’ .” 3^ The material maxim serves the 
purpose of introducing circumstances into moral deliberation. Perhaps the concern of 
particularists is not that particular circumstances are not taken into account. What
75* See Anscombe 1958, p. 2.
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may be worrying to them is that “the maxim, however specific, is abstract and 
general, while the action is individual and concrete.”3i But this expresses only that 
one would act likewise in relevantly like circumstances. If everything is considered in 
the maxim, the universalizability test may become unwieldy, but it is at least possible 
to answer the particularist objection that universal principles overlook the particular 
facts of individual cases.
Seeing the particular other in each case in which one applies universal moral 
rules is an important component of moral deliberation. I will now argue that the skill 
and habit o f seeing others as particular are developed in loving relationships, and that 
this moral education is the source o f the political value of marriage. Also, the ability 
to see the particularity of the other spouse is of moral value within the relationship.
The deliberative focus on the particular other is constantly limited by one's 
inability to perceive the full range of particularities which characterise the context. 
The best one can do, often, is to conjecture and infer. This inability diminishes as 
one’s knowledge of the others involved in the situation grows. The connection 
between relationships to others and particular knowledge of them that suggests what 
moral role love plays. Relationships with others enable one to witness their 
particularity. Shared experience provides knowledge of others’ particularities and of  
the context which is ordinarily inaccessible. In other words, loving relationships with 
others enable one to fine-tune the application of moral principles in particular 
circumstances as one is ordinarily unable to do.
Loving intimacy is valuable in aiding one to fulfil duties prescribed by general 
moral principles towards the loved one. There are also particular duties generated in 
close relationships, through promises, reliance, and expectation. In addition to 
explicit promises and agreements accrued, relations between persons over time may 
generate duties founded on reliance. If Sally has led her spouse to believe that he 
may rely on her, not through any explicit promise but through repeated interaction,
36 Paton 1963, p. 76.
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then it becomes obligatory (over and above her general moral duties) for her to be
reliable.32
Such duties accumulated during the relationship may only be carried out with 
this detailed knowledge of the other. These duties are not different in kind from 
ordinary moral duties. As one comes to deeper knowledge of the other, fulfilling 
duties towards her becomes more complex as, first, one sees the complexity of her 
character, and, second, she begins to hold interests in one’s own behaviour. In the 
first instance, one’s knowledge of how to carry out general duties towards another 
will increase as one knows her better. Second, when the relationship between two 
people becomes a strong interest for each party, both parties must weigh this newly 
created claim in their moral deliberations. For example, a spouse considering whether 
to accept a job offer in a far-off city should consider the effect on his relationship in 
terms of both his and his spouse’s interest in it. These duties depend on the context 
and history of the relationship, not love itself. One does not owe any special 
consideration to an obsessed stalker.
Another relevant question is the duration of duties created in loving 
relationships. What is the status of the obligations created through reliance when 
love ends? Some of the duties created through sympathetic intimacy can only be 
carried out through sympathetic intimacy, through the knowledge o f the other and the 
sharing of ends. Duties derived from intimacy, especially those whose existence 
depends on the framework of intimacy, cannot continue when the relationship is 
dissolved. Having once been intimate may have some claims, so that duties may be 
envisioned as trailing off rather than stopping cold. But if these duties, aside from 
explicit promises, depend on the existence of shared ends, it makes no sense to think 
of them as continuing when those shared ends have been dissolved and separated.
Love develops habits of considering others’ interests. Its political value is in 
part the movement away from egoism that it effects, as one recognises the
3^  Paton 1963, p. 137.
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importance o f another’s good to her, and comes to desire it with her. Another part of 
the political value of loving relationships comes from the practice they provide in 
seeing another as a particular other. Seeing another as particular is not necessarily 
motivational. Its value is the knowledge it gives o f the value o f others’ interests, 
histories, and needs to them. This may not be sufficient to motivate, but it is critical 
to understanding how to treat another morally. Moral action cannot proceed without 
(at least when this is possible) some sense of what the other sees as her good. 
Coming to know another person in her particularity reinforces, or provides, 
knowledge o f the importance of considering others’ interests.
Loving relationships create habits o f weighing another person’s interests with 
one’s own and seeing the other’s particularities. Politically, they are valuable because 
they can create the disposition to take account o f others’ needs. This in turn may 
promote a sense o f justice. This point can be found in both Rawls and Mill. Mill 
writes that as society progresses, justice will be
grounded as before on equal, but now also on sympathetic 
association; having its root no longer in the instinct of equals for 
self-protection, but in a cultivated sympathy between them ... The 
family, justly constituted, would be the real school of the virtues o f  
freedom. 33
If marriage were a society of equals, children would learn to treat others as equals.
What we need to see is how loving relationships promote the sense of justice. 
Rawls claims that attachment to particular others strengthens regard for principles of 
justice which are known to benefit and protect those loved ones. This claim must be 
weighed with the possibility that partiality towards one’s loved ones may subvert
37 See Scanlon 1990 for a discussion of the principle o f reliance.
33 Mill [1869], pp. 46-7. See also Rawls 1971, pp. 473-4; the passage is cited in my Chapter III at 
fn. 55.
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justice. Mill suggests that sympathy towards others may prompt justice towards 
them. This may occur through analogical apprehension, much like the transition 
suggested by Noddings between natural and ethical caring. The development of 
feelings o f sympathy for one particular person may enlarge sympathies for others in 
general. This is an empirically verifiable — or falsifiable — psychological principle. I 
do not wish to assert it as a universal phenomenon of human nature. However, 
examination of the moral role played by love shows why this principle is plausible. In 
loving relationships, one is both motivated and enabled to treat another morally. This 
creates habits of considerate action on behalf of others. It also creates a habit of  
considering another’s interests in decision-making.
I have claimed that the experience of loving relationships will extend an 
agent’s sympathies, habituating her into modes o f trust and relationality. Some 
philosophers worry that the opposite is true, that family sympathies conflict with the 
impartiality necessary for justice. This is a problem for Rawls where families interfere 
with equal opportunity.34 Think of Plato:
Does not the worst evil for a state arise from anything that tends to 
rend it asunder and destroy its unity ...? ... [The Guardian] must 
regard everyone whom he meets as brother or sister, father or 
mother, son or daughter, grandchild or grandparent.... A result that 
will be due to ... our Guardians’ holding their wives and children in 
common.35
This argument applies equally to private property, of course, although the question 
here is not the abolition of private property or of the family, but of whether the state 
has reason to promote loving relationships.
34 See Rawls 1971, pp. 511-2.
35 Plato 1965, pp. 163-5 (V.461-3).
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First, there is no moral harm in partiality as long as it does not lead to 
injustice towards others. Justice does not require that a wife love her husband no 
more than she loves her neighbour’s husband. Loving one’s spouse more than one 
loves others does not entail that one has no concern at all for others. The ‘disruptive’ 
model o f partiality pictures a marriage (or family) as a circle outside of which one is 
indifferent to the claims of others. But it can be contrasted with a harmonising model 
of love which does not divide the partners from the world, but locates them in it. 
Their relation reaches out (in lesser degree) to friends, family, acquaintances, 
connecting them to others rather than marking them off. This seems equally possible 
and plausible. Partiality does sometimes follow love, but love may also effect an 
enlargement of sympathies.
Moreover, the ‘disruptive’ partiality, so far as it occurs, may be a feature of  
certain individuals whatever position they find themselves in. Certain natures may 
jealously set themselves against the common good, and set the good o f their families 
against society too if they have them. In other words, this tendency may pre-exist 
love relationships. Of course, one might think o f parents being motivated to do more 
for their children than they would for themselves. But it seems unlikely that the 
institution of marriage will promote this partiality. Rather, it brings the relationship 
into the public sphere of judgement, expectation, and regard. Marriage seems likely 
to connect the partners to the rest of the world rather than pitting them against it, 
simply because it locates them in a public context.
The argument that experience of love will promote a disposition to trust and 
sympathise with others in general I trace back to Hegel, First, the habit of responding 
to others sympathetically may be developed through love. Hegel (like Aristotle) 
emphasises the role of one’s habits in structuring one’s desires. Where love meets the 
standard of sympathetic intimacy, the prolonged habit of caring for another may 
condition one to respond with sympathy in various situations. Coming to understand 
oneself as a self related to a particular other by trust will promote relations o f trust to
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others. There is also a learning advantage. In relationships, one learns how to treat 
others as they wish and comes to understand how other people are. Experiencing the 
reality of another person reinforces the reality of other people’s experience.
3. Love and justice: their compatibility
Some advocates of care ethics argue that universal moral rules threaten the 
perception o f the particular other. The contextualist criticism of universalism is allied 
to an attack on the liberal conception of individual and the primacy o f justice, a 
position which allies communitarians and some feminists.36 They hold that justice is 
inimical to love or altruistic virtues, for the application of principles o f justice within 
certain associations, such as the family, distorts the commitment and shared 
relationship which takes priority here. Similarly, the model of the individual as a 
rational contractor is said to be distorted, since individuals do in fact have all kinds of  
attachments to each other, some of which may outweigh the claims of justice in 
value.37 In this section, I will defend the relevance of justice to marriage.
This will in part lay the ground for my next chapter. In it, I will argue for the 
application of freedom of contract to marriage. The proposal that the marriage 
contract should be regarded as an ordinary contract raises criticisms that the 
principles of justice, including freedom of contract, are inapplicable to marriage or to 
intimate relationships more generally. Spontaneity, affection, altruism — the crucial 
attributes of intimate relations — should not be subjected to contractual ordering, a 
tool designed for economic transactions.
The relationship between contract and liberal justice is complex. Freedom of 
contract is implied by the prioritisation of liberty in liberalism (although the difference
36 For a discussion of the similarities between communitarians and comuunity-interested feminists, 
see Weiss 1995,
37  See Held 1990.
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principle takes precedence)/^ Rawls’ theory is also, at another level, a contractarian 
account of the foundation o f justice. The attack on liberal standards of justice has 
included criticism o f contractarianism. The priority of justice in small associations 
where the circumstances o f justice (mutual disinterest, conflicting claims on scarce 
resources) do not apply has been denied. It is precisely in these circumstances that 
the contractarian model o f the individual as self-interested and unattached does not 
apply. Of course, the disinterested individual described as taking part in the original 
position is part o f Rawls’ thought-experiment which is not intended to involve claims 
about any “particular theory o f human motivation. ”3^  But the contractarian model o f  
the individual has met with criticism. For example, Benhabib notes that Hobbes’ 
suggestion to “consider men ... as if but even now sprung out o f the earth, and 
suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind o f engagement to 
each other” denies the fact of infants’ dependence on their parents."  ^ Held argues 
that taking the contractual model of the individual as paradigmatic overlooks the 
relationships of dependence which are at least as fundamental to human experience.^  ^
Of course, Hobbes and Rawls have good reason for describing the contract 
situation as they do. These suppositions enable them to determine what conditions 
will protect individuals when sympathy fails. However, communitarians suggest that 
the principles o f justice generated in this way are inappropriate in, even inimical to, 
communities where the circumstances o f justice described by Rawls do not apply. 
This brings Michael Sandel to argue that the individual rights theoretically secured on 
contractarian assumptions have no place in communities where these conditions do 
not obtain.42
3^  See my Chapter V1.3 for a more thorough discussion.
39 Rawls 1971, p. 130. See pp. 126-30 for his description of the circumstances of justice.
46 Quoted in Benliabib 1987, p. 84, from Hobbes' ‘Pliilosophical Rudiments Concerning 
Government and Society’,
41 See Held 1987.
47 See also MacIntyre 1985, pp. 244-51.
;
....
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The criticism of liberalism made by Sandel is that virtues such as altruism take 
precedence over justice in associations like the family. Sandel does not discuss the 
contractual regulation of marriage, but his position implies that contract is 
inappropriate as a tool for negotiating intimate relationships. (We will see that 
community-orientated feminists claim precisely this.) Introducing a basis for concrete 
legal expectations into a marriage will produce self-interest and formality at odds with 
affection. One legal theorist points out that marriage contracts seem to invite 
invidious comparisons with commercial contract. Contract suggests “individualism in 
the sense o f selfishness, and ... that one party has the right to break a contract so long 
as that breaching party pays damages.”"*^ But is the inference that contract therefore 
weakens marriage correct?
Before addressing the role o f contract in marriage, I will consider the claim 
that justice is inapplicable within the family and even disruptive of the higher virtues 
which characterise the family. This view has much historical precedent. Susan 
Moller Okin has shown that there is a long philosophical tradition of viewing the 
family as governed by affection rather than justice. On this view, the conditions o f ^
justice — self-interested competition for scarce goods — do not apply  ^as there is an i
“identity of interests” among family members."^  ^ Hegel and Hume both exemplify this 
tradition. Hume writes, in his account of justice, “Between married persons, the 
cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all division of  
possession; and has often, in reality, the force ascribed to it.”*^  ^ And we have seen 
Hegel’s account:
Weisbrod 1994, p. 778.
Okin 1982, and Okin 1989, Chapter 2: 'The Family: Beyond Justice?’
Okin 1989, p. 26. Okin writes that Allan Bloom puts the family above justice, “acknowledging ... 
that the division of labor found within the gender-structured family is unjust... but [claiming that it 
is] grounded in nature and necessary.”
46 Hume [1777], p. 185.
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The right which belongs to the individual [dem Einzelnen] by virtue 
of the family unit and which consists primarily in his life within this 
unit takes on legal form [die Form Rechtens] ... only when the family 
begins to dissolve.4?
On this view, there is no need for allocations o f rights within a functional family, since 
sentiment provides for distribution and precludes the possibility of separate claims.
I have already criticised Hegel’s view in Chapter II. Moreover, modem 
feminism has concentrated on demonstrating why rights must be extended to reach 
inside families.4^  Most feminists would not challenge the importance of rights within 
the family, but challenges to the contractual conception of the self and the primacy o f  
universal principles have come from feminists as well as communitarians such as 
Sandel. These criticisms are united by an understanding of intimate relationships as 
characterised by a trust and generosity which are devalued by the contractual model 
o f the individual and disrupted by inappropriate applications o f abstract principles.
Sandel takes issue with Rawls’ assignment o f justice to a pre-eminent status 
among the social virtues. He claims that justice obtains precisely where “nobler but 
rarer virtues” — generosity, benevolence, affection — are l a c k i n g . 4 9  He cites the 
family as an institution in which “affections may be engaged to such an extent that 
justice is scarcely engaged, much less as the ‘first virtue’. N o t  only is justice 
superseded in the family and other groupings in which there are shared ends and 
values, but the introduction of justice into such circumstances may in fact “represent 
a moral loss” if it occasions the “breakdown of certain personal and civic attachments 
... [or] a rent in the fabric of implicit understandings and commitments.”^^
47 Hegel [1821], p. 200, par. 159.
48 Wollstonecraft [1792]; Mill [1869]; Okin 1989.
49 Sandel 1982, p. 169.
50 Sandel 1982, p. 169.
51 Sandel 1982, p. 33.
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Sandel imagines an ideal family in which generosity, not justice, prevails, so 
that issues of what individual members are owed, or have a right to, are ignored. 
When this domestic peace is broken and affection begins to fail, the family dutifully 
uses the two principles of justice, instead of generosity, to determine distributions. 
Sandel argues that the former scenario, in which justice is not an issue but the family 
naturally pulls for the same ends, seems at least as morally good as the second.^  ^ The 
virtues which it supplanted were finer than justice. Okin responds that while 
associations may display higher virtues than justice — such as altruism — they are only 
“morally superior to associations which are just just only if they are firmly built on a 
foundation of justice.”^^  Justice provides a remedy when affection fails, assuring that 
when nobler virtues no longer operate, each will at least get her own.
Sandel implies that justice detracts from love and affection. When spouses 
begin to assert their rights against each other, trust, generosity, and spontaneity may 
begin to take second place to considerations o f justice. Too much attention to the 
terms and expectations of a marriage is at odds with the natural community which 
should arise between spouses. Voicing a similar claim, Minow and Shanley note that 
“the model of a self-possessing individual linked to others only by agreement ... fails 
to do justice to the complex interdependencies involved in family relations and child-
rearing. ”54
Families may not manifest the circumstances of justice or function with justice 
as their primary virtue, but justice is still applicable to them. John Tomasi cites 
MacIntyre, Sandel, and Taylor as holding that individual rights have no place in 
“intimate harmonious communities” and concentrates on the passage from Sandel 
which I have already cited. Tomasi summarises Sandel’s argument as follows: “If 
individuals conceive of themselves as individual holders of rights, that self-conception 
will preclude genuine commitment on their part and thus will weaken and inhibit
52 Sandel 1982, p. 33.
53 Okin 1989, p. 32.
54 Minow and Shanley 1996, pp. 11-12.
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community.”55 Tomasi argues that not only is this false, but that communities 
without justice might no longer be virtuous.
Tomasi’s strategy is to distinguish between withholding and waiving rights. 
Rights withheld are held but not exercised, remaining in one’s possession. It is this 
active decision not to claim that to which one has a right that “gives definition and 
meaning to certain social virtues. ”56 Altruistic actions are meaningful precisely 
because the agent had a right to some property or deed which she chose not to 
exercise. Performance of such acts strengthens interpersonal attachments since the 
recipients and spectators recognise that others gave over entitlements, and “helps to 
guarantee that these attachments are true” because the agent’s act was voluntary.57
Tomasi claims that Sandel loses the distinction between possessing rights and 
insisting on them. Just because family members possess rights and can think of  
themselves as rights-holders does not mean they will choose to interact solely on 
these terms. Tomasi compares a third case with the two marriages Sandel imagines. 
In this case, a servile, deferential wife, takes her husband’s goals as her own. She has 
no sense of her own identity or interests. This case seems to meet the communitarian 
standards o f virtue, as well as Sandel’s second example fits the liberal model. But 
this marriage is clearly sub-optimal: “if an intimate community is beyond rights, it 
may have slipped beyond virtue as w e l l . ” 58
Minow and Shanley’s comments, and the concerns expressed by Sandel, are 
plausible in their insistence that marriage should not be depicted as a series of  
mutually rewarding exchanges. Ideally, marital relationships should involve trust, 
affection, spontaneity, generosity, and intimacy. A marriage in which these qualities 
are completely and permanently replaced by self-interested insistence on each 
partner’s rights seems less valuable than one characterised by altruistic virtues. And a
55 Toniasi 1991, pp. 521-2.
56 Tomasi 1991, p. 524.
57 Tomasi 1991, p. 527.
58 Tomasi 1991, p. 535,
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description o f marriage as a contractual exchange between two self-possessing 
individuals would seem to miss an essential aspect of it. But the conclusion that the 
possession of rights within marriage, or the contractual ordering o f the institution, 
will have these negative effects is not warranted.
The fact that marriage differs substantially from a self-interested contractual 
exchange does not provide a good reason why it cannot be regulated through 
contract. In the first place, marriage is already contractually regulated. It comes with 
fixed rights and obligations. Were all rights and obligations stripped from it, it would 
cease to have any legal substance. So the picture of marriage as wholly governed by 
affection has always been disingenuous. But contractual ordering (that is, giving 
spouses the liberty to set their own terms to the marriage, a proposal which I will 
discuss in Chapters V and VI) may seem to be more inimical to love and affection 
than the traditional contract in this way: rather than taking on already decided rights 
and obligations, spouses would negotiate between themselves, as self-interested 
opponents. Haggling over who will get what in the event o f divorce, and how 
earnings will be shared, may not seem the most propitious or appropriate way to 
begin a marriage.
There seem to be two steps to make in response to this. First, as Okin points 
out, there is a place for individual self-interest within marriage. Not only does justice 
demand the extirpation of abuse and exploitation when they are prevalent, but justice 
between the genders requires (in current social circumstances) that altruism be limited 
by considerations of rational self-interest. Second, the provision for protective self- 
interest may seem to create the wrong atmosphere for marital trust. As 
communitarians argue with regard to human rights, these terms and obligations create 
the wrong model of relation. But marital planning creates the conditions for trust by 
limiting the possible negative consequences. With security established, trust is 
possible. In order to be able to practice spontaneous generosity in marriage, each 
spouse needs the long-term security provided by contracting. But to recognise the
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fact that individuals have reason to secure their own interests is not to deny the 
altruistic and affective elements of marriage.
Just as justice is compatible with small, harmonious communities, contract is 
compatible with emotional, other-centred, and committed relationships. Contractual 
regulation does not imply that the relationship is essentially contractual. The work 
done by the contract is to settle arrangements legally and to clarify expectations. 
Individuals’ possession of rights does not mean that they will assert them in all 
circumstances. The marriage is initiated by a contract, but is constituted by it only as 
a legal status. Moreover, it is less likely that rights agreed on by the spouses 
themselves will lead to domestic disharmony than those imposed by the state in the 
current marriage contract. In both cases, rights and obligations exist, but in the case 
of private ordering, they are fully fore-known and agreeable to both parties. When 
each party agrees on the obligations she will take on, each party is less likely to have 
to insist that the other fulfils her own. A pre-written and universal agreement 
“necessarily alienates the partners from full responsibility for and freedom in their 
relationship. ‘Profound closeness’ between the partners — or at least an area of it — 
is thereby expropriated rather than promoted .”5*
There is another issue pertinent to the contractual regulation o f marriage. 
This is the viability of contracts stipulating marital arrangements in detail. For 
example, the terms of a pre-nuptial agreement made in the U.S. in 1997 bind the 
couple in question to “‘engage in healthy sex three to five times per week’; to go to 
bed at 11:30 p.m. and get up at 6:30 am; to ‘pay cash for everything unless agreed to 
otherwise’; and ... not to ‘raise voices or get snappy’. T w o  feminist legal theorists 
propose that contractual agreements could include obligations such as “sexual 
access,” birth control, recreation, “nature and extent of permissible social or sexual 
relations with others,” children, and religion.^)
59 McMurtry 1972, p. 592.
60 Cited in The Guardian, 21/5/98, Section 2, p. 12.
61 Weitznian, pp. 1252-3; see also Shultz, pp. 220-4.
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One criticism of such pre-nuptial agreements is that they create a hidebound 
formality in a relationship where spontaneity should be the norm and preclude the 
exercise o f altruism. The pre-nuptial agreement is at odds with the nature of the 
relationship. If agreements about the minutiae of everyday life are taken (even 
metaphorically) as contractual obligations to perform, the focus o f the spouses seems 
to have shifted from the marital relationship with the other person onto a series of 
discrete acts to be performed. If marriage is life-defining, its give-and-take should 
determine everyday activities. Contracting on small issues has it the other way 
around. The marriage is prior (conceptually, logistically, emotionally) to choices on 
bed-time and leisure activities. However, the liberal conception o f neutrality requires 
that the state not impose a conception of the good marriage by forbidding such 
contracting. The state may set definitional limits by simply ruling out some contracts 
as marriage contracts. A contract to trade a piece of land for some money could 
never qualify. But the limit invoked in this criticism is not a definitional limit on 
marriage, but rather a counter-principle to freedom of marriage contracting based on 
a conception o f the good marriage. Because the criticism is based on a possibly 
contested conception, it cannot justify state proscription of such detailed contracts.
However, not all such pre-nuptial agreements are within the scope of 
contractual agreement. The limits on the reach o f contract are described by June 
Carbone:
contract, as a model to govern relationships, has its greatest influence 
where (1) the contract primarily concerns the interests of the parties to 
the contract with a minimal effect on third parties or society generally;
(2) the parties to the contract are capable of reaching acceptable 
bargains; and (3) enforcement would not impose inordinate difficulties 
on the legal system.62
62 Carbone 1988, p. 147.
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A further condition (4) is that matters subject to contract must be “capable of rational 
management and planning,”^^
Some elements of detailed pre-nuptial agreements do not meet conditions 3 
and 4. They present an inordinate difficulty of enforcement and proof. In some 
cases, it would be a violation of rights to be forced to carry out some obligations, 
such as sexual access or religious observance. Further, at least some o f these items 
are not subject to rational planning, especially the emotions. Choices about sexual 
activities, social life, and recreation depend on the flow o f day-to-day life and the 
occurrence of the unexpected, although they are subject to rational planning in the 
legal sense. Some elements of marriage cannot be subjected to rational decision­
making and planning without destroying the conditions within which the activities can 
be enjoyed.
Of course, one could contract (pre-nuptially or not) to meet someone every 
Saturday for a movie. What would such a contract mean? Performance o f the act 
could not be legally enforced. However, compensation could be awarded for breach. 
If such a contract were not proscribed, a court would not find it void ah initio. But 
what compensation would be made for a breach of a contract to meet someone every 
Saturday in exchange for some consideration? It is difficult to see what damages 
could be claimed, other than a return of the consideration, unless the parties had also 
agreed upon damages in the event of a breach.
There is no difficulty with agreements on these issues between married 
persons, and in fact such agreements may be essential to married life. - Spouses may 
arrange, explicitly or tacitly, to walk the dog alternate nights, or go to the'movies 
every Saturday. Yet including such arrangements in the contract, as a legal tool, is 
inappropriate. The contract, while legal, is essentially meaningless, except as 
providing grounds for divorce. But if divorce is readily accessible, these extra
63 Shultz 1982, p. 220.
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grounds make no difference. While due to difficulties of enforcement, proof, and 
planning some topics seem bad candidates for contractual negotiation, such as 
recreation, sexual matters, and domestic chores, financial matters can be legally 
negotiated because they are easily enforced and can be subjected to rational 
management and planning.
Contract does not threaten the complexity and spontaneity of marriage just as 
justice does not threaten the virtues of harmonious intimate associations. This is not 
to imply that marital virtues necessarily issue from the withholding o f contractually 
acquired rights. The contract is a public statement of and legal agreement to the 
relationship, to be built upon from day to day. It neither reflects nor governs the day- 
to-day interaction between spouses. Hegel writes that marriage begins “from the 
point o f view of contract ... in order to supersede it [ihn aufzuheben'\F '^  ^ The 
contract does bear some such relation to the lived marriage, which is the performance 
o f the contractual agreement to marry: “Actual marriage, in any form which makes 
the parties in law husband and wife, is performance [not merely 'the contract]. 
Nothing short is.”65
In this chapter, I argued that loving relationships between individuals promote 
virtues which are valuable in citizens, namely, dispositions to sympathise with others 
and to recognise and take into account the interests of others. I also argued that 
justice does not hinder love. Therefore, the institution of marriage is justified in 
terms of the valuable dispositions which it promotes. State regulation of marriage 
through contract does not conflict with loving dispositions. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss what form contractual regulation of marriage should take.
64 Hegel [1821], p. 203 or par. 163 — his italics.
65 Bishop 1881, §2, at 2; quoted by Weisbrod, p. 780.
CHAPTER V: A CONTRACTUAL ORDERING OF MARRIAGE
A contract! where are any o f the attributes o f contracts, o f equal and 
just contracts, to be found in this transaction? A contract implies the 
voluntary assent of both the contracting parties. Can even both the 
parties, man and woman, by agreement alter the terms, as to 
indissolubility and inequality, o f this pretended contract? No. Can 
any individual man divest himself, were he even so inclined, of his 
power o f despotic control? He cannot. Have women ever been 
consulted as to the terms of this pretended contract? ^
1. The proposed re-ordering of marriage
i. Weitzman: business and conjugal partnerships
ii. Shultz: private decision, public enforcement
2. Deficiencies of the traditional marriage contract
i. Sexism
ii. Inflexibility
iii. Enforcement
iv. Incoherence
3. Liberal grounds for a contractual ordering of marriage
i. The changing character of marriage: law and society
ii. Liberty and diversity
My objective in this chapter and Chapter VI is to ascertain how marriage 
should be legislated as a basic structure of society within Rawlsian liberalism. I will 
argue that marriage, as a legal institution, should be regulated by the principles of 
neutrality between conceptions o f the good and of freedom of contract which
 ^Thompson [1825], p. 84.
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characterise liberalism. In this chapter, we will see how marriage would be affected 
by the application of the principle of freedom of contract. I will consider arguments 
made by legal theorists in favour of, and liberal grounds for, re-ordering marriage as 
an institution regulated by private contracts. The legal theorists whom I discuss 
propose that marriage should be regulated like any other contract, resulting in greater 
latitude in its terms.
I wish to consider the implications of Rawlsian liberalism for marriage as one 
of the basic structures of society. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls provided a 
systematic argument justifying commonly held intuitions about justice. These 
intuitions, which are in conflict with utilitarian theories of justice, include beliefs that 
“[jjustice is the first virtue of social institutions” and that “the welfare of society as a 
whole cannot override” the rights conferred by justice.^ Rawls derives two principles 
of justice, first, that individuals should enjoy equal rights to basic liberties, and 
second, that social and economic inequalities should be arranged to the greatest 
benefit o f the least advantaged, and that positions should be equally open to all.^  
Rawls’ subsidiary argument for the more controversial “difference principle” — that 
socio-economic differences should benefit the worst-off — is that it follows from the 
widely accepted principle of equal opportunity, in that that principle holds that 
individuals should not be disadvantaged for morally arbitrary reasons. The principles 
are justified because they “match our considered convictions of justice or extend them 
in an acceptable way.”4 Rawls’ chief argumentative strategy is the device of the 
original position, a thought-experiment in which all individuals in society are 
imagined to step behind a veil of ignorance which prevents each from knowing his or 
her particular social and economic status, talents and abilities, and conception of the 
good. The contractors then unanimously choose a set of principles to govern the 
basic structures of their society.
2 Rawls 1971, p. 3.
2 See Rawls 1971, section 45; I will discuss the principles in greater detail in Chapter VI.3. 
4 Rawls 1971, p. 19.
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While Mill’s classical liberalism would restrict individual actions only to 
prevent harm to others, Rawls’ difference principle gives the state wider powers of  
redistributive taxation. Nevertheless, Rawlsian liberalism values freedom of contract. 
First, market freedom is retained in Rawlsian liberalism for its efficiency and its role 
in providing the freedom to choose one’s occupation. Also, since the liberal state 
does not prefer any conception of the good to another, but remains neutral between 
them, freedom o f contract within the limits of justice enables individuals to pursue 
their own conceptions o f the good through contractual agreements. Freedom of 
contract is valuable but restricted by higher liberal principles. In Chapter VI, I will 
consider how the difference principle and the requirements of equal opportunity limit 
freedom of contract, asking specifically whether liberal principles require state 
intervention to promote gender equality. In this chapter, I will discuss how marriage 
legislation could be revised to accord with the principle of freedom of contract and 
what reasons would support this revision.
In section 2, I will examine the deficiencies of the traditional marriage 
contract to show how it has been an anomalous contract. That is, the principles 
which apply to other contracts have not applied to marriage. I will suggest that the 
marriage contract should be brought into line with other contracts in these areas, as 
far as is possible. Further, the marriage contract has discriminated against women, 
which conflicts with the liberal principle of formal equality of opportunity. In section 
3, I will discuss arguments given by legal theorists for the contractual ordering of 
marriage. Then I will show how the liberal values of liberty and neutrality between 
conceptions of the good are relevant to the ordering of marriage. Freedom of 
contract in marriage will be shown to be justified, within limits, by the fundamental 
principles of liberalism. I argued in the Introduction that marriage is one of the basic 
structures of society, to which these liberal principles apply. Moreover, marriage is 
not only a social structure, it is a legal institution and a contract. If it is to continue 
to exist as a legal institution (as I have argued that it should) then the principles which
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govern institutions in a liberal society must apply to it. To begin, I will describe what 
the application of freedom of contract to marriage would entail.
1. The proposed re-ordering of marriage
i. Weitzman: business and conjugal partnerships
Lenore Weitzman proposes both that private marriage contracting should be 
available to individuals as an alternative to the current legal marriage contract, and 
that a private contractual ordering of marriage would be preferable to the current 
system. She describes what might be included in a private marriage contract:
A man and a woman could decide, in advance, on the duration and 
terms of their relationship, as well as the conditions for its dissolution.
They could specify their respective rights and obligations for the 
financial aspects of the marriage (support, living expenses, property, 
debts, and so forth) as well as those for their more personal relations 
(such as responsibility for birth control, the division o f household 
tasks, child-care responsibilities). Further, they could make some 
decisions before entering the relationship ..., while reserving others for 
later.... They could also specify the process of making a later 
decision, such as an agreement to use an arbitrator in the event of  
disputes. 5
She adds that if freedom of contract were consistently applied to marriage, the 
marriage contract need not be between a man and a woman, but could be made by
5 Weitzman 1974, p. 1249.
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same-sex couples and larger groups such as extended families.^ In a 16-point list,
Weitzman suggests as possible topics for the contract “aims of and expectations for 
the relationship,” duration o f the contract, property, income, debts, support and 
expenses, household arrangements, “personal and interpersonal relations” (including 
surname, sexual issues, birth control, and leisure), relations with others, children, 
religion, wüls, “procedure for changing the contract,” dispute resolution, damages for 
breach, and d i s s o l u t i o n .  7 As an addition to the current system, these contracts could 
either stand in lieu of marriage, or exist within legal marriages. However, in either 
case, they are presently unlikely to gain legal recognition as marriages. As a re­
ordering o f marriage, contracts similar to those described above would regulate and 
constitute marriage.
Weitzman suggests that the conjugal contract could usefully be modelled on 
the business partnership contract outlined in the Uniform Partnership Act. This Act 
provides default terms governing partnerships, but allows contractors to alter the 
terms to suit their needs. 8 On this model, only agreements concerning income, 
property, arbitration, and dissolution would be frilly enforceable, although some other 
breaches might result in monetary damages, as agreed. Due to the vagueness or 
difficulty o f enforcement o f some marital obligations, “some o f the rights and 
obligations ... in [these] contracts may not be subject either to specific performance 
or money d a m a g e s . ” ^ Some subjects o f marital agreements, such as religious 
commitment and recreational priorities, would be included in the contract only in |
order “to clarify [the couple’s] own thinking and to set forth ideals and aspirations,” 
not as legally binding obligations.^^
6 See Weitzman 1974, p. 1249, 1255.
7 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1250-3.
8 Weitzman 1974, p. 1256.
9 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1270-1.
Weitzman 1974, p. 1271.
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ii. Shultz: private decision, public enforcement
Marjorie Shultz, another American legal theorist, writes that “the state may 
undertake two functions: channeling of behavior and resolution o f disputes.” ^  In the 
former role, “the law may ... regulate conduct... for example, it may define the rights 
and obligations of spouses within marriage.” In the latter mode, “legal institutions ... 
authoritatively interpret and enforce obligations, evaluate claims, and select 
remedies.” 12 The state directs marital behaviour by defining in law the roles of 
husband and wife. In its other role as dispute-resolver, it adjudicates conflicts 
between spouses, enforcing obligations either as defined in the behaviour-channelling 
process or by the spouses themselves. If the state took this enforcement role in 
marriage, it “would mean making legal institutions available for authoritative 
resolution of disputes between spouses.”i^  Currently, the state emphasises the first 
role, o f directing behaviour, with respect to marriage, but downplays the other (as I 
will show in section 2 below).
Shultz argues that while traditional marriage law has channelled behaviour but 
avoided resolving disputes, it should instead leave definition of marital roles to 
private choice and enforce the choices that are made. She
recommends that the state ... defer to private decisions about the 
obligations and conduct of marriage while providing to the 
relationship the legal tools of legitimacy and dispute resolution.... 
[Mjarital partners could, within the limits of public policy, define and 
plan their relationships, giving them the content, character, duration.
Shultz 1982, pp. 211-2.
12 Shultz 1982, p. 212.
13 Shultz 1982, p. 212.
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and structure that the parties themselves choose ... [and] have access 
to legal enforcement and dispute resolution. i4
That is, marriage should be ordered as a private contract defined by the partners and 
enforced by the state.
Like Weitzman, Shultz suggests what subjects could be covered in a private 
marriage contract: income and support, property, housework, domicile, dispute 
resolution, and duration. She gives examples o f an “open marriage” contract, a 
same-sex marriage contract, and a contractual exchange of “traditional vows.”i5 
However, she notes that not all of the subjects of such contracts meet the conditions 
of contractual ordering, that is, “that obligations should ... be capable o f legal 
enforcement ... [and] capable of rational management and p l a n n i n g . ” i6  While 
financial matters, for example, meet all the criteria o f legally enforceable contracts, 
for some subjects of agreement the contract is useful only as a metaphor (as it used 
by therapists, the service industry, and educators), and in some areas even the 
metaphor is inappropriate. The applicability o f contract depends on the extents to 
which rational planning is possible, behavioural requirements can be specified, and 
recourse to law would be effective and appropriate.
Shultz’s proposed ordering of marriage closely resembles Weitzman’s, as a 
private contract covering financial arrangements and the incidents of a shared life, 
specifying obligations, most of which the state will enforce. Both writers leave open 
the question of which contractual obligations should be considered legally enforceable 
by performance or by damages, and that o f what limits and basic formula the contract 
should have. Both intend the state to set public policy limits on personal choice, and 
to arbitrate between spouses both during the marriage and upon dissolution. It is this 
conception that I will refer to as a private contractual ordering of marriage, and
14 Shultz 1982, p. 329.
15 See Shultz 1982, pp. 220-3.
16 Shultz 1982, p. 220.
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which the application o f the principle o f freedom of contract to marriage law would 
entail. In section 3 ,1 will put the case for this. Marriage is a contract and as such, in 
a liberal state, the principle of freedom of contract should apply to it. Freedom of 
contract derives from the liberal principle of neutrality between conceptions of the 
good and the corresponding value of liberty. In the next chapter, we will see how 
these stronger liberal principles may override freedom of contract in the case of 
marriage. In the following section, I will show how the traditional marriage contract 
has been atypical of contracts in general.
2. Deficiencies of the traditional marriage contract
The ‘traditional marriage contract’ is in fact a usefiil fiction, for the contract 
“is unwritten and its terms are not defined” — one major anomaly of the marriage 
c o n t r a c t .  ^7 Although marriage is spoken of as a civil contract between spouses, it is 
in fact governed by the body of marriage law, which gives the terms of the contract, 
and in its current form is a very unusual contract. The obligations it entails are not 
chosen by the spouses, but determined by pre-existing marriage law. These 
obligations are not made known to the marrying couple, and cannot' be altered by 
t h e m .  ^8 The role of the state is that of an unrecognised third party to the contract, as 
if it were a bargain between “both spouses on the one hand and the state on the 
o t h e r . ” ^9 For ease of reference, I will speak of the body of marriage law as the 
‘traditional marriage contract’.
Time and place also matter. While I will begin by making some general points 
about marriage law, law governing marriage differs within the various legal 
jurisdictions of the U.K., and in America there are in fact at least 50 ‘marriage
7^ Sachs and Wilson 1978, p. 148. 
8^ Weitzman 1974, p. 1170.
19 Shultz 1982, p. 227.
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contracts’ since each state has its own marriage legislation, and different jurisdictions 
within each state may impose extra conditions. The law has also changed over time, 
with significant changes at the end of the 19th century, and then relative stagnation 
until the 1970’s, when legislation gradually began to become more progressive. The 
law is still in a process of change. What I will refer to as the traditional contract is 
the marriage law of Britain and America from the 1880’s to the 1970’s, and I will 
note when statements about marriage law refer to a jurisdiction or time period more 
limited than this.
i. Sexism
The traditional marriage contract created gender-specific legal obligations 
disadvantageous to women. Under the doctrine of coverture, a woman ceased to be 
a legal person when she became a wife, her identity ‘covered’ by her husband’s. This 
doctrine was part of English common law until 1882 when the Married Women’s 
Property Act was passed, but the marriage contract retained its implications until very 
recently, especially in American state law, and in some jurisdictions still does.^o For 
example, the Ohio Supreme Court in 1970 declared that a wife was “at most a 
superior servant to her husband ... only chattel with no personality, no property, and 
no legally recognised feelings or rights.” A statute was made in Georgia in 1974 
defining the husband as “head of the family” and the wife “subject to him; her legal 
existence ... merged in the husband.”2  ^ The traditional marriage contract reflected 
coverture in various other ways. It recognised the husband as head of the household 
and required that the wife take his surname. It also gave him the right to determine 
their domicile, meaning that a wife who refused to live where her husband desired
29 The doctrine existed in America as well, where its erosion began in 1839, when the first Married 
Woman’s Property Act was passed in Mississippi.
21 Cited in Sachs and Wilson 1978, p. 149.
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was guilty o f desertion.22 The contract imposed upon the husband a duty to support 
his wife and family. While onerous to the husband, it resulted in his being ceded legal 
authority over the family finances. Finally, the wife was legally responsible for 
domestic and child-care services. Payment for them was precluded and contracts 
arranging this struck void by courts. This also provided explicit rationale for 
women’s exclusion from various professions and from business.
In America these obligations were upheld in statutory law and in court 
cases.23 In Britain they were unwritten but supported by case law and social policy:
Very few of the rights and duties of husband and wife ... are laid down 
in legislation in Britain (although in other [European] countries there 
is a code detailing a normative relationship), but there is a consensus 
among lawyers, judges, and governmental bureaucrats about the 
nature of family relationships.... The law in Britain relating to national 
insurance, pensions, supplementary benefit, sickness and 
unemployment benefit, family income supplement and income tax are 
all based on stereotypical sex classifications which impute a dependent 
role to women ... [and consequently] nurture the position o f women as 
low-paid, casual, or part-time workers.24
In 1980’s Britain, the social security system and divorce law were based on, and 
encouraged to the point of prescription, women’s roles as mothers and home­
m a k e r s .  25 For example, the ‘one-third rule’, which suggests allocating one-third o f  
marital property to the wife on divorce, was defended by Lord Denning in 1973 on
22 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1173-80.
23 See Weitzman 1974, p. 1173.
24 Freeman and Lyon 1983, pp. 26-7.
25 See Freeman and Lyon 1983, p. 29.
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the grounds that the husband will bear greater expenses, since he “must get some 
woman to look after the house — either a wife ... or a h o u s e k e e p e r . ” 26
Today most of the sexist obligations imposed by the traditional marriage 
contract have been removed or neutralised. For instance, the duty to support has 
been made non-gender-specific. But these changes have been made piecemeal and 
unevenly across jurisdictions. Patchwork revision of marriage law may eventually 
extirpate sexism, but creating such an ad hoc jumble may confuse couples and give 
marriage no clear legal standing or rationale, perhaps leading to its devaluation. And 
while sexist laws may be rewritten in gender-neutral fashion, their underlying 
rationale is that of an archaic institution. The duty of support is one such instance.22 
The sexist nature of traditional marriage law clearly contravened state neutrality 
between conceptions of the good and formal equal liberties and equality of 
opportunity. There is no place for arbitraiy gender-specific obligations, or those 
based on contested notions of the nature of the genders, in liberal law. We will 
consider what gender equality demands from marriage legislation in Chapter VI. 
However, the imperative for a coherent non-sexist restructuring o f marriage does not 
provide an argument for the private-contract system, as marriage could be revised in 
the form of a single, non-sexist contract.
ii. Inflexibility
The terms of the marriage contract have not been negotiable. This conflicts 
with the principle of freedom of contract. In making a contract, certain procedural 
criteria have to be met. Marriage requires more than this. This in itself is not 
anomalous, as other institutions in which the content of the contract is relevant have 
definite terms structured around the nature of the institution. For instance, joining a
26 Quoted by Freeman and Lyon 1983, p. 32.
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professional organisation requires a certain structure of obligations. But the 
obligations imposed in marriage have been motivated by contested conceptions of the 
good, for instance, the idea that heterosexuality is preferable to homosexuality, and 
notions of different roles for men and women. Moreover, the behaviour required by 
these obligations has infringed on the area thought o f as private, for example, the 
wife’s duty to perform housework or sexual services. The inflexibility of the terms of 
marriage is problematic to the extent that the rationale of the requirements is based 
on conceptions of the good which are contested, and in that they encroach on the 
private sphere. The only form of marriage currently available is that corresponding to 
a certain conception o f the good. Where different conceptions of the good might 
assign value to different forms of marriage, different terms should be available.
One singular aspect of the marriage contract is that it can take place only 
between two parties, a man and a woman. As discussed in my Introduction, the 
broad definition of marriage does not require that marriage be heterosexual or 
monogamous. Besides this threshold criterion, in American law marital obligations 
defining specific behaviour could not be altered by spousal consent, and both parties 
were liable for non-fulfilment. This inflexibility o f terms directly conflicted with the 
principles of freedom of contract and neutrality between conceptions o f the good. 
For instance, married women were forced to go through legal proceedings to retain 
their original surnames as their legal names, and such petitions were sometimes 
outright refused.28 Again, a wife’s legal domicile was her husband’s residence, even 
when she lived apart from him and wished to be registered (for example, for tax 
purposes) at her own address. Wives and husbands could not change these 
requirements. Nor could spouses change their legal responsibilities or contract 
between themselves about income and support: “A prospective husband may not be 
absolved from his duty to support his wife ... [it] is an obligation imposed by law and
27 Weitzman 1974, p. 1244.
28 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1173-80.
?
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cannot be contracted away.”29 Contractual agreements to pay a wife for domestic 
services or assistance in her husband’s business were ruled unenforceable. In one 
instance, a court decreed that it would not enforce such a contract and that the wife 
should repay what she had already received.2® Marital duties were indirectly enforced 
in British law, but equally inescapable there.
These duties were made compulsory because they served state interests in 
promoting traditional values and preventing welfare dependency. The inability of 
spouses to alter their obligations to each other by mutual agreement also reflected the 
doctrine of coverture, which presents a theoretical impediment to the enforceability of 
contracts between husband and wife. Under coverture, “the assumed single identity 
of the husband and wife precluded any contract between them in the course of their 
marriage.”^^ If husband and wife are a single legal person, contracts between them 
are impossible. But since the doctrine of coverture has long been rejected, it no 
longer provides a rationale for precluding contracts between spouses. Its descendant, 
the unit theory of marriage, which stands behind spouses’ immunity from testifying 
against each other and the denial of the possibility of marital rape, has not been 
completely phased out, but some limited contracts between husbands and wives are 
now r e c o g n i s e d . 5 2  The difficulty is no longer theoretical.
Two reasons for the unalterable status of the marriage contract remain. First, 
courts are reluctant to enforce additional contracts between spouses, amending the 
terms o f the marriage contract, for fear of incompetence or for reasons of privacy. 
But this does not provide a rationale in cases where a court is competent to enforce a 
contract, as is the case with financial agreements. The second reason is state interest. 
As a matter of policy, the marriage contract has been enforced against contracts 
which supersede or conflict with it because its terms have been thought to benefit the
29 Weitzman 1974, p. 1181 fn. 61, quoting I. Grant, ‘Marital Contracts Before and During 
Marriage’, in The California Family Law 160 (Continuing Education of the Bar 1962).
39 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1189-90.
3^  Weitzman 1974, p. 1172.
32 Shultz 1982, p. 288.
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state economically and to promote public morality. I have already examined the 
claim that traditional marriage promotes public morality in Chapter III, but the 
economic question I will treat briefly here. Is the inflexibility of the marriage contract 
justified by the state’s economic interest? Marriage’s economic benefit to the state 
has consisted in its shifting the burden of support for spouses from the state to each 
other. If contractual ordering were to render this obligation optional, the state would 
be forced to become responsible in cases where spouses opted not to take on 
obligations of support. While the benefit to the state is evident, the policy itself can 
be challenged on three grounds. First, the duty was traditionally gender-specific, that 
is, it was incumbent upon the husband to support the wife.33 Support obligations are 
now formally gender-neutral, though substantive inequalities persist in public policy 
in some jurisdictions. The duty of support itself might be criticised as reflecting an 
anachronistic expectation that one partner to the marriage will be economically 
dependent on the other. But another rationale — that of diminishing demands on state 
funds — can be supplied. It was for this reason that the British Poor Law required 
support between members of the extended family (siblings, uncles, and so on). The 
question, then, is whether imposing duties of support between adult family members 
is justifiable.
The imposition is unacceptable because it violates liberty and equal 
opportunity, and because obligations of support fall on the state. First, the 
compulsory duty of support infringes upon liberty because individuals might 
reasonably wish to marry without incurring support obligations. Individuals should 
be able to pursue their own conceptions of the good where this does not harm others. 
Second, the financial requirement negatively affects the equal opportunity (of rich and 
poor alike) to marry; “[ejven if the husband’s support obligation were extended to 
the wife, it might still be overly broad and unconstitutional as an unreasonable burden
33 Under the Poor Law in Britain, liability stretched much wider, and the household means test was 
not gender-specific. See Finch 1989, pp. 116-124. But British law presupposed and indirectly
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on the fundamental right of m a r r i a g e .”34 Third, imposing duties of support between 
adult family members legally affixes responsibilities where they are presumed 
naturally to exist. However, the assumption that the family is the natural source of  
relief for the needy is ungrounded. Legalisation of these obligations proves invasive 
when familial affiliation simply does not bring such strong feelings of obligation. The 
onus o f support, for those who cannot obtain any other source of income, falls on the 
state, or, through redistributive taxation, on society, when “[s]ocial and economic 
inequalities are ... arranged ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” as they 
are under Rawls’ difference principle.35 In any case, enforcement is inefficient, and — 
since the families of the poor are likely to be poor themselves — imposes the costs on 
those who can least afford it.36
The traditional marriage contract may save the state money by requiring 
support, but within Rawlsian liberalism, this is not a good enough reason to limit 
freedom o f contract, which requires that the choice should be left to the discretion o f  
private marriage contractors, with constraints on procedure and content for fairness. 
In general, inflexibility clashes with the central requirement of Rawlsian liberalism, 
that the state treat its citizens as equals by maintaining neutrality between conceptions 
of the good.37 The original position embodies this neutrality. Behind the veil o f  
ignorance, contractors are unaware of their particular conceptions of the good. So 
they ensure that they will have the liberty to pursue their particular conception of the 
good, whatever it may be, so long as pursuits involving or resulting in harm to others 
are restricted.38
enforced male support obligations through divorce law and public policy, and by preventing property 
ownership by females. See Sachs and Wilson 1978, pp. 136-46.
34 Weitzman, p. 1244.
35 Rawls 1971, p. 302.
36 It is inefficient because tliose evading the duty must be taken to court. This is coStly and 
ineffective.
37 See Dworkin 1978, pp. 127-9. Chapter V.3 provides a detailed account of Rawls’ position.
38 Rawls 1971, p. 137.
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If there is more than one set of marital obligations, or more than one 
definition of marital roles, which spouses may legitimately want their marriage to 
embody, making a highly specific code of marital behaviour compulsory infringes 
upon individual liberty by preferring one conception of the good. The state does not 
have a compelling economic interest which would justify its prescriptive definition of  
marital roles, nor, as I argued in Chapter III, does it have a justificatory reason in 
terms of promoting public morality. Given this, and given the diversity o f desired 
marriage types, either individuals should be allowed some choice as to the obligations 
they undertake when they marry, or such obligations should be left unspecified. The 
alternatives are a diversification of marriage legislation, or a de-legalisation of  
marriage. In Chapter III, I found the de-legalisation option wanting both from the 
state’s and the individual’s perspective. The former option — diversification — leaves 
us again with two choices. The state could offer a range of marriage packages from 
which prospective spouses could choose, or spouses could agree on terms within a 
more or less defined structure. At one extreme, the state could provide a fill-in-the- 
blank form, and at the other, every couple could draw up their own contract. Section 
3 will take up the argument that the state should diversify marriage legislation in the 
second way.
iii. Enforcement
Marriage creates binding obligations defined by the state, yet spouses in the 
U.S. have not been able to enforce the performance of these obligations through the 
courts. Again, this is a peculiar anomaly of the marriage contract, since other 
contracts are routinely enforced when their obligations are clear and their legality 
assured. While, as we have seen, public policy has been to disregard contracts made 
between spouses to supersede or redefine these obligations, the state has also refused
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to enforce directly, at spouses’ requests, the very obligations which it creates in the 
marriage contract.^  ^ Particularly, as a matter o f policy courts have not upheld wives’ 
claims to their statutory right to support, and awards of alimony or child support have 
been minimally enforced. It is evident that some aspects of the marriage contract, 
such as a duty to love, would be difficult or impossible to enforce, due to the 
vagueness of the obligation, and the difficulty of determining whether or not it has 
been fulfilled. But non-enforcement of the marriage contract clearly conflicts with its 
status as a contract when the obligations in question are clearly defined and 
remediable.
American courts have refused to enforce obligations of support at spouses’ 
request within an ongoing marriage due to a “fear of disrupting domestic harmony ... 
[and] questions about the institutional competence of courts to deal with the issues 
that arise between spouses.”"^® The possibility o f disrupting domestic harmony is a 
weak rationale for reffising enforcement of marital obligations. When one spouse is 
suing another, dissonance would seem already to be the rule. Likewise, doubts about 
institutional competence do not rule out all such cases. Some marital obligations may 
prove impossible to specify, but some, like the duty to support, are definite and 
enforceable. Where a legal duty to support exists, determining whether support is 
being provided and ordering compliance seem to present no extraordinary difficulty 
to the courts.
The chief rationale for non-enforcement is the protection of marital privacy. 
This is partly explicable by the nature of legal marital obligations since a court 
upholding a husband’s right to domestic services or ‘conjugal access’ would seem to 
violate individual freedom. Courts are reasonably wary of enforcing obligations 
whose compulsion would infringe on individual liberty. However, courts and public 
policy have upheld these very rights by failing to prosecute or criminalise marital 
rape, and by failing to recognise the cash value of domestic services either by voiding
See Shultz 1982, pp. 232-240, and Weitzman 1974, pp. 1185, 1194-7.
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contracts to pay for them, or through benefits systems which fail to recognise home­
makers as workers/^ The state also upholds these obligations by revising to allow 
individuals to contract out of them, and by basing public policy on the assumption of 
such obligations. Tax law, government benefits, and property divisidn on death or 
divorce are part of this indirect enforcement. But the reluctance to interfere is not 
consistent. The duty of support has been enforced against the wife’s wishes in cases 
where she was in danger of becoming a public charge, and where third party actions 
were involved."*^  The state has been inconsistent in its respect for marital privacy. 
When obligations are enforced in some instances by courts, and are widely enforced 
through indirect means, consistency requires enforcement at the behest of spouses.
Citing privacy as a reason for not enforcing support reflects a tendency to 
protect the family from outside scrutiny. Courts have been deemed incompetent to 
judge even definite marital obligations due to a belief that judicial arbitration is not 
appropriate to marital obligations. Legal resolution is not thought to be suitable for 
disputes within an on-going marriage. The reasons given for non-enforcement of 
marital obligations, namely marital privacy and court incompetence, reflect a belief 
that the private is not assessable by public standards o f justice and that disagreements 
between spouses should not be resolved by the application of principles o f justice by 
an independent authority. But the family must be liable to the appraisal of 
independent judges when its members seek to appeal to the arbiters of justice. It has 
no claim to immunity. *^3 It follows from this that courts cannot refuse to consider 
claims from family members and to enforce legal obligations. Legal obligations do 
not cease to be legally obligatory because of their location within the ‘private’ sphere 
of marriage. If rights and public criteria of justice continue to apply within marriage 
(I examined arguments against this in Chapter IV) then there is a case for public
40 Shultz 1982, p. 235.
4^  See Weitzman 1974, pp. 1185 and 1193 and Freeman and Lyon 1983, pp. 26-9. 
42 Shultz 1982, p. 240.
42 This claim is supported in Chapter IV.3.
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enforcement of marital obligations. The fact that marriage is legislated as a contract 
suggests as much. In the next section, we will consider the other half of the argument 
for contractual ordering, that is, the case for private definition of marital obligations.
The state should enforce legal obligations in marriage and the reasons it gives 
for not doing so are insufficient. Whereas one o f the peculiarities o f the traditional 
marriage contract has been the difficulty of enforcing its legal obligations, under the 
private marriage contract system which I propose, marriage contracts will clearly 
resemble other contracts and be enforced as those are. Courts will not be expected to 
treat obligations whose performance cannot be judged or enforced as legal, just as 
they would not in other contracts. These arguments mirror changes in the legal 
climate, as courts are now beginning to enforce pre-nuptial agreements and other 
obligations within the family.
iv. Incoherence
Since the late 1970’s, progressive legislation has made marital obligations 
equal between the genders by couching them in gender-neutral terms and removing 
restrictions on married women. The trend towards recognising pre-nuptial 
agreements has also meant that couples have increasingly been able to create their 
own agreed, legally enforceable terms governing finances and property for the 
marriage and on its dissolution. But these corrections of the more anomalous aspects 
of the traditional marriage contract — sexism, inflexibility, and inconsistent 
enforcement — while representing an improvement, do not satisfy the requirements of 
liberal principles.
First, sexism persists in the standard contract through its effect on the 
application of tax and benefits law. Additionally, shifting the contract to gender- 
neutral terminology may seem to remove sexual discrimination, but in fact may cloak
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it, since the inequality between men and women is not addressed, but in fact may be 
substantively perpetuated despite the formal c h a n g e / ^  The marriage contract also 
discriminates against same-sex and polygamous unions by not extending its 
recognition and benefits to them, thereby preferring a particular conception o f the 
good. Second, while pre-nuptial agreements allow spousal definition o f the terms 
backed by legal enforcement, the extent of their enforcement varies between 
jurisdictions and they may be successfully legally challenged. For those without pre­
nuptial agreements, the standard terms apply, and these terms are not explained or 
made known to the spouses, a significant anomaly of the marriage contract.
Section 3 will present arguments for the necessity of further change to the 
marriage contract. But at the least, current marriage legislation is incoherent. The 
traditional legal marriage contract has been subjected to piecemeal reforms which 
mean there is no longer a unified legal conception of marriage. There are the 
remnants of an archaic system and ad hoc adjustments tacked on to meet current 
needs. Law will be more effective and efficient in dealing with particular cases if it is 
motivated by a few guiding rules. If a body of law is not governed by clear 
principles, there will be difficulty in deciding cases which fall outside pre-existing 
laws. For example, while marriage carries definite obligations, individuals will resort 
to private contracting to realise their particular aims. A contractual ordering of 
marriage will mean that the individual will make (and the law enforce) only a single 
contract, and it will give a clear rationale to marriage law — public enforcement of 
private ordering, within well-defined limits. Efficiency is not the only rationale for 
greater coherence. Marriage conveys a status on those who participate in it. While 
the meaning of this status may vary between couples and between communities, legal 
recognition — and thus the function of marriage law — will be enhanced if it is seen to 
attribute some clear meaning to marriage. This suggests the need for a clear and
4'^  See my Chapter VI.
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generally acceptable restatement of the purpose of marriage and a corresponding 
reworking o f legislation.
3. Liberal grounds for a contractual ordering o f marriage
i. The changing character of marriage; law and society
My argument for the freedom of marriage contracting is that the principles of  
Rawlsian liberalism demand it, as I will try to show in section ii. There are two 
reasons for this: first, liberalism values freedom of contract within limits. If marriage 
is legislated as a contract, freedom of contract should apply to it. But why should 
marriage be legislated this way? State neutrality between conceptions of the good, a 
fundamental liberal principle, requires that marriage legislation recognise as many 
forms o f marriage — since each reflects a conception o f the good — as exist. The 
state can only do this by permitting couples to determine their own marital terms, 
within certain limits. I will return to this argument in section ii; I wish first to 
examine a separate argument made from a legal perspective, which maintains that 
marriage legislation must change to match changing social norms, and that currently 
social norms imply a contractual ordering of marriage. While this argument seems 
unsuccessful, it raises a theme which is relevant to my argument, that is, that the 
current marriage contract reflects a conception of the good which is in fact only one 
among many competing conceptions of the good marriage.
Marriage has changed significantly over the last fifty years, as it has been 
swept along in the wake of feminism and the sexual revolution. The argument which 
I will examine now holds that these changes indicate a need for corresponding 
changes in marriage law, and that the nature of the social changes points toward a 
contractual ordering of marriage, primarily because of increasing diversity. Weitzman 
and Shultz argue that the traditional contract fails to reflect social reality. They point
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out that despite many reforms the contract remains anachronistic. It assumes, with 
statistical improbability, a lifelong commitment. It assumes that the marriage is a first 
marriage, which is less likely as more people remarry later in life. They claim that it 
favours the materially well-off and the white middle-class, whose families tend to be 
detached from the extended kin network. It also reflects the Judaeo-Christian ideal of 
a monogamous and heterosexual relationship.^  ^ As marriage undergoes a process of 
social change, marriage law structured around an older ideal no longer meets 
individuals’ needs.
Multi-culturalism, marital impermanence, changing attitudes to sex and 
gender, and the diversification of lifestyles have produced a variety of needs which 
marriage law does not fulfil. But is the claim that law should reflect social change 
and respond to new needs compelling? If law should mirror reality thus, then 
Weitzman’s argument that marriage law should be made more flexible to reflect 
social changes is plausible. She claims that “legal norms should conform to 
sociological reality,” limiting this principle to cases where social change prevents law 
from fulfilling its original purpose — in this case, legislating a form o f marriage 
satisfactory to the public.^  ^ She argues that law cannot perform its function of 
legislating stable marriages if it fails to meet social needs. But, on the other hand, if 
the legal definition of marriage is rewritten, law will no longer be performing its 
original function of endorsing a certain kind o f marriage. Some might say that the 
institution that it embodies is no longer marriage.
Revision of marriage law to match social norms must be checked by fidelity to 
a conception of marriage which both reflects our cultural understandings and 
provides a basis for differentiating marriage from other relationships. To hold that 
marriage law should adapt to social practice presupposes one of two claims. One 
might argue that the purpose of law is to meet needs rather than to perpetuate 
anachronistic social institutions, and so marriage law should reflect only the
45 These criticisms are discussed at length in Weitzman 1974, pp. 1198-236.
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prevailing understandings and practices of marriage. But this principle-could be used 
to endorse or eliminate all practices according to social norms. It might also lead to 
marriage law which does not reflect our conceptions o f marriage, or to the 
deregulation of marriage. These results seem inadmissible. Alternatively, one might 
argue that there is a distinctive concept of marriage which must inform the law, for 
otherwise it will not be marriage law, but that it is also crucial for law to change with 
society. Law must adapt to social reality without abandoning its guiding concept. 
While more conservative, this is still controversial. For instance, laws reflecting the 
impermanence of modern marriage by permitting fixed-term marriage contracts will 
be seen by those who believe marriage is lifelong to conflict with the nature of 
marriage. So the position that law can and must adapt to social change and still 
retain a distinctive concept of marriage depends on an appropriate characterisation of 
marriage. On some characterisations o f marriage, there can be no reconciliation 
between the idea and reality.
From the principle that law should adapt to social norms, there is a further 
step to the argument for a private contractual ordering of marriage. While Weitzman 
argues that the marriage contract should be made more flexible in order to 
accommodate changing marital expectations, Shultz pushes the point further. She 
argues that social changes in marriage are such that contractual ordering o f it is 
appropriate. The high rate of divorce means that planning for the distribution of 
marital property is necessary. As contract is the premier tool for rational 
management and planning of future needs, this points to private ordering. Greater 
diversity in life choices is another feature of modern partnerships, including unmarried 
heterosexual and same-sex cohabitation and group marriages as well as legal serial 
marriages, open marriages, and deliberate c h i l d l e s s n e s s . ^ ^  The chief strength of 
contract is legitimising diverse relationships. Where agreements are characterised by 
variousness, private choice and individual needs, contract is the tool designed to
4^  Weitzman 1974, p. 1197; also see p. 1199.
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affirm the arrangements in all their variety. If marital relationships exhibit diversity, 
contract would appear to be their natural regulator. Contractual ordering of marriage 
could meet the need, across society, for the legitimisation of diverse relationships.
Weitzman’s argument for the privatisation of marriage contracts is that law 
should adapt to changing social needs. Someone might respond that social changes 
are not necessarily either for the better or the worse, just as law need not minister to 
needs indiscriminately. Law must embody an independent standard of right and 
through its system of penalties channel individual behaviour to meet that standard. A 
rising rate of murder or tax evasion should not prompt legal reconsideration of the 
permissibility of these actions. It then appears that law should change with changing 
social norms only in special cases, if at all.
The social norms argument is not sufficient to motivate a theory of marriage 
law. It leaves unanswered the question of why marriage should be legislated at all, 
and how its essential definition should be shaped. Even if a separate answer to these 
questions can be provided to supplement the social norms account, social norms 
remain inadequate as a guide to legislation. We do not simply match law to the way 
people behave. However, there is reason for the recognition of a variety of forms of 
marriage not based on the social norms argument. Another principle is more 
plausible: when a number of different forms o f a practice are all compatible with 
justice and with the rationale behind the legal recognition of the practice, the law 
surrounding that practice should be extended to recognise the variety of practices. 
This principle is justified by the liberal principle of neutrality between competing 
conceptions of the good, not by changing social norms. In one way this principle is 
more permissive than the social norms argument, since it holds that in theory all 
practices compatible with justice and the purpose of the institution should be 
recognised, whether or not anyone is actually seeking recognition. It does not wait 
on social change. But by introducing the notion of the rationale justifying the
47 Shultz 1982, pp. 245-6.
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existence of the legal institution, it brings in a separate threshold criterion. This result 
is desirable, however, since a criterion which will rule out some kinds of contracts as 
marriage contracts is necessary. If social norms undergo a dramatic change, or large 
sections of society want certain transactions to be recognised as marriage contracts 
(for tax purposes, for instance), recognition might not be justified by the original 
rationale. This principle explains why it is not discriminatory for the state to rule 
some relationships as marriages. The state is not simply fulfilling a social need 
through marriage legislation. The institution has its own justification which guides 
what will be recognised as marriages. But there are other reasons, as I will show, 
why it is desirable to have a core definition of marriage.
The social norms theory is inadequate because some distinctive notion of 
marriage must govern the contract, and this cannot simply be compiled from social 
norms. If there is to be any substance to marriage law, it must incorporate a 
distinctive definition o f marriage. I have tried to provide such a definition in the 
Introduction. When a contract is a marriage contract it must either implicitly or 
explicitly mark out the relationship it seals as marital. For instance, a contract with 
no other content than the disposition of mutually owned property on the dissolution 
of a partnership should not count as a marriage contract. So, for example, if a 
contract regarding property division on dissolution is a marriage contract, the 
relationship is implicitly (if no explicit statement is made) marked out as marital, 
whatever law defines ‘marital’ as entailing. If marriage law does not convey some 
such significance to marriage, it will not be able to serve its purpose of legitimating 
marriages.
A definitive description o f  marriage must be introduced into law because 
individuals seek recognition o f marital relationships from the state. Marriage cannot 
be reduced to property arrangements, planning for dissolution, or legal benefits. 
Marriage law exists, in part, in order to allow individuals to stamp their relationships 
with the seal o f  legitimacy. O f course, marriage no longer plays the same role in
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social organisation as it did when sex and reproduction outside marriage were illicit, 
when marriage was indissoluble and an economic necessity for most women, and 
when property and power were vested in the family. It might therefore be asked 
whether recognition of marital relationships is any longer necessary since marriage 
does not have the same functional importance. However, its significance continues 
undiminished for many. As well as being seen as the primary locus o f intimate 
relations, marriage is protected against obsolescence by its role as the site of 
reproduction and as one of the basic social units.
But the definition of marriage cannot be written in response to social needs. 
That is, law cannot legitimate as marriage whatever individuals wish to be so 
legitimated. For one thing, there is no popular consensus. To many, marriage means 
a lifelong, exclusive, heterosexual union. To others, the legal recognition o f only 
such unions, or those which aspire to this condition, is discriminatory. But if 
marriage law is adapted to satisfy all preferences — for instance, by allowing same-sex 
marriage, limited-term marriage contracts, or group marriages — many people will no 
longer consider the relationships legitimised by law to be marriages. Popular 
attitudes to marriage are irreconcilable and cannot guide a needs-oriented approach 
to law. If same-sex marriages and so on are to be legitimated, this must be because 
they fall into the category of marriage, not simply because the demand exists. A core 
definition is conceptually necessary. This core definition is drawn from the shared 
understanding of marriage which attributes to it those features which, as I argued in 
Chapter III, justify its presence as a legal institution.
Second, if there is no independent criterion of a marriage contract, the law 
would fall into incoherence. Social practice has diversified so that an unalterable 
marriage contract specifying a number of obligations will not meet all needs. The 
contract’s specifications will have to be fairly sparse to render it widely attractive. 
But a total lack of specifications would make the contract a formality, and divest it of 
appeal. At first sight, making marriage a purely formal status, devoid o f substantive
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legal consequences, might seem to offer a solution to the problem of diverse needs. 
The marriage contract could be stripped of controversial obligations and its meaning 
left to individual understanding. But there would then be no way to define the 
grounds for recognising marriages, since this would lead to exclusions. The tendency 
would be for marriage to become a convenient legal status which two or more 
persons can enter together in order to qualify for certain state benefits and make 
arrangements concerning property. If the category o f marriage collapses thus, it 
would no longer make sense to have a law of marriage. A common understanding of 
marriage must weigh against total diversification of its meaning so that some bargains 
just will not count as marriage contracts.
To sum up, I have rehearsed arguments that the existing body of marriage law 
fails to reflect social norms. This is convincing. I have also discussed and dismissed 
the claim that marriage should adapt to changing social reality. Another claim, 
justified by liberal neutrality and not (directly) changing norms, is plausible; when two 
or more competing conceptions of marriage exist, all should be recognised by law if 
they satisfy the demands of justice and if they are compatible with the core definition 
of marriage. Marriage law must be governed by a definition of marriage drawn from 
our shared understanding of what marriage is. This shared understanding in turn is 
the description under which marriage law is justified, which accounts for the principle 
I have formulated. I have suggested in the Introduction what is definitive about 
marriage and must therefore guide marriage legislation.
This definition is also, of course, temporally located. But it is widespread and 
persistent. It captures, and is informed by, what is distinctive about marriage in 
modern social practices. I wish to reject the strong claim that the law should 
recognise as marriages any relationships which individuals demand recognition for as 
marriages, and that marriage law should directly reflect social norms. Instead, under 
the liberal principle of neutrality, the law should recognise a variety of forms of 
marriage which are consistent with the central definition of marriage as an affective,
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life-defining relationship. The rationale of the law is not meeting needs, but 
promoting social stability. This explains why marriage law will not recognise all 
social norms or individual demands. Marriage legislation is justified, as I argued in 
Chapters III and IV, by the role marriage plays as an affective relationship. Thus, if 
our shared understanding of marriage changed significantly enough, the legal 
institution might no longer be justified. The justification, and hence the law, would 
have to be re-evaluated. And this is why the state is also justified in not recognising 
as marriages those relationships which do not meet the criteria.
ii. Liberty and diversity
Liberty is fundamental to liberalism. This is embodied not just in the equal 
political liberties prescribed by Rawls’ first principle of justice, but also in individuals’ 
freedom to pursue their conceptions of the good, without the state disadvantaging 
some or preferring others, as long as their pursuit is consistent with the demands of 
justice. In the last section, I noted that real marriages are strikingly diversified in 
their understood obligations and commitments, and that many currently non-marital 
relationships with different needs and expectations bear a family resemblance to 
marriage. If marriage law should change with social norms in order to meet 
individual needs, then the diversity of marital and marital-type relationships provides 
a strong rationale for a private contractual ordering of marriage. But in fact the 
argument from diversity is not dependent on the claim that marriage law should 
change with social norms. The legal protection of diversity and the value o f liberty 
are of greater fundamental importance than the law’s conforming to social norms.4^  
A contractual ordering of marriage is justified in terms of liberty and diversity.
4^  See, for instance, Weitzman 1974, p. 1197.
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Defending the value of liberty is well beyond the scope of this thesis, but I will 
show its importance in liberalism. Mill’s classical principle of liberty is that 
compulsion should only be used on individuals to prevent harm to ôthers. Rawls 
limits this by extending the state’s redistributive powers, but retains liberty as a 
fundamental value. His first, and lexically prior, principle of justice requires that 
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others.”^^  These include the political liberties, freedom of  
speech, assembly, thought, of the person, and the right to hold property. The 
underlying rationale for the value of liberty is that each person in the original position 
would act to secure their ability to pursue their conception of the good. The state 
should treat individuals equally by not preferring any one conception of the good, 
allowing all equal liberty to pursue their conception.
The idea that the ability to pursue relationships with others under mutually 
agreeable terms is an important part of individual liberty, is central to liberalism: 
“modern liberalism is concerned not only to protect the private sphere of social life, 
but also to carve out a realm within the private sphere where individuals can have 
privacy Personal life is conceived o f as an area in which the individual should be 
able to express herself free from state intervention. The public-private distinction has 
been criticised by feminists when it has been used to claim that private life is or 
should be exempt from the standards of public justice. But while the state is required 
to intervene in private life to enforce laws, liberals, including feminists, maintain that 
the state should respect a zone of personal liberty within which individuals are free to 
act.
My first claim is that liberty to pursue one’s conception of the good requires 
marriage legislation which recognises a variety of forms of marriage. The provision 
of a single marriage contract for all individuals limits their ability to enter into marital 
relationships of their choosing. Legitimating only one form of marriage unjustifiably
49 Rawls 1971, p. 60.
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prescribes how intimate relationships should be conducted: “the conception of a 
single structure for all marriages is a tyrannical one: it implies that the state can 
decide what form marriage should have regardless of its citizens’ needs and 
d e s i re s . A l lo w i ng  only one form of marriage discriminates by restricting marriage 
to a single set of terms and excluding others. Individuals’ ability to pursue their 
conceptions of good relationships (without causing harm) should not be limited. But 
the state continues to prefer one contested conception of the good by banning same- 
sex marriages, group marriages, and marriages structured non-traditionally. State 
neutrality requires legitimisation of various forms of marriage.
Someone might respond that a single marriage contract is not illegitimately 
prescribing the terms of marriages. They might claim that this view rests on a 
mistaken polarisation of status and contract. A common (but, the critic would say, 
overdrawn) view is that status is inflexible and insensitive to individual differences, 
whereas contract is flexible, individualised, and a pillar o f freedom. Thus Sir Henry 
Maine famously wrote that “the movement of progressive societies [was] a 
movement from status to contract.”^^  But contract is not inherently individualistic. 
The American legal theorist Nathan Isaacs noted that the distinction should be drawn 
not between status and contract but between “standardized relations and 
individualized r e l a t i o n s . ” ^^ Standardised default contracts fill in the detailed terms of 
an exchange when no explicit agreement is made concerning them. The law is not 
prescribing terms in such cases, but second-guessing them for ease of transaction: 
“the idea of the law filling in contract terms from a presumed intent based on a 
standard transaction is very different from an idea in which law tells people what to 
do based on an imposed norm.”54
5^  Kymlicka 1990, p. 258; his italics.
5^  Weitzman 1974, p. 1200.
52 Maine [1861], p. 100.
52 Weisbrod 1994, p. 787, quoting Isaacs 1917, p. 39. 
54 Weisbrod 1994, p. 789.
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So the marriage contract might be seen as filling in the terms which, given 
standard expectations about marriages, the law assumes that spouses intend to govern 
their relationship, rather than imposing a controversial conception of marriage.
However, marriage is not like a standard default contract because there is no legal 
alternative. It is not the default option but the only option for legitimating marriages.
So it does impose a norm rather than simply supplying the terms which it is expected 
will be desired. Even if the marriage contract were a default contract o f this type, 
however, there is still an argument for private ordering. A default contract reflects 
social expectations concerning the transaction, but we have already seen the diversity 
o f expectations about marriage, which only contractual ordering can fit.
The proposed contractual ordering asks more than that individuals be left free 
from government interference in the pursuit of their conceptions of the'good. It asks 
that conferral o f legal recognition be made available to their pursuits of different 
conceptions. A critic might respond that individuals are currently free to pursue their 
relationships as they wish outside of marriage. He might ask why their liberty 
requires that they should be able to formalise their non-traditional arrangements as 
marriages. But to bar, for example, same-sex marriages, is to prefer one conception 
o f  the good, that is, heterosexuality, in marriage legislation. Neutrality between 
conceptions o f the good requires that the state legitimate different kinds of marriages.
If it fails to do so, it discriminates against certain choices, depriving them of 
recognition and legal benefits. Extending recognition to private decisions is a basic j
function of government, as in the legitimisation and enforcement of wills and ‘1Icontracts. But the state only lends its power and authority to marriages which 4
embody a very specific set of terms. Constraints on wills and contracts, by contrast, j
are procedural. j
IIndividuals whose relationships are not eligible for state recognition as 4
Imarriages are deprived of the means, which others enjoy as a right, of pursuing their 
conceptions of the good. Cohabiting without marriage is not an equivalent option to
Chapter V: A Contractual Ordering of Marriage 174
marriage. Cohabitants are precluded from a range o f benefits, including 
legitimisation. Moreover, in Britain and America, there has been a trend to impose 
the terms of the state marriage contract on long-term cohabitants who choose not to 
marry. Those who forego marriage due to the inflexible obligations imposed by the 
state are excluded from a valuable good. The benefits of marriage should be available 
to those with different conceptions of the good. The claim that the ban on same-sex 
marriage does not discriminate because it does not actively interfere with 
homosexuals is a chimera, since the state is arbitrarily refusing to provide for 
homosexuals what it provides for heterosexuals.55 The state can interfere by refusing 
to endorse a contract since the presumption is that when contracts meet certain 
formal criteria, the state will enforce them.
In addition, the state discriminates against a range of conceptions o f marriage 
by narrowly restricting its terms. American courts have spoken o f marriage as a 
“fundamental r i g h t . ” 56 The implied right is the right to enter into the state-defined 
institution of marriage, not an entitlement to state legitimisation o f personal 
relationships. But I want to suggest that the state-defined institution illegitimately 
prefers one conception of the good above others. If one has a right to marry, it 
should then be a right to state recognition of one’s relationship and access to 
whatever legal benefits this carries, when one’s relationship matches the definition of  
marriage. Non-discrimination calls for state recognition for all marital relationships, 
whatever terms the spouses set. Someone might dispute this on the grounds that 
what it means for a relationship to match the definition of marriage is for it to be 
heterosexual, between two people, with an aspiration to permanence. They might 
even claim that marriages must have the purpose of procreation, that they must be 
sealed by a religious ceremony, that the husband and the wife must take on certain 
defined roles. But such an idea of marriage is only one among many competing
55 Kaplan 1997 provides an extended argument for the right of homosexuals to many based on a 
Foucauldian theory of identity.
5^  Weitzman 1974, pp. 1237-9.
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conceptions. As I argued in the Introduction, there is a broadly shared conception of 
marriage as an intimate, lasting, companionable relationship between people. It is this 
‘overlapping’ idea of marriage which the state should legitimate, not the narrower 
ideas based on certain contested conceptions of the good.
My second claim is that the protection of diversity in pursuits of the good is a 
liberal value which implies a contractual ordering of marriage. Only a private 
contractual ordering of marriage can enable marital diversity. Any single set of 
legally binding obligations incurred on marriage will prove burdensome in a diverse 
culture. Different individuals seek different marital arrangements. They may wish to 
undertake different obligations regarding income, financial support, property, 
domestic work, decision-making procedures, domicile, sexual exclusiveness, property 
allocation in the event of divorce, and so forth. Different issues will be o f varying 
importance to different people. No single contract will satisfy all of these people. 
Even a limited range of contracts will not meet all their needs, so they will be 
compelled to draw up their own contracts, in addition to the marriage contract, to 
enforce other conditions they might want to set. Currently, many o f these private 
contracts will not be legally enforceable, and legal difficulties will ensue as long as 
private contracts clash with the terms of the legal marriage contract. The only way to 
meet diverse needs is to defer to private ordering of marriage. Contract is the tool of  
private ordering, through which individuals can make their arrangements legally 
enforceable and legally sanctioned. If diversity is truly to be protected, and in the 
absence o f countervailing conditions, only a private contractual ordering o f marriage 
will do.
Diversity is to be protected, within limits, in a liberal society. I do not wish to 
claim that diversity is in itself valuable. It may be (for example, variety may be 
preferable to a monotonous lack o f  choice), but other considerations may override 
the presumption in favour o f  diversity. Our desire to preserve cultural differences is 
compromised when the practices they contain are injurious. Our obligation to
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prevent harm is overriding. When harm is not at issue, however, protection of 
diversity of lifestyles in a civil order is required by liberalism. Diversity is valuable 
because of its intimate connection to individual liberty. First, diversity is the outcome 
of liberty. Given that people’s preferences differ, when individuals follow their 
wishes, different arrangements will result. This freedom o f choice is of great value. 
Diverse choices should be protected because they are the exercise o f liberty. Second, 
diversity extends and enables liberty o f choice by providing choices. When certain 
choices are denied recognition, the ability to pursue a conception of the good 
vanishes. Mill wrote, “it is important to give the freest scope possible to 
uncustomary things, in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be 
converted into customs.” ?^ Mill argued that liberty is the precondition for social 
progress, as new ideas emerge from freedom of choice. But in Rawlsian liberalism, 
diversity is not chiefly valuable because it enables progress, but because the ability to 
pursue one’s conception of the good depends on the existence o f  social structures 
which provide for the pursuit of diverse conceptions.
We have seen that the liberal principles o f freedom o f contract, state 
neutrality, liberty, and equal opportunity provide compelling reason for contractual 
ordering. Non-discrimination requires the recognition of various types of marriage. 
The protection of diversity, which is needed in order to protect liberty of choice and 
to foster an atmosphere in which this liberty can flourish, also demands it. In the face 
of these reasons, only an overwhelming state interest can justify the imposition of a 
single marriage type on all. In Chapter III, I considered claims about the moral value 
of marriage which hold that same-sex marriage, divorce, and other forms of non- 
traditional marriage threaten public morality and a good social order, and found them 
lacking. In Chapter VI, I will consider whether freedom of marriage contracting 
conflicts with the demands of justice between the genders.
57 Mill [18591, p. 132.
CHAPTER VI; GENDER AND LIBERAL JUSTICE
But, it will be said, the rule of men over women differs from all these 
others in not being a rule o f force: it is accepted voluntarily; women 
make no complaint, and are consenting parties to it.i
1. Unrestricted marriage contracting would disadvantage women
2. The liberal principle of freedom of contract: failures of consent
3. The liberal conception of equality
4. Liberalism is committed to addressing gender inequality
The application of liberal principles to marriage requires that the state not 
privilege one conception o f the good marriage and that the principle o f freedom of  
contract be applied to marriage. Yet there are persuasive feminist arguments for 
restricting marriage contracting in order to prevent contracts which disadvantage 
women. In this chapter, I shall argue that such limits can be reconciled with 
liberalism by demonstrating that liberalism is in fact committed to addressing gender 
inequality through state intervention, and that the principles which so commit 
liberalism are prior to the principle of freedom of contract and do not violate liberal 
neutrality. This discussion will extend my analysis of the implications of liberal 
principles for marriage.
In the last chapter, I argued for the replacement of the current system of 
marriage with a state-run system of private contracts. Under this proposal, marriage 
would still be legislated by the state — that is, the state would endorse and enforce the 
contracts as it does now — but the terms of the marriage contract would be left to the
1 Mill [1869], p. 14.
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discretion of individuals, as the terms of other contracts are. Of course there would 
be limits on these terms. There are limits on the terms of any contract: people cannot 
legally contract to become slaves, or, indeed, to trade sex for money. But secondly, 
there must be some definitional limits on the marriage contract. Not just any type of 
contract will count as a marriage contract. But there is a third area where we need to 
look at the limits on marriage contracts.
This third area of concern is to do with implications of deregulating the 
marriage contract for women. Feminists are rightly suspicious o f the marriage 
contract: until the mid-19th century a woman lost her legal identity on marriage under 
the doctrine of coverture, and the after-effects of that doctrine lingered until recently. 
In March 1996, the Marital Rape Exemption still remained on the books in 33 U.S. 
states.2 Feminists have identified the traditional institution of marriage — in which a 
woman is economically dependent on her husband — as a central cause of women’s 
socio-economic inequality with men, as evidenced by lower average wages, less 
property holdings, fewer females in positions of authority. A feminist might therefore 
argue that because marriage, at least in its traditional form, is dangerous to women’s 
life-prospects or well-being, contracts establishing marriages should be limited in 
ways that will protect women, for example by including mandatory property division 
on divorce.
The specific case at issue is this: a man and woman making a marriage 
contract wish to stipulate that on divorce there will be no alimony or support. There 
is a statistical likelihood that if or when divorce occurs, the woman will have no 
property and be unemployable as a result of her assumption of child-care duties. Can 
liberals allow a law stating that the marriage contract must include provisions for 
equitable division of property on divorce? Or will such a law violate the principle of 
freedom of contract or, more importantly, of state neutrality? Would such a law
2 In the U.S., the Marital Rape Exemption (which exempted husbands from prosecution for rape of 
their wives) remained until 1976, Information from the National Clearinghouse on Marital and 
Date Rape.
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impose a notion of the good life on citizens? In section 1 I will review the problem. 
In section 2 I will consider two radical feminist arguments which seek to establish 
why entry into contracts should be limited. These arguments include in their scope 
the participation of women in any practices oppressive to women as a group and try 
to establish that women’s entry into such contracts governing such practices should 
be subject to state intervention. I will show that the argument that social pressures 
on women invalidate their consent to such contracts fails within liberalism. In section 
3 I will show that the principle of freedom of contract is subordinate to the liberal 
conceptions of equality and state neutrality. Finally, in section 4 I will show that 
these conceptions in fact commit liberals to endorsing state action to reform sexist 
social practices.
1. Unrestricted marriage contracting would disadvantage women
The traditional marriage contract contributed in many ways to women’s 
oppression, from depriving wives of their legal personhood to denying them a right to 
control sexual access to their bodies. Contractual ordering of marriage would mean 
that sexist obligations would not be compulsory components o f the contract. 
However, feminists have pointed out that a free contractual ordering would not 
preclude contracts disadvantageous to women. Freedom of contract does not 
guarantee contractual fairness. This objection involves a deeper criticism, borrowed 
from socialism, of contract itself: contract is compatible with exploitation or 
systematic disadvantage to a group. Another line of feminist criticism argues that 
marriage contracts are not rightful contracts. They claim that women are forced or 
coerced into marriage by economic conditions in which material goods are unequally 
distributed between men and women. A third feminist criticism argues that 
socialisation undermines the validity of women’s apparent consent. Women’s
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acceptance o f feminine roles is conditioned by their experience o f an oppressive 
environment. In this section, I will set out the first position, concluding that the 
systematic disadvantage to women occasioned by their assumption o f traditional 
wifely duties provides a good prima facie reason to build safeguards on property 
division into the contract. In the rest of the chapter, I will explore approaches to 
showing that such safeguards are compatible with liberalism.
Freedom of commercial contract has been widely held to be a fundamental 
entitlement in modern capitalist society. This explains the importance accorded by 
contract theorists and economists to Sir Henry Maine’s statement that “the movement 
of progressive societies [was] a movement from status to contract.”  ^ The centrality 
of contract has emerged because it governs interactions characteristic of modern 
liberal society. Contract represents individualised, consensual exchanges, as opposed 
to externally determined and imposed status. The consent of parties to a contract 
connotes “choice (with its implications of available alternatives) and ... voluntariness 
(since one is free to choose no relationship at all).”4 The binding enforcement of the 
contract by the state limits the freedom of the agent to breach the contract only in 
order to endorse the original free choice. Contract has been identified with liberalism 
in another way, as “contractual rationality” has been seen as definitive of justice by 
contemporary political philosophers such as Rawls.5
But this view of contract as typical of voluntary relations, as opposed to the 
status relations of, for instance, feudal or caste systems, has been challenged by 
socialist criticism. The fundamental mistake attributed to proponents of contract is 
the assumption that parties to contracts have equal freedom. To put it crudely, 
property owners set the terms of the contract, and under certain conditions — as
2 Maine [1861], p. 100.
4 Shultz 1982, pp. 213, 218.
5 See Held 1987, especially pp. 111-114. Held claims: “Contemporaiy society is in the grip of 
contractual thinking,” p. 111. Other examples are the hypothetical contracts of classical social 
contract theory and David Gauthier’s actual moral contractualism.
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when the alternative is starvation — workers are forced to consent.^ Formal freedom 
of contract is thus compatible with exploitation. Feminists who claim that marriage 
contracts may be exploitative accept that the consent is free, but argue that the 
contracts will systematically disadvantage women. Others claim that apparently 
rightful contracts are invalid because the consent given was insufficiently voluntary. 
The claim is either that women are forced to accede, or that their consent is brought 
about by social conditioning.
Setting aside for the moment arguments that women’s consent to marriage 
contracts is not valid (because it is coerced or socially conditioned), let us turn to the 
claim that women’s consent to certain activities, though free, may result in systematic 
disadvantages for them. In arguing against a free contractual ordering of marriage, 
many feminists make the point that a gendered imbalance of power may lead to 
inequitable agreements. Pateman emphasises women’s lower earning power, writing 
that “only a few middle-class and professional women are likely to be in a position to 
negotiate an intimate contract.”  ^ Okin argues that marriage contracting would 
contribute to the féminisation of poverty, noting that “justice is by no means 
enhanced by the maximisation of freedom of contract, if the individuals involved are 
in unequal positions to start with.” She goes on to ask sceptically “What would 
[wives being divorced] have to bargain withT^
Women and men are not equal bargaining agents, but, as classes, occupy 
different social and economic positions. Women’s consent to the terms of the 
marriage contract, though free, may be influenced by lack of alternatives, social 
pressures to marry, lack of bargaining power, and low expectations. Due to this 
inequality, and because the marriage contract will typically take place between a man 
and a woman, there is reason to fear that power relations will affect the agreement 
made. Opponents to contractual ordering point out that women would be better
6 See Elster 1985, p. 214.
7 Pateman 1988, p. 155.
 ^Okin 1989, p. 173; and see Okin 1990, pp. 665-6. See also Sachs and Wilson 1978, p. 149.
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protected if the state were to prescribe fair terms for marriage than if the terms were 
left to discretion. Flexibility and the ability to individualise the marriage contract are, 
they claim, a lower priority than the protection of women (and children) from poverty 
or dependence.
This set o f priorities seems right. Legislation should not disadvantage a group 
o f citizens arbitrarily, but moreover, when unconstrained individual agreement is 
likely to result in indigence, loss of dignity, or deprivation of any real freedom 
because of the substantial inequality of the parties involved, there is ample reason for 
the government to regulate contracts in order to protect the worse-off citizens. 
Within liberalism, freedom of contract is limited by justice, in order “to protect equal 
opportunity and to prevent exploitation.”  ^ Libertarians disagree; but, for example, a 
minimum working age, safety-at-work conditions, and equal opportunity laws are 
compatible with liberalism on these grounds. Some issues are more contentious, such 
as a minimum wage, limited working hours, or affirmative action. The question is 
whether relations between men and women constitute exploitation to such a degree 
that a liberal state would have reason to intervene. I shall argue in section 2 that a 
socialist analysis of men and women as classes is inadequate.
A consistent liberalism seems to demand the application of the principle of 
freedom o f contract within certain limits to the family: applying “liberalism to the 
family would seem to require, or at least tolerate, the contractualization of sex, 
marriage, and parenting.” ®^ I have argued in Chapter V that the principle of freedom 
of contract and equal opportunity should be applied to the family. Policy limits on 
marriage contracting are not inconsistent with contractual ordering, but current 
restrictions on marriage far exceed restrictions on contract in general, defining the 
content of marital roles and stixicture. However, while prescriptive value-promoting 
legislation is unjustified, prescriptive legislation to secure equal opportunity is not. If
9 Kymlicka 1991, pp. 87, 89. 
Kymlicka 1991, p. 88.
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unrestricted marriage contracting is not compatible with equal opportunity, then 
procedural constraints on contract may, nevertheless, not be adequate. I will now 
discuss the minimum procedural constraints on contract and consider what 
disadvantages might accrue to women if marriage contracting is restricted only by 
these constraints.
The legal theorists who propound contractual ordering of marriage address 
the possibility of unfair contracts, concluding that the necessary safeguards already 
exist in current procedural requirements in commercial contract law.^^  Law 
legitimates only those contracts which meet conditions of competency and 
voluntariness and do not illegitimately harm third parties. Parties to the contract
must have the capacity to plan and make decisions in their own 
interest. They must approach one another on a plane of equality ... at 
least in the generic sense of their equal right to accept or reject the
bargain. 12
Parties must also, o f course, give their consent. This
serves as a screening device to ensure that only qualified agreements 
gain access to contractual ordering.... The process leading to consent 
must be fair, free of fraud, duress, and unconscionable elimination of 
meaningful choice. The basic factual assumptions ... must be as the 
parties understood them. Additionally, the obligations assumed must 
be sufficiently clear, explicit, and definite for the consent to have 
substance and for a remedy to be ascertainable in case of breach. 12
11 Weitzman 1974, pp. 1275-6.
12 Shultz 1982, p. 217. See Restatement (Second) o f Contracts (1981), sections 7 and 12-17. 
12 Shultz 1982, p. 218.
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However, these constraints do not prevent individuals from willingly making 
contracts disadvantageous to themselves. As with the labourer and the factory owner 
— though for vastly different reasons —, the relation between men and women in 
marriage as it is commonly realised tends to exploitation. The structure of marriage 
is so deeply ingrained that procedural conditions alone seem inadequate to ensure 
fairness.
Feminists worry that women will agree to contracts which will negatively 
affect their overall life-chances. The two issues most pertinent are those of support 
and property division on divorce. The argument that most strongly supports a claim 
for mandatory equitable property divisions is that women typically make 
compromises in marriage which irreversibly harm their life-chances, measured in 
social primary goods, so that the cumulative effect of their decisions is gradually to 
undermine their ability to choose anything but the relationship. Thus,.a woman who 
spends twenty years bearing and raising children will lose career opportunities. 
Economic dependence on her husband will be compounded by divorce, since the cost 
of raising any remaining children will fall more heavily on her than her ex-husband. 
Contractual ordering could spell disaster if, for instance, a woman makes a contract 
requiring no alimony on divorce and twenty years later finds herself jobless and 
unemployable.
From the standpoint of freedom of contract, requiring support between 
spouses, or imposing alimony payments, seems invasive. But in terms of preventing 
disadvantages to women, the absence of these restrictions is cause for worry. While 
it is undesirable that women are expected to be primary child-carers, it is nevertheless 
the case that they often are, and so they become economically dependent. If 
support obligations were eliminated or limited to preventing dependence on the state, 
it would result in poverty for many women. Some feminists hold that the root
14 See Okin, 1989, Ch. 7; Delphy 1976; Sachs and Wilson 1978.
1^  This is argued to be a chief cause of sexual inequality. See Okin 1989, pp. 131-2, 185, and 
Chodorow 1978.
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problem is that society and the state fail to recognise child-raising as an economically 
valuable form of labour. The way to redress this is for the state to pay fiill-time 
parents at a competitive rate. Another solution is to enable women to combine 
traditional and public roles, such as by restmcturing work to allow for parenting. 
Finally, women’s position would be improved if parenting were shared equally.
But while women continue to combine work and the major part o f parenting, 
so that gender inequality is still perpetuated through the structure of heterosexual 
relationships, marriage legislation is one way to address inequality. This provides a 
rationale for prescribing equitable support obligations and guidelines to property 
division in marital contracts. In section 4, I will argue that this is a rationale which a 
liberal must accept. This also allows legal grounds for common-law marriage, for it 
would seem that the state could not with consistency impose specific divisions of  
property on common-law marriages and not in marriage contracts, since then living 
together would bring more onerous obligations than marrying. But common law 
marriage legislation protects the vulnerable.
The question is how support obligations should be envisioned. Okin suggests 
that both spouses should have equal legal entitlement to all earnings qoming into the 
h o u s e h o l d . B u t  while this is intended to remedy both women’s poverty and the 
inequality of power within the enduring marriage, it does not sufficiently address the 
latter problem. A wife’s legal entitlement to her husband’s earnings will not detract 
from his power as the sole wage-earner, since he still gains emotional leverage as well 
as reserving the decision not to earn. More to the point, it might discourage couples 
from marrying, thus limiting its effect. The proposal also seems unreasonably strong, 
since the aim is to prevent women who give up paid employment from suffering from 
doing so, but it in fact makes everyone liable to share all of their income, opening up 
new avenues of abuse. Finally, a system causing property held by spouses to belong 
equally to both reflects the idea that there is no distinction between married persons.
Okin 1989, pp. 180-1.
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Their separateness, however, must be respected. The idea that property rights are 
insignificant in the context of affection has been rejected by feminists,
In conceptualising support obligations, we should turn from Okin’s model of 
equal legal entitlement to a model of contractual exchange. Support should 
compensate traditionally unpaid labour and lost life-chances. The suggestion that 
spouses should share all income, or that the wage-earning partner should support the 
other independent of her contribution, fails to meet the problem at hand. The 
rationale of legislating support is that women typically forego economic independence 
in order to undertake labour for the benefit of both parties. The payment model — 
unlike Okin’s equal entitlement model — recompenses this labour. If marriage did not 
routinely entail economic disadvantage and powerlessness for women, these 
restrictions would be unnecessary. If support is understood as payment, the wife will 
earn her share rather than depending on her husband; whereas promoting dependence 
by legislating it may reinforce inequality.
When women lack men’s earning power as a matter of course, the structure 
of marriage disadvantages women economically, and the poor are increasingly 
women and children, there is good reason to limit freedom of contract in order to 
protect the vulnerable. However, if this is the reason for limiting freedom of 
contract, the constraints should target the undesirable outcomes more directly than 
Okin’s suggestion does, by applying specifically to cases in which assumption of 
wifely duties has undermined a woman’s earning power.
This leaves the question of property distribution when one partner has not 
foregone work, but has earned less due to her gender. Wives who have contributed 
to their husbands’ careers, and those who have worked for pay but simultaneously 
performed household and maternal duties seem entitled to some portion of their 
husband’s earnings as a return for their ‘investment’. But the payment model does
See my Chapter II.3-4, on Hegel’s doctrine of the unity of spouses, especially with regard to 
property ownership. And see Okin’s rejection of Hume’s statement to this effect, Okin 1989, p. 30.
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not apply to cases in which the female partner simply fared worse in earnings due to 
her gender. A particular individual’s partner has no obligations to recompense her for 
those conditions which cause women to fare worse. The task of changing them rests 
on society as a whole.
Restrictions on freedom of marriage contract would address gender 
inequality. Insofar as marriage as an institution contributes to sexual inequality, there 
is reason to limit contractual agreements so that women do not work for no, or 
inadequate, pay. The rationale of the constraints is to prevent the systematic 
disadvantage of women which is likely to occur if they are absent. Beyond that, 
restraints on the marriage contract do not serve feminist purposes. It remains to 
show (in sections 3 and 4) that such constraints are compatible with liberalism.
2. The liberal principle of freedom of contract: failures of consent
Liberals have defended different types of freedom of contract (different kinds 
of non-intervention). Notably, Rawlsian liberals differ from libertarians by holding 
that redistribution of property in the interests of equal opportunity does not constitute 
illegitimate use of government power. This reflects on Rawls’ part a conception of 
moral equality between persons entailing that they not be privileged or penalised for 
morally arbitrary factors. There are tensions between traditional institutions of 
liberalism (primarily the free-market economy) and Rawls’ ideal of liberal equality; I 
will examine these tensions in sections 3 and 4. In this section, I will show how 
restricting the marriage contract as suggested in section 1 cannot be justified by 
arguing that marriage contracts do not meet standards of procedural justice because 
women’s consent to them is not free. I will leave aside the debates between liberals 
over the extent of freedom of contract.
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Liberals have appealed to various principles in order to defend the freedom of 
contract. In Rawlsian liberalism, state neutrality implies that the state should not 
control the content of contracts, but simply provide a mechanism for enforcement. 
Unsurprisingly, many liberals have followed Mill in appealing to the principle that 
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”^^ This “very 
simple principle” sets a necessary condition for preventing freedom of contract: it 
says that this freedom must be allowed unless disallowing it would prevent a certain 
type of harm. The harm principle is endorsed by liberals in their rejection of legal 
paternalism, the view that prevention of harm to oneself is a reason in support of legal 
prohibitions.26 Liberals have appealed to other principles, such as the principle of 
utility, in defending the freedom of contract. Thus, a liberal might allow freedom of 
contract in a case where such freedom causes third-party harm on the grounds that in 
this case the beneficial effects of such a contract will outweigh the harm. However, 
the feminist arguments which I am considering do not appeal to the harm principle or 
to the utility principle but to the procedural conditions which standardly govern the 
making of contracts.
There are two sets of conditions which qualify freedom of contract: 
procedural or ‘entry’ conditions, and outcome. Entry conditions to contract require 
that parties be competent, that they freely consent, and that the contracts do not 
illegitimately harm third parties. These preconditions to contractual validity are 
standardly endorsed by liberals. One might also criticise the outcome of contracts as 
unfair or exploitative. Rawls’ difference principle might play such a role, by 
redistributing the benefits of contracts which met the entry requirements. Certain 
types of contracts are invalid: notably, those that illegitimately harm third parties.
Mill [1859], p. 68.
1^  This poses difficult questions of what constitutes harm to others. For discussion of the issue, see 
Ten 1980, Chapter 4; Rees 1985, Chapter 5; and Skorupski 1989, pp. 340 ff.
26 See Feinberg 1984, p. 14.
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But there is no liberal prohibition of individuals making contracts disadvantageous to 
themselves. Liberals reject legal paternalism, the view that prevention of harm to 
oneself is a reason in support of legal prohibitions.21 Rawls’ guidelines for entry are 
standard: competence, threshold understanding, absence of coercion or deception, 
preservation of “the equal liberty of the parties.” He adds that contractors must 
occupy “a reasonably fair bargaining position,” but the context makes clear that this 
requires only that the contractors be awake, sane, and u n d e c e i v e d .22
The harm principle demands that the state not interfere in individuals’ 
voluntary actions except to prevent harm to others. But the application of this 
principle to contract has a paradoxical outcome. Since the state (or some regulatory 
body) must enforce contracts in order for the institution of contracting to exist, its 
non-interference consists in reinforcing the terms chosen by the parties to the 
contract. The state can depart from this position of non-interference in three ways: 
by making certain contracts criminal (examples in law are prostitution, murder 
contracts, bigamy), by stipulating the terms of contracts (marriage), or by failing to 
recognise a contract (until recently, pre-nuptial agreements, marriages of 
convenience). A contract may fall into the last category, in which it is not criminal 
but not enforced, because it conflicts with law, although its content is not actually 
c r i m i n a l .2 3  But the presumption of freedom of contract is this: when a contract does 
not violate the rights of a third party, when it is voluntary, when the parties are 
competent, and when it is enforceable (e.g. not nonsense, indefinite, or in conflict
21 Feinberg 1986, p. xvii.
22 Rawls 1971, p. 345. Parties must be “fiilly conscious, in a rational frame of mind, and know the 
meanings of the operative words, their use in making promises, and so on. Furthermore, these 
words must be spoken freely and voluntarily, when one is not subject to threats or coercion, and in 
situations where one has a reasonably fair bargaining position, so to speak. A person is not required 
to perform if the operative words are uttered while he is asleep, or suffering delusions, or if he was 
forced to promise, or if pertinent information was deceitfully withheld from him.”
23 Feinberg argues that bigamy should fall into this category rather than being a crime: it simply is 
not a marriage, Feinberg 1986, pp. 265-7. This is also the basis on which pre-nuptial agreements 
were traditionally not recognised in American law; see Weitzman 1974, p. 1181 fn. 61, pp. 1258-66.
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with law), it is a valid contract. The fact that a contract’s outcome is inequitable is 
not in itself a reason to limit the transaction.
Limiting the marriage contract for the purpose of preventing female poverty 
seems to conflict with freedom of contract. If women who are informed and 
competent choose disadvantageous marriage contracts, then the state’s role is to 
enforce the contract. One approach open to feminists is to claim that in these 
contracts the entry conditions are not met. Such contracts are not procedurally just. 
One such argument is that women are forced or coerced into oppressive activities by 
social or economic pressure. These include activities defined or prescribed by the 
traditional gender system such as heterosexual sex, dominant/submissive 
relationships, prostitution, participating in the production of pornography, surrogate 
pregnancy, or choosing to forego a career to raise c h i l d r e n .2 4  Women are said to be 
forced into such activities by financial hardship (e.g. women as a group earn less than 
men, unskilled and uneducated women can often earn more through prostitution or 
pornography than they could through other forms of employment), and by social 
pressures such as the expectation of peer group and family that women will perform 
certain roles, and the perceived need of male protection from violence. A second 
argument is that women freely choose to participate in oppressive activities, but that 
the desires which lead them to make these choices are the result of social 
conditioning. I will examine these arguments in turn.25
241 am not expressing the view that these activities are oppressive but representing a view that these 
and/or some other activities are influenced by a system of oppression.
25 Of those I will consider, Pateman and MacKinnon are socialist feminists and critics of liberalism. 
Perhaps the unacceptability of their arguments within liberalism confirms them in their 
dissatisfaction with it. But feminists who are committed to liberalism have used these views as 
arguments against the deregulation of marriage, and I am concerned to show the ineffectiveness of 
this strategy. But if feminists think some of Pateman's and MacKinnon’s ideas are plausible, or 
point to a truth, we need to think how a liberal could, and could not, use them. Finally, both 
MacKinnon and Pateman argue that socialism, like liberalism, is limited as a tool for feminists. 
What is needed is a feminist political theory. I am more hopeful that an egalitarian liberalism could 
accommodate feminist goals. But I want to be clear about how it could do so by first showing how it 
could not.
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The first feminist objection to contractual ordering of marriage claims that 
because women and men as classes possess unequal shares o f social power, women 
are forced to participate in oppressive activities. On this basis, Carole Pateman writes 
that “women collectively are coerced into marriage” by economic p r e s s u r e s . ^ ^  It is 
also argued that women will be forced to marry by social pressures such as “parental 
or peer pressure to m a r r y . ” ^^ Minow and Shanley suggest that the economic 
compulsion to marry constitutes force:
[0]ne of John Stuart Mill’s great insights in The Subjection o f Women 
was his observation that the decision to marry for the vast majority of 
women could scarcely be called ‘free’. Given women’s low wages, 
scarcity of jobs, and lack of opportunity for higher or even secondary 
education, marriage was for them a ‘Hobson’s choice’: that or none.
Even the ‘I do’ of someone very much in love and desirous of 
marriage does not in-and-of-itself guarantee freedom.
But Mill was writing in 1869! Women now have access to education and jobs, and 
possess equal civil and legal rights; women are still concentrated in low-paying jobs, 
and others hit the glass ceiling, but the suggestion that women will be forced to marry 
out of economic necessity seems wrong. It was in fact a feature of the traditional 
view of marriage that contract was considered inappropriate to it due to the supposed 
inequality of husband and wife.28 Women were then considered incapable of 
contracting; but now women and men are at least formally equal.
26 Paleiiian 1988, p. 132.
2^  ^ Sachs and Wilson 1978, p. 149
28 See Carbone 1988, p. 148. Contract was also considered inappropriate because husband and wife 
were one legal person.
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The passage cited from Minow and Shanley continues with a discussion of 
contract pregnancy, interspersed with their remarks on contractual ordering of 
marriage;
[T]o depict a woman who agrees to bear a child because it is the only 
way to bring her household income above the poverty line as 
exercising her ‘freedom’ ignores the restraints or compulsions of  
economic necessity.^^
Yet these “compulsions” do not amount to force, in the case either o f contract 
pregnancy or of marriage. Further, criticisms of contract pregnancy often involve 
claims that such contracts alienate women from their bodies, deny the intrinsic value 
of the reproductive capacity, cede control of women’s bodies to the state or the 
employer, and perpetuate the objectification of w o m e n . ^ o  Whether or not these 
objections hold against contract pregnancy, they do not apply to the contractual 
ordering of marriage. Writers who treat the contractualisation of marriage, sex, and 
reproduction as of a piece obscure the important differences between them.^i
The thought that women are forced to marry is not unique to contemporary 
feminists. Mill’s argument in The Subjection o f Women that lack of other 
employment forces women to marry is w e l l - k n o w n . ^ 2  jf  women who choose 
disadvantageous marriage contracts have been coerced into doing so, then 
restrictions on marriage contracts are justified, since the procedural criteria are not 
met. If women are forced by economic hardship or social pressures to participate in 
oppressive activities, this might establish why a neutral state should intervene in
29 Minow and Shanley 1996, p. 11.
36 See Minow and Shanley 1996, p. 11; Kymlicka 1991, pp. 95-7; Pateman 1988, Chapter 7; 
Carbone 1988.
31 Those guilty include Minow and Shanley 1996, pp. 9-13; Pateman 1988, Chs. 6 & 7, esp. pp. 
184-8; Carbone 1988; and Kymlicka 1991, p. 88.
32 See for example Mill [1869], p. 29.
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certain voluntary oppressive activities.^  ^ But either claim is incompatible with liberal 
standards of procedural justice in contract.
In some cases, force or coercion renders consent to a contract defective, and 
the contract unenforceable. When coercion reduces voluntariness beneath a certain 
level, consent is invalid: “the act of consent is so deficient in voluntariness that it 
lacks legal or moral e f f e c t . ” 34 in order to argue that women’s consent is not 
sufficiently voluntary for the contract to have effect, one must prove the presence of 
coercion (or force) capable of reducing voluntariness below the significant level. But 
the case is very weak.
First, “coercion ... implies] the presence of an intentional agent or coercer”:
A coerces B into doing Y if A performs an action X that has the 
intended and actual consequences of making B do Y, which- differs 
from the action Z that B would have performed had A instead pursued 
his ‘normal’ course of action W. (Elster 1985, p. 211-2)
If a woman were held at gun-point until she signed a marriage contract, she would be 
coerced, but the case at issue here is one in which she acts apparently freely. Can one 
make a case that social and economic pressures actually coerce her to act? It seems 
not, since no intentional agency lies behind the various and entrenched social and 
economic pressures. Further, as we shall see in the case of force, women do have 
meaningful alternatives.
Social pressures could more plausibly be seen as a case of force than of 
coercion, since force “need not imply more than the presence of constraints that leave 
no room for c h o l c e . ” 35 In other words, no agent need intend the effect. However,
33 This issue is controversial. But since I will argue that force is not to be found in this case, I am 
leaving it to one side.
34 Feinberg 1986, p. 254.
35 Elster 1985, p. 212.
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the economic and social factors which influence women are not effective enough to 
count as force. In cases of force, the victim is deprived of alternatives, but social 
pressures influence rather than determine action. Women can clearly choose to act 
against them. Finally, there is the phenomenological aspect. In cases of coercion or 
force, the agent is caused to act against her preferred option by a threat or a lack of 
alternatives. But many women choose, apparently freely, involvement in oppressive 
activities as their preferred alternative.
In the case of marriage contracting, a woman might quite happily choose a 
contract with no alimony provisions. If so, her choice could not be called forced. 
Alternatively, a woman might agree to such a contract on her prospective husband’s 
demand because, although she would prefer alimony provisions, she prefers to marry 
without alimony than not to marry. Her choice is not fully voluntary, but it is not a 
case o f coercion or force, for she has a meaningful alternative — not to marry.
Socialism provides examples of cases where such apparent freedom of choice 
is illusory, but they do not fit this case. Socialists argue that the apparent freedom of 
workers to leave the proletariat and become shop-keepers is not real freedom:
proletarians, though formally free not to remain workers ... 
nevertheless are forced to sell their labour power.... Similarly, women 
are collectively coerced into marriage although any woman is free to 
remain single.... Coercion to enter the marriage or employment 
contract casts doubt on the validity of the contract.36
But the cases are disanalogous. Not all workers can leave the proletariat and 
become, for example, shop-keepers because the working class is necessary for the 
existence of property owners. But all women may act against social pressures.
36 Pateman 1989, pp. 131-3. Elster 1985, pp. 214-5 also refers to this argument, made by G. A. 
Cohen.
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Catharine MacKinnon would disagree with that. “[T]o those who say, ‘Any woman 
can’,” she responds “a// women can't/ ' A s  with workers, a female elite may 
overcome sexism, but the system which permits pornography and lacks a law of sex 
equality keeps all women, except for the privileged few, in their places. But their 
choice is not like the choice for a labourer between working and starving, or working 
and surviving at an unacceptable level.38 The problem for women is not that they are 
forced into a role by lack of alternatives, but that they freely choose roles 
disadvantageous to them.
The penalties may be as severe, but they are highly complex. In the case of 
marriage, however, choosing not to marry may have serious disadvantages (lack of  
male protection from violence, reduced social status) but we cannot conclude that 
women are forced to marry as the starving labourer is forced to work. In the 
example of marriage, women are less vulnerable (because less economically 
dependent) when they resist traditional roles. In this respect, social pressures 
resemble coercion more closely than force:
A worker is coerced to sell his labour power if he would be better off 
were he to withdraw with his own means of production. A worker is 
forced to sell his labour-power if he would be unacceptably worse off 
were he to withdraw with his own means of production.^?
There are similarities between sexual and class oppression. The exploitation 
of women and workers serves the interest of another class which therefore has an 
interest in maintaining the status quo. Both forms of oppression operate by becoming 
accepted as normal, so that the unfairness of the mechanisms which exclude women 
and workers from power and property-ownership becomes invisible. But there are
32 MacKinnon 1987, p. 77.
38 See Elster 1985, p. 214 on the sense of ‘force’ as a choice between labour and starvation.
39 Bister 1985, p. 216.
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important differences, which render a socialist analysis of women’s oppression 
inadequate. For one thing, sexual, racial, and class oppression intersect, necessitating 
different analyses of the condition of women from different social groups. For 
another, the intimate relations between men and women are fimdamentally different 
from class relations. Women may be exploited as a result of conforming to traditional 
gender roles, but the system of socially constructed gender roles cannot be 
understood as the exploitation of one class by another. In any case, liberals would 
dispute the claim that exploitation blocks valid consent.
The claim that women’s consent to oppressive activities is not free cannot 
carry political weight as a case of force or coercion. For the claim to act as a reason 
for state intervention which liberals can accept, it must mean that women are not free 
in a politically relevant way. Their freedom must be reduced to the extent that 
consent is invalid. But liberals claim that contractors are in the relevant sense free if 
they are not coerced. Social and economic pressures cannot be construed as coercion 
or force. More importantly, we cannot give content to the claim that such pressures 
render women’s choices not free without undermining liberalism.
Imagine two possible manoeuvres someone determined to show that women’s 
consent is not free could make. First, she could claim that the definition of coercion 
is inadequate and that social pressures do in fact constitute coercion. Second, she 
could claim that liberalism needs to redefine the level of voluntariness needed for 
consent, so that while social pressures do not amount to coercion, they are sufficient 
to invalidate consent. The first attempt must fail, for an attempt to stretch the 
definition of coercion wide enough to encompass social pressures will render an 
implausibly wide range of choices and actions as cases of coercion. The same 
problem recurs in the second manoeuvre. There are strong reasons against redefining 
the voluntariness required for contract so as to exclude consent based on social 
pressures, as this would raise the standard of voluntariness required for consent to an 
impossibly high level.
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The second feminist argument against freedom of marriage contracting which 
I will consider is that women choose to participate in oppressive activities without 
coercion, but that the desires which lead them to make these choices are the result of 
social conditioning. It is therefore said that their choices are not truly free, or that 
they are not competent. But it is implausible to argue that women are rendered 
incompetent by social conditioning, since women raised in oppressive environments 
are still able to deliberate r a t i o n a l l y .46 So I will focus on the argument that women’s 
consent is not free in certain types of exchanges with men because women are 
socially conditioned to accept subordination as the natural structure of heterosexual 
relationships.
The question of whether, if women are socially constructed to accede to their 
own oppression, a woman can be said to have truly consented has occasioned much 
discussion in contemporary feminist theory, specifically regarding the question o f  
consent to heterosexual intercourse.4  ^ Some feminist objections to contractual 
ordering of marriage echo the claim that women’s apparently free consent is the 
product of social conditioning. Okin cites “the history of gender in our culture and 
our own psychologies” as an impediment to fair contractual negotiation.42
Here, briefly, is MacKinnon’s account. Sexuality and gender are social 
constructs and their central dynamic is inequality. Desire is not natural, but a social 
construct. And in our society it is structured by the inequality between men and 
women. “Stopped as an attribute of a person, sex inequality takes the form of  
gender; moving as a relation between people, it takes the form of sexuality.”43 This
46 Walker 1995, pp. 464-6, makes a convincing case that adaptive preferences do not affect the 
agent’s competence. The point could be refined: certain oppressive circumstances, such as war, 
extreme poverty, and so on, could well damage an agent’s deliberative and rational capacities; but I 
am referring to the experience of women in liberal societies, with civil and political rights, where 
forms of psychological, social, and economic oppression affect them.
41 See Catharine MacKinnon, 1989, and Gauthier 1997, Ch. 4.
42 Okin 1989, p. 173.
43 MacKinnon 1987, p. 6.
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inequality takes the form of dominance and s u b m i s s i o n . 4 4  MacKinnon’s evidence 
includes violence against women and the nature and popularity of pornography 
featuring women. Male dominance does not just consist in social power, but in the 
construction o f maleness as normative.
This inequality permeates all social relations. “[T]he molding, direction, and 
expression of sexuality organize society into two sexes, women and men. This 
division underlies the totality of social relations; it is as structural and pervasive as 
class is in marxist theory.”^^  While people can cross boundaries, so that a successful 
female may take on the dominant viewpoint, in fact gender inequality is all-pervasive. 
All sexuality, even homosexuality, is defined by the heterosexual norm, that is, the 
dynamic of dominance and submission. Given this, sexuality is not truly consensual 
because it is based on female submission; what can a woman do but submit? 
MacKinnon writes “If ‘no’ can be taken as ‘yes’, how free can ‘yes’ be?”46 She 
alleges that women cannot give meaningful consent to heterosexual sexual relations, 
conditioned as they are to submit.^ *?
Social conditioning explains “how ... women come to want that which is not 
in our i n t e r e s t . ” ^^ To those who find the universality of this claim implausible, 
MacKinnon asks, “[Wjould you agree, as people say about heterosexuality, that a 
worker chooses to work? ... If working conditions improve, would you call that 
worker not oppressed? ... Those who think that one chooses heterosexuality under 
conditions that make it compulsory should either explain why it is not compulsory or
44 “[X]he sex difference and the dominance-submission dynamic define each other. The erotic is 
what defines sex as an inequality, hence as a meaningful difference.” MacKinnon 1987, p. 50.
45 MacKinnon 1987, p. 49.
46 MacKinnon 1987, p. 95.
42 "Because the inequality of the sexes is socially defined as the enjoyment of sexuality itself, gender 
inequality appears consensual.” “[W]omen’s place is not only different but inferior,... not chosen 
but enforced.” MacKinnon 1987, pp. 7, 23. See Archard 1998, Chapter 6, for a critical discussion of 
this claim.
48 MacKinnon 1987, p. 54.
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explain why the word can be meaningful here.”49 in what follows, I want to take the 
former option.
MacKinnon’s thesis does not raise a specific objection to contractual ordering 
of marriage, but to heterosexual relations in general. While it is implausible that 
consent is never possible, feminists such as MacKinnon are right to draw attention to 
morally troubling aspects of sex.56 As I argued in Chapter I, sexual desire always 
contains components of objectification. Inequality between the genders and the 
erotization of domination which some feminists argue takes place in society may 
worsen this element. But these conditions are not sufficient to invalidate consent.
The second feminist argument for limiting freedom of contract in matters 
affected by the oppression of women admits that women may desire to participate in 
oppressive activities, but holds that these desires are instilled through social 
conditioning. We should be clear that the feminist argument does not attack all social 
conditioning as invalidating consent, only that which is part of a system of 
oppression. Preferences which have arisen due to oppressive social conditioning are 
‘adaptive preferences’.^  ^ The feminist response must surely be that social 
conditioning itself is not the threat to freedom. The relevant fact is that women’s 
social conditioning is part of a system of oppression. On these grounds, feminists 
argue that “what liberals take to be women’s voluntary consent to various social and 
political arrangements is spurious, because the beliefs and desires that give rise to the 
consent are simply oppression i n t e r n a l i z e d . ” ^^ This question of whether adaptive 
preferences invalidate consent has been much discussed in contemporary feminist 
theory. Carole Pateman claims that femininity and masculinity are ‘“developed 
within, and intricately bound up with, relations of domination’,” so that women 
accept domination as n a t u r a l . Adrienne Rich claims that the ‘erasure of lesbian
49 MacKinnon 1987, p. 60.
56 See Archard 1998, pp. 84-94, for an argument against the view that consent is never possible. 
5^  Walker 1995, p. 459.
52 Walker 1995, p. 457.
53 Cited in Walker 1995, p. 460.
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existence’ conditions women’s preference for h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y . Again, the point was 
made long ago by Mill. In On Liberty, he writes ambiguously of polygamy:
this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned 
in i t ... as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; ... 
this fact... has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the 
world, which, teaching women to think marriage the one thing 
needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being 
one of several wives to not being a wife at all.55
Women were socialised, in Mill’s day, to believe that marriage was their chief end, so 
that they would prefer even a disadvantageous marriage to none at all.
Women’s consent to occupy subordinate positions in intimate relations, the 
claim goes, is based on the internalisation of roles which are integral to a 
comprehensive system of oppression. The contemporary claims are grounded in 
feminist sociological criticism, a major theme of which is how women’s political 
oppression is reinforced through intimate heterosexual relations. One prominent 
author defines “heterosexual desire ... as sexual desire that eroticises power 
difference,”56 and another writes, “the idea of power and submission is built into the 
language and imagery of heterosexual encounter.”52
Setting aside the implausibility of the universal claims made, the question is 
whether this sort of social conditioning can be admitted by a liberal as a reason for 
limiting freedom of contract. Under the standard liberal definition of free consent, the 
exercise of ‘adaptive preferences’ counts as valid consent which “renders it 
illegitimate for the state ... to interfere in the consented-to arrangement.”58 The
54 See Rich 1980.
55 Mill [1859], p p .  160-1.
56 Jeffreys 1990, p. 2.
52 Segal 1987, p. 99.
58 Walker 1995, p. 462.
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choice is properly connected to the agent because it represents her preferences, even 
though these preferences arose in oppressive circumstances. They are not a 
momentary departure from selfhood, the result of intensive brainwashing or drug 
abuse, or a mental aberration unconnected to her personality structure. Instead, they 
are central to her personality and understanding of the world. Her beliefs may change 
over time, but to stop her from exercising her preferences because of their causal 
origin in oppressive social practices is an intolerable intrusion on her liberty, even 
though she would be better off not possessing them. The central principle of 
Rawlsian liberalism is that the state should treat agents equally in allowing them to 
pursue their own conceptions of the good.
Certainly some forms of manipulation of beliefs and desires negate consent. 
In Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, agents of the state deliberately manipulate 
individuals through drugs and social conditioning in order to mould them into desired 
personality types. This scenario is clearly objectionable to a liberal since it involves 
state intervention pre-empting individuals’ ability to choose their own conception of 
the good. Likewise, someone who was brainwashed or drugged into consenting 
would not have truly consented. But to suppose that decisions made, by women on 
the basis of social conditioning do not meet the procedural requirements of contract, 
failing the requirement of voluntariness, would result in undesirable practical 
implications and theoretical incoherence.
The practical implication is that most contracts cannot meet procedural 
criteria, since social pressures in some way related to oppression will be present in 
most if not all cases. One could try to limit the cases in which contracts will be 
invalid by appealing to a notion of individual good, so that the state intervenes only 
when the individual acts on desires which are formed through social conditioning and 
against her good. But this too runs into problems. Liberal reservations about the 
state acting coercively in the name of the good of the individual, but against the
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preferences she actually holds, are famously expressed in Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two 
Concepts of Liberty’.59
Theoretical problems arise if we accept the claim that social conditioning is a 
factor capable of rendering consent invalid. This would require a definition o f  
freedom too rigorous for liberalism. Excluding the exercise of preferences based on 
social conditioning from freedom of contract would end with the result that freedom 
o f contract never applies. And this result is unacceptable because the issue is not a 
metaphysical question of free will, of whether choices ever are free in the sense of  
undetermined, but a political issue of what conditions must obtain for a choice to be 
considered free. If the presence of social conditioning renders contractual agreement 
not free, then no contract can ever meet the conditions necessary for it to be valid. 
The principle of freedom of contract vanishes. Further, liberalism is based on a 
conception of human autonomy. Accepting that social conditioning leaves us unfree 
undercuts this. It is incoherent to try to solve this problem by restricting the claim to 
adaptive preferences: if we can act independently of social conditioning, then we can 
also act independently of social conditioning which arises in oppressive conditions.
Finally, consent has a morally transformative power. Some actions towards 
others are impermissible if consent is not given. If consent based on adaptive 
preferences is considered invalid, the set of illegitimate actions expands. This seems 
to lose crucial distinctions. To repeat MacKinnon’s question, “I f ‘no’ can be taken as 
‘yes’, how free can ‘yes’ be?” Surely in this case we want to say that ‘yes’ carries a 
permission which ‘no’ does not.
3. The liberal conception of equality
59 Berlin 1969, especially pp. 22-5.
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In the last section, I criticised two arguments which seek to establish that 
entry conditions to contract are not satisfied under certain social conditions. 
However, it is possible that the exit conditions o f contracts could be criticised under 
Rawlsian liberalism, despite its value on freedom of contract. In this section, I will 
seek to show that other liberal values outweigh freedom of contract in liberalism, so 
that restraints on property division and so on may be built into the marriage contract 
to prevent unacceptable outcomes.
Rawlsian liberalism is in tension with the free market. It is guided by an ideal 
of equality which overrides economic laissez-faire. Other principles are prior to the 
principle of freedom of contract. Notably, mA Theory o f Justice, the liberty principle 
and the difference principle are the first principles governing the arrangement o f the 
major institutions of society. In their final form, these principles read:
First Principle: “Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system of liberty for all."
Second Principle: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached 
to offices and positions open to all under all conditions of fair equality
of opportunity.”60
The liberty principle is lexically prior to the second principle (that is, the liberty 
principle must be satisfied first, then the second principle may be satisfied), and the 
principle of equal opportunity is lexically prior to the difference principle. The 
liberties supported by the first principle are the political liberties, freedom of speech
60 Rawls 1971, p. 302.
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and assembly, of conscience and thought, of the person, the right to own personal 
property, and “freedom from arbitrary arrest and s e i z u r e .
These principles take priority over free market and freedom of contract. In 
fact, free market and freedom of contract are secondary in liberal theory to a 
particular ideal of equality. Kymlicka writes of Rawls and Dworkin,
If they allow some kinds of inequality-producing economic freedoms, 
it is not because they believe in liberty as opposed to equality. Rather, 
they believe that such economic freedoms are needed to enforce their 
more general idea of equality itself. 2^
The common feature is that the free market allows individuals to be rewarded or 
penalised for their efforts and choices, just as the difference principle excludes 
rewards and penalties not causally related to desert. Rawls writes that his principles 
may be applied either in a property-owning democracy or a socialist system. Market 
freedom (within either system) has the virtues of efficiency and protecting the liberty 
of vocational self-determination. 63 Efficiency, however, comes into play only after 
the two principles of justice have been satisfied.
Dworkin argues that the capitalist free market is not essential to liberalism, 
but desirable insofar as it furthers the central liberal goals.64 In a passage which 
serves as a summary of Rawls, Dworkin defines liberalism as the view that the 
government must “treat its citizens as equals” and that this requires that “political 
decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any conception of the good 
life, or of what gives value to life.” From this follows a
61 Rawls 1971, p. 61.
62 Kymlicka 1990, p. 85.
63 Rawls 1971, p. 274.
64 Dworkin 1978, p. 119.
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principle of rough equality: resources and opportunities should be 
distributed, so far as possible, equally .... Any other general aim of  
distribution will assume either that the fate of some people should be 
of greater concern than that of others, or that the ambitions or talents 
of some are more worthy, and should be supported more generously
on that account.65
The liberal preference for a limited free market system follows from the egalitarian 
effect of the pricing system of a market economy. The free market efficiently 
provides measures of the costs of goods and labour and so enables the “egalitarian 
distribution, which requires that the cost of satisfying one person’s preferences should 
as far as is possible be equal to the cost of satisfying another’s.”66 The liberal 
“chooses a mixed economic system — either redistributive capitalism or limited 
socialism — not in order to compromise antagonistic ideals of efficiency and equality, 
but to achieve the best practical realisation of the demands of equality itself.”62
So market freedom, and concomitantly the principle of freedom of contract, is 
subordinate to the demands of equality. The conception of equality which underlies 
Rawls’ liberalism is that of moral equality. He claims that human beings are morally 
equal in virtue of possessing the potential "for a conception of the good ... [and] for a 
sense of justice. "68 The principles of justice are derived from the original position, a 
thought-experiment in which members of society, under a veil of ignorance which 
excludes knowledge of their social and economic status and natural a^ bilities, choose 
the stmcture of their society. Their choice is just since it reflects their moral equality, 
because no participant has greater bargaining power than another. Much criticism 
has been directed at the use of the original position as an argument. However, we
65 Dworkin 1978, pp. 127-9.
66 Dworkin 1978, p. 131.
62 Dworkin 1978, p. 133.
68 Rawls 1971, p. 561.
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can see it as a device useful for representing equality. What renders the principles 
morally obligatory is not the hypothetical contract, but the fact that the principles 
chosen extend our own intuitions of justice, as they would appear without the bias of 
self-interest: "a particular description of the original position [is justified] if the 
principles which would be chosen match our considered convictions of justice or 
extend them in an acceptable way. "69
The intuition about justice which Rawls develops is that people should not be 
disadvantaged in the distribution of social goods by undeserved differences, such as 
natural talents or social class: “justice ... nullifies the accidents of natural endowment 
and the contingencies of social circumstances as counters in the quest for political and 
economic advantage."26 Morally, “social contingencies [and] natural chance ... seem 
equally arbitrary.” Being born with a shrewd mathematical mind, like being born rich, 
is morally arbitrary luck. Justice “treats everyone equally as a moral person” by “not 
weight[ing] men’s shares in the benefits and burdens of social co-operation according 
to their social fortune or their luck in the natural lottery.”2^  The principles of justice 
act so that the undeserved accidents of natural distribution do not privilege their 
lucky possessors in the distribution of social goods, but instead pool these natural 
resources “so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate.”22 
Whether the difference principle is tnaly efficacious in this respect is an issue I will not 
pursue. The point I wish to draw is that at the heart of Rawlsian liberalism is a 
radical notion of what equal opportunity requires. What I will argue next is that the 
requirements of this conception of equality extend even further when gender 
inequality is viewed through its lens.
69 Rawls, 1971, p. 19.
26 Rawls 1971, p. 15; see also pp. 128, 18, 72.
21 Rawls 1971, p. 75.
22 Rawls 1971, p. 102.
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4. Liberalism is committed to addressing gender inequality
The conception of equality fundamental to liberalism commits it to state 
action to reverse gender inequality. Such action is not incompatible with state 
neutrality, or the subsidiary principle of freedom of contract, but required by it, 
although the issue has been ignored by liberal theorists such as Rawls and Dworkin. 
Others have called attention to their oversight: “it seems that that premiss [of 
equality] has more radical implications than either Dworkin or Rawls recognizes ... It 
might ... move us to radical changes in gender relations.”23 When liberal theory is 
applied to gender inequality and the gendered structures of society, it demands that 
the state actively address these conditions through redistributive measures such as 
state-supported child-care, and through coercive measures such as mandatory divorce 
settlements. In the Introduction, I said I would leave aside the issue o f children, 
because the ethical duties parents have to them entail that child-care will require more 
state intervention than marriage. However, in this section, I must refer to women’s 
connection to reproduction as a significant element in gender inequality. But my 
remarks here reflect on current social arrangements, rather than endeavouring to 
promote a normative view on how the state should regulate child-care.
Rawlsian liberalism provides a clear route to justifying state intervention 
addressing gender inequality. Rawls’ principles of justice apply to “the basic 
structure of society, or more exactly, the way in wliich the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social cooperation.” His examples include “competitive markets, private 
property in the means of production, and the monogamous f a m i l y . ” ^4 The family is 
therefore one of the institutions to which the principles of justice apply, but Rawls 
does not see this through: “the family is both treated as a distinct and fundamental
23 Kymlicka 1990, p. 89. See also Okin 1989, p. 89 -  Rawls’s theory “neglectfs] gender.’
24 Rawls 1971, p. 7.
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institution, and never discussed in any detail/’^ s in fact, Rawls seems to assume that 
the family as it stands is just. He makes the family the school of morality and 
differentiates the virtues of “a good son” from those of “a good daughter” as well as 
those o f “wife and husband.”’  ^ But Rawls recognises that the family is a major social 
institution. As such, the principles of justice must be applied to it.
Feminists have pursued this argument before. Karen Green’s account of the 
application of the liberty principle to marriage illustrates the difficulties which arise 
when proposals to restructure the family clash with liberty and state neutrality. She 
holds that the liberty principle requires shared child-care responsibilities between the 
sexes such that “having children would be of no more importance to a woman in 
pursuit of her life’s goals and conception of the good that [sic] it would be to a 
man.”22 But in what sense can the liberty principle require this, since women must be 
free to purse a conception of the good which consists in raising and nurturing 
children, if they so desire? Feminists hold that justice between the genders cannot be 
achieved so long as child-care remains primarily women’s responsibility. But if 
shared parenting, flexible work hours, state-supported crèches, and so on, became the 
norm, but an individual woman chose to care for her children full-time, it would be 
intrusive to prevent her from doing so. Parents cannot be legally required to share 
child-rearing duties equally, since it may be part of their conceptions of the good for 
one or the other to devote him- or herself to child-raising.
Moreover, the liberty principle includes only formal civil and political liberties. 
Rawls denies that “the inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as 
a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally” count as a lack of
25 Munoz-Dardé 1998, p. 337.
26 Rawls 1971, pp. 467-8 and sections 70 and 71; Munoz-Dardé 1998, p. 337, cites Rawls 1993, p. 
xxix, “I do assume that in some form the family is just.” See Munoz-Dardé 1998 and Okin 1994 for 
discussion of inconsistencies in Rawls’ treatment of the family m A Theory ofJustice and Political 
Liberalism.
22 Green 1986, p. 31.
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liberty, “but rather ... these things... affect the worth of l i b e r t y . O n  his definition, 
“persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain constraints 
either to do it or not to do it and when their doing it or not doing it is protected from 
interference by other persons.” Lack of means does not count as such a constraint.'^  ^
As we have seen, women are free in this sense. Rawls’ liberty principle is not fruitful 
for feminists, first because liberty requires that we be free to pursue our own 
conceptions of the good within conditions of equality, second because the liberties it 
protects are formal.
Green also mentions that liberalism values the equal opportunity of members 
of society to develop fully. This theme is of more use to feminists. Women are free 
to choose a career, but unlike men, are forced to choose between a career or children. 
They are forced by the lack of alternatives, where good child-care costs more than 
women can earn, compounded by the fact that female occupations are paid less than 
male, and that the demands of raising children conflict with the hours and effort 
required by jobs. They are also forced to choose by the biological fact that women 
bear children. The structures for pursuit of social primary goods are fitted for 
someone without the responsibilities of parenting, so that women who parent are 
disadvantaged. If a man and a woman share parenting, they are both worse off in the 
work world than a man whose wife takes on the responsibilities. Finally, government 
incentives for parents often penalise mothers who work, so that a working-class 
woman will lose money by going back to work, and in addition to this loss, will have 
to pay for child-care. Women are forced to choose either children or work when they 
are made unacceptably worse off if they choose to have both. This is the case for 
women who lose financially — due to losing state benefit — when they take up 
employment. Women who have professional careers are forced to choose between 
children and career success by the fact that having both makes success less likely. All
78 Rawls 1971, p. 204.
79 Rawls 1971, p. 202.
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workers must choose between devoting themselves exclusively to their work or 
careers and pursuing other interests, including family. But women — due to biology, 
widespread social expectations, workplace discrimination, and poor provision for 
working parents — pay a heavy penalty in career terms for choosing to have children. 
Men do not have to make the same choice between family and career, since they do 
not suffer such great disadvantages as women do as a result of having children.
Women bear far more costs of child-raising than men (besides simply giving 
birth): “[m]arriage, as it is conceived by the mainstream of our society, still entails a 
prima facie duty on the behalf of a mother, to limit her pursuit of goals other than the 
care of her children.... Her husband’s liberty to pursue other goals is not similarly 
curtailed.”80 Using Rawlsian liberalism to argue against this inequality, Green draws 
on the idea that individuals should be equally able to pursue their conceptions of the 
good. But she does not explain why equal opportunity requires a restructuring of  
gender-based practices when, in fact, women already have formal equal opportunity. 
Do the principles of justice require more than that?
The implementation of the difference principle could improve the conditions 
of women as the worst-off members of society. But we are looking for arguments 
that the principles of justice must specifically address gender issues, and in doing so 
restructure the family. Okin presents several arguments that liberal justice requires 
state intervention including creation of equitable divorce law, law governing the 
ownership of property during marriage, subsidised day care, flexible working hours 
and parental leave for both parents, and gender-free s c h o o l i n g . 81 Okin identifies 
herself as a liberal and appeals to Rawlsian principles, the original position, and 
Rawls’ discussion of the development of moral psychology to argue for her concrete 
proposals for c h a n g e . 8 2  I  will not consider here whether Okin’s prescriptions are 
well-judged. Instead, I will rehearse her arguments to show why such intei*vention is
80 Green 1986, p. 35.
81 Okin 1989, pp. 175-9.
82 Okin 1989, p. 23; and see Kynilicka 1991, p. 87.
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consistent with liberalism. She presents three reasons for the application o f Rawlsian 
principles to the family. First, the family influences moral psychology. Second, 
agreement within the original position will be impossible within a gender-structured 
society. Third, the family is a life-shaping institution.
Okin’s first argument is that citizens will not develop a sense of justice as long 
as fathers and mothers possess unequal shares of power. Mill too declared that 
children will not learn justice and that society will be morally retarded so long as 
conditions of inequality prevail between husbands and wives. He wrote that “the only 
school of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals” so that men’s moral 
faculties will be stunted so long as their closest intimacies are with those subordinate 
to them.83 The family is closely connected to our ability to develop morally:
the true virtue o f human beings is to live together as equals; claiming 
nothing for themselves but what they as freely concede to everyone 
else; regarding command of any kind as an exceptional necessity, and 
in all cases a temporary one; and preferring, whenever possible, the 
society of those with whom leading and following can be alternate and 
reciprocal.... The family is a school of despotism.... The family, justly 
constituted, would be the real school of the virtues of freedom....
What is needed is, that it should be a school of sympathy in equality, 
of living together in love, without power on one side or obedience on 
the other.84
Because the family figures more prominently in our daily lives than citizenship, in 
which others are recognised as equals, its nature greatly influences our moral
83 Mill 11869], p. 45.
84 Mill [1869], pp. 47.
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character. Mill’s and Okin’s claims are similar; habitual inequality in our personal 
lives ill equips us to treat others, in any circumstances, as free and equal.
In Part 3 of A Theory o f Justice, Rawls gives an account of the development 
and nature of human moral psychology and moral equality. The family features in 
this account as the school of justice. But, as Okin argues, if children are exposed to 
injustice between the genders in the family, they will learn injustice rather than a sense 
of justice. The importance of inculcating a sense of justice in children arises from 
Rawls’ notion of a well-ordered society. In such a society, “everyone accepts and 
knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and the basic social 
institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles.”^^  A conception of 
justice lacking the ability to generate acceptance for itself is “seriously defective,” and 
so Rawls sets out to show that his theory will be stable because individuals living 
within it will develop a sense of justice motivating them to support the principles of 
justice.86 If the family is a school of injustice, his theory of moral development fails, 
and he has not shown that his theory will produce a well-ordered society. Okin 
concludes from this that “[fjamily justice must be of central importance for social 
justice.”87 Rawls himself has since dismissed the conception of a well-ordered society 
as it appears in A Theory of Justice as “unrealistic. ”88 But in Political Liberalism, he 
ignores the question of children’s moral development and fails to explain how citizens 
can learn a sense of justice when the largest portions of their lives are spent in non­
political settings. 89
Okin’s other arguments address Part 1 of A Theory o f Justice. She makes the 
following claims: i) the principles of justice require that social institutions be 
constructed so as not to discriminate on the basis of gender; ii) unless gender is
85 Rawls 1971, pp. 453-4.
8^  Rawls 1971, p. 455.
87 Okin 1989, p. 100.
88 Rawls 1993, p. xvi. Rawls tries in Political Liberalism to redefine the sources of political 
stability.
89 See Okin 1994, esp. pp. 34-5 and 37-9, for a discussion of these problems in Political Liberalism.
Chapter VI: Gender and Liberal Justice 213
eliminated, a nonsexist theory of justice will be impossible.^  ^ The latter argument is 
weak. Okin’s thought is that women and men differ in their “basic psychologies, 
conceptions of the self in relation to others, and experiences of moral development,” 
and thus will never be able to reach any agreement in the original position. If this is 
true, gender structures must be eliminated before we can come to a theory of justice 
through the device of the original position.^i
First, the premise that men and women have different approaches to morality 
is highly controversial, as Okin knows. In the context of this argument, she wrote 
“[w]hat seems already to be indicated by these studies, despite their incompleteness 
so far, is that in a gender-structured society there is such a thing as the distinct 
standpoint of women” on moral i s s u e s . 9 2  But earlier in the same book, she wrote 
“the evidence for differences in women’s and men’s ways of thinking about moral 
issues is not (at least yet) very c l e a r . ” ^^ Second, if men and women differ essentially 
(not as a result of social conditioning), then an end to the gender system will not 
make agreements between them any easier. Third, the same comments can be made 
about people from different religions and ethnic backgrounds. The point of the 
original position is to transcend these differences, by securing the conditions for 
unanimity. Consensus will be reached because conceptions of the good and 
psychological features are excluded by the veil o f  i g n o r a n c e . 94
Finally, Okin’s argument has been criticised because “the notion of the 
original position plays no interesting role in generating an argument for a truly 
genderless approach to justice.”95 The argument Okin sketches would bring gender 
equality to the original position as a pre-requisite for deliberation, rather than
90 Okin 1989, p. 105.
91 Okin 1989, p. 106. She refers lo care ethics; on care ethics, see my Chapter IV. She also cites 
psychoanalysts Nancy Chodorow (1978) and Dorothy Dinnerstein (1977) who analyse the effects on 
children of being primarily nurtured by women.
92 Okin 1989, p. 106.
93 Okin 1989, p. 15.
94 Rawls 1971, p. 137.
95 Russell 1995, p. 402.
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generating it from the original position as a principle of justice. However, Okin’s 
point has force as a criticism of the original position. If gender differences are so 
deeply ingrained that the veil of ignorance cannot block them out then the original 
position will fail as an embodiment of freedom and equality. What this suggests is 
that a description of the original position must attempt to identify and eliminate sexist 
presuppositions.
Okin’s other use of the original position is stronger. She imagines what the 
contractors would choose if they were aware that they could be either men or women 
and concludes they would attempt to minimise the influence of gender on life- 
chances.9G Although the family has been seen as private, it is a major determinant in 
the distribution of social goods, and thus arrangements in it must meet the demands 
o f justice. It is a life-shaping institution, the “gender structure [of which] is itself a 
major obstacle to equality of opportunity,” affecting the “opportunities of girls and 
w o m e n . ”97 Okin marshals empirical evidence to show that the gender-structured 
family is a major source of inequality and the increasing féminisation o f poverty. 
Russell points out that the contractors will know that they may be traditionalists and 
so will not choose to eliminate gender. To put it another way, the liberty principle 
requires that we be able to live as traditional men and women if we desire. But 
Russell’s conclusion is too quick and demonstrates the need for searching attention to 
our constmction of the hypothetical contractors. As far they know, they may be 
white supremacists or they may be black. So they will want to arrange society so that 
they are free to hold their opinions, but not so that they are disadvantaged by 
whatever race or sex they happen to be.
Okin argues that contractors would rule out “views ... that women are 
inherently inferior beings.” They would minimise the socio-economic costs of
9^  Similarly, one of the central claims made by Munoz-Dardé 1998 is that the contractualism in the 
original position should be individualistic rather than restricted to heads of families; see esp. pp. 
348-52.
97 Okin 1989, p. 16.
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divorce to women and children, and they would structure society and public policy so 
that women were not disadvantaged by their gender, whether they chose to live 
traditionally or not.98 The central Rawlsian conception of equality, embodied in the 
original position, requires that social structures be arranged to preclude disadvantage 
on the basis of sex. Furthermore, I will now show that state neutrality between 
conceptions of the good — which is the rendering Dworkin gave to “treating people 
as equals” — requires that the state act to eliminate gender-structured practices which 
disadvantage women.
Gender-structured social practices exclude women from equality of 
opportunity with men. They make it costlier for women to pursue their conceptions 
of the good, in terms of both economic and psychological costs. These practices — 
including the gendered division of labour within the family, the devaluing of women’s 
work, and working arrangements which disable those with small children in the 
competition for social primary goods — share some features with cases of force and 
coercion: i) if the practices were absent, women would follow different courses o f  
action; ii) these courses of action would be more beneficial to women than those they 
currently follow. We have seen above that i) does not carry political weight. But ii) 
deserves more attention. We must ask how women are worse off under these 
conditions, or how they might be better off. I shall argue that the gender structure of 
society displays the same characteristic as force in closing off alternatives which, 
under liberalism, should be left open. So i) should be rewritten as follows: i) if the 
practices were absent, women would follow different courses of action, some o f  
which are made unavailable by the social conditions themselves. The exclusion of 
these courses of action is significant because they are the courses of action which 
women could follow if pursuit of the good were no less costly for them than for men, 
that is, if they had equal opportunity.
98 Okin 1989, pp. 174-5.
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Many courses of action which defy gender structures and make women better 
off are available: having a career, asserting independence, and so on. But it is 
impossible for women to live as they could in a society in which women were not 
systematically disadvantaged and oppressed. The force of this point is not that 
women’s lives would be better than they are. Increase in utility does not outweigh 
liberal principles. The point is that the world that is made impossible by social 
practices is one in wliich women could live without the impediments Jo success and 
the strains on their psychology, their social relations, their attitudes to and 
expectations of work, love, and parenting, which currently exist as a consequence of  
oppression. The closure of this possibility, I will seek to show, is unjust, which does 
have bearing on the application of liberal principles. In a world shaped equally by and 
for women and men, women could pursue their good on an equal footing to men. 
Women do not have equal opportunity because they lack the chances that men have. 
Women are formally able to pursue their conceptions of the good. But they are not 
able to pursue conceptions of the good without incurring costs which men do not 
incur. Women who choose to pursue the goods which men have traditionally 
pursued — social primary goods and public standing — are disadvantaged in their 
pursuit, as men are not, if they choose to have a child. Women who choose to live 
as women traditionally have — raising children — cannot gain the social and economic 
goods needed for a minimally decent standard of living. Even when individual 
women are able to overcome social barriers, they do not have access to conceptions 
of the good which would be available to them in a society where women were fully 
equal.
I am not suggesting that women are essentially different from men and would 
be free if social structures reflected this difference. I do not think we are in a position 
to know all the ways in which women are naturally different from men. However, 
women’s roles are defined differently from men’s. Social and political institutions 
privilege those with men’s roles. Consequently, women have a lesser share in
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primary goods (including property and self-respect) and worth of liberty than men. 
Individual women cannot attain shares equal to those of men without making 
sacrifices which men are not expected to make, including meeting resistance from 
society, their own psychologies, in some cases the law, trying harder than men, and 
sacrificing family life. Society (and most political theory) assumes that reproductive 
labour will be carried out by women. In our social structures, women are not usually 
able to have children and their share of social primary goods, whereas men are.
Women do not have equal opportunity to pursue conceptions o f the good, 
and this provides a strong reason for a liberal state to intervene to create equality of  
opportunity. People in the original position would not want to be disadvantaged by 
their gender. They want to secure conditions in which each is equally,able to pursue 
his or her conception of the good. Gender-structured practices eradicate a possibility 
of good to which women are entitled, that is, their pursuit of the conception of the 
good which men are able to pursue and grasp: success in both private and public life. 
Also eliminated are the unknown possibilities of the good, for women, of living as 
fully equal members of society. Dworkin holds that a liberal state is required to act to 
secure the good under threat in such circumstances (he uses the example of 
environmental conservation). A liberal state is not permitted to “support 
conservation” on the basis that it is part of “a superior conception of what a truly 
worthwhile life is.” But a liberal can hold that the state is required to act on behalf on 
conservation on the basis that non-intervention “is not neutral amongst competing 
ideas of the good life, but in fact destructive of the very possibility of some of 
these.”99 If wildlife and nature are destroyed, the conception of the good which 
involves them will no longer be open to pursuit. Similarly, social practices have shut 
out the possibility of women’s pursuit of the good which men pursue on equal terms 
with men and eliminated the prospect of women pursuing the good that would be 
available to them if they were fully equal members of society.
99 Dworkin 1978, p. 141.
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It remains to prove the premise that the good life for women, which includes 
family and social goods, is closed off as an alternative by existing social 
arrangements. Some professional women can pay for good child-care and devote the 
same efforts to their careers as their male counterparts. But these cases are 
exceptional. Moreover, even these women are still systematically disadvantaged by 
perceptions of gender, often by an employer’s notion that a mother cannot devote 
herself to her career as a father can. Further, women who manage to combine both 
roles are assailed by guilt and public opprobrium for not dividing their time between 
children and career, which men routinely do without guilt or shame. Finally, no 
woman is able to live in a society in which women are not oppressed (except for 
female separatist communities). Women are excluded from political power, property 
ownership, the higher echelons of business and the professions. The good life for 
women is shut out as a possibility by the operation of social structures. To open 
up this possibility, the state must act on these institutions.
See Okin 1989, Chapter 7, and pp. 1-6.
CONCLUSION
Marriage is best defined as a relationship characterised by love, intimacy, and 
an element of formal recognition. In Part One, I discussed Kant’s and Hegel’s 
accounts o f the moral value of marriage. I argued that both accounts suffered from 
insurmountable internal inconsistencies, but that they suggested two different 
approaches to the moral value of marriage, which was the subject of Part Two. One 
approach to the moral value of marriage focuses on its institutional structure, that is, 
the contract and the exchange of rights and responsibilities which distinguish 
marriage. The second focuses on the nature of the relationship between the spouses.
I argued that moral value is found only in the love relationship typical of marriage, 
not the institutional structure, and that this value can exist outside legal or religious 
marriage. I argued that love is valuable within a universalist ethics because it 
promotes dispositions which conduce to the fulfilment of duty. Further, I argued that 
love is compatible with justice and is only of value in the context of justice. I also 
argued that the existence of the legal institution is justified as promoting this kind o f  
love relationship.
In Part Three, I argued for freedom of marriage contracting under the 
principle o f  liberal neutrality. But I also argued that liberal neutrality does allow 
restrictions on contract in order to eradicate serious gender inequalities which prevent 
women from equal opportunity to pursue their conceptions of the good. The 
strategy o f claiming that women are not free is not compatible with liberalism. But 
liberalism can accommodate feminist goals through the principle of equal opportunity. 
Nor, as I argued in the final chapter, does the liberal view of the individual as an 
autonomous contractor subvert feminist goals. A liberal feminism will be able to use 
the restructuring of marriage to further gender equality, and it will be able to use 
liberal ideals of autonomy and justice to achieve its goal of justice between the sexes.
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